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ABSTRACT 
The present study is concerned with the analysis of a 
piece of economic legislation - the Securities and Futures 
Commission Ordinance (SFC) of Hong Kong - within the 
theoretical framework of the theories of economic 
regulation, testing the legislation's stated objective of 
investor protection for the securities industry. 
Principally two sets of theories attempt to explain the 
impact of economic regulations. They are the ·Public 
Interest Theory" and the "Capture Theory". The former is 
largely of a normative nature. It stipulates that in case 
of market inefficiency economic regulations are enacted for 
protecting the interest of the general public. The Capture 
Theory states that economic regulations are enacted for 
interest groups rather than for the protection of the 
interest of the general public against the defects and 
inefficiencies of the market economy. George J. Stigler is 
the pioneer of the latter theory. Over the years his 
Capture Theory Model has been subject to rigorous analysis 
and expanded upon by economists such as C. Friedland, S. 
Peltzman, W. Gordan, R. Jackson etc. Stigler's original 
pessimistic stance that economic legislation is inefficient 
and ineffective in protecting the general public is 
- i -
gradually being modified and refined by J. Hirshleifer, L. 
Edwards and F Edwards, P. Spiller, J. Kalt and M. Zupan, D. 
Haddock and J. Macey and D. T. Llewellyn. A multi-
relationship model which consists of players like 
regulators, legislators, consumers and manufacturers 
gradually emerges. 
With both the central planned economies and market 
economies practising deregulation over the last decade, the 
Capture Theory Model is being further challenged because it 
could not explain fully regulation and at the same time, 
deregulation or re-regulation. D. T. Llewellyn points out 
that the usual Capture Model premise of "legislative versus 
legislative-free" environment does not hold for the UK 
Financial Services industries. The Capture Model which 
ignores the forces of the market intermediaries and 
professionals, may, therefore, not be an appropriate model 
for industries which the above mentioned interest groups 
play an important part in the regulatory process. K. J. 
Button, in examining the deregulation of the UK bus 
industry, suggests that Sharkey's "Winning Coalition" model 
which is based on the theory of cooperative games, may 
provide a more appropriate framework for analysis. 
In ascertaining the effectiveness of the SFC Ordinance 
in protecting the public interest the present researcher 
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employs the survey research method for collecting data from 
interest groups of the securities industry as well as from 
the general public. The collected data are used for testing 
three hypotheses. Each hypothesis tests the effectiveness 
of the SFC in discharging one of its major functions. 
Binary Choice Models are employed for ascertaining the 
likelihood that the general public is being protected by the 
legislation. The chi-square analysis is also employed for 
ascertaining the degree of confidence and the other 
characteristics of the collected data. 
The findings indicate that benefits of the SFC 
legislation, an economic legislation, are not all the time 
accrued to interest groups, as predicted by the Capture 
Theory. The general public does occasionally derive 
benefits from this legislation. However, it is also not 
correct to state that this economic legislation only bestows 
benefits on the general public, as predicted by the Public 
Interest theory. Interest groups also, at times, derive 
benefits from it. Both the Public Interest Theory and the 
Capture Theory are unable to explain fully the findings. It 
is further observed that the general public does behave like 
an interest group. The general public bids for the benefit 
of an economic legislation as though it is an interest group 
but, unlike an interest group, it offers negative 
"considerations" such as "not raising a public uproar" or 
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"refrain from supporting the other party". The regulator, 
the SFC, also behaves like an interest group. On the one 
hand it maximises support from the general public which 
would guarantee its future funding from the public but on 
the other it also solicits rewards from interest groups. 
The results also demonstrate that, when mutual interest 
prevails, interest groups (including the SFC and the general 
public) may join hands in bidding for legislative benefits. 
The results support neither the Public Interest Theory 
nor the Capture Theory. Both of them cannot fully explain 
the interaction among interest groups. As observed, it is 
more appropriate to consider each interest group as a player 
in a corporate game of manoeuvre. Players of this corporate 
game of manoevure are each holding stakes of a different 
nature and value. Sharkey's "winning coalition" model which 
is based on the theory of cooperative games seems to be 
providing a viable framework for such an analysis. These 
two sets of theory, however, do provide a useful framework 
from which the conduct of interest groups are analysed. 
Regulators and legislators, except for their occasional 
"shirking" behaviour, do act like any other interest group. 
In future, a corporate game model within which all parties 
to an economic legislation are players could be a more 
insightful way of looking at the behaviour of the general 
public, legislators, regulators and corporate bodies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the problem 
The present study is concerned with the analysis of the 
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION ORDINANCE of Hong Kong 
(Chapter 24 of the Laws of Hong Kong), within the 
theoretical framework of the theories of economic 
regulation, testing the legislation's stated objective of 
investor protection for the securities industry. 
Research of this nature is uncommon outside the USA and 
UK legislature and is unique in the Hong Kong environment. 
A variety of theories and hypotheses touch upon and are 
concerned with economic regulations. These theories are 
often advocating conflicting concepts and no consensus has 
yet emerged. However, 'the most widely adopted theories of 
regulation can usefully be divided into two broad groupings' 
1 First is the Public Interest Theory. This theory is 
composed of normative values devoid of rigorous analysis. 
It has dominated the thinking of economists for generations 
and there are still keen advocates of this theory today. 
1.p.489, The Antitrust Bulletin, Fall 1989, 'Economic theories of 
regulation and the regulation of the United Kingdom's bus indus-
try', Kenneth J Button. 
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The theory simply asserts that economic regulations are 
enacted for the protection of the 'general public'. It says 
that benefits from economic regulations would accrue to the 
general public and not to private individuals or groups. 
The second and more recent theory is the Capture Theory 
propounded by economist and Nobel laureate George J. 
Stigler. This theory asserts that economic regulations are 
'supplied' to economic groups simply as a form of commodity 
and that benefits derived from such economic regulations 
would be captured by them. 
The researcher, using primary data, attempts to test 
the hypothesis that the benefits from the Securities and 
Futures Commission Ordinance, an economic legislation, are 
captured by the general public. The alternative hypothesis 
is, of course, that legislative benefits are not captured by 
the general public. If such were the case, the researcher 
will attempt to ascertain whether benefits are captured 
exclusively by interest groups, as predicted under the 
Capture Theory or shared, either among interest groups or 
among interest groups and the general public. 
The importance of the study 
The research involves an analysis of the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC), an independent agency set up under 
2 
the Securities And Futures Commission Ordinance. The 
analysis focuses on the ability and effectiveness of the SFC 
in protecting private securities investors. The Public 
Interest theory and the Capture Theory are adopted as the 
guiding theories of this analysis. primary data relating to 
the effectiveness of the Securities and Futures Commission 
are collected through original empirical research. As the 
Public Interest Theory and the Capture Theory are advocating 
different concepts, at the conclusion of the analysis the 
acceptance of one may lead to the rejection of the other. 
However, there is a possibility that both theories are being 
rejected by empirical evidence i.e. the legislation provides 
benefits to interest groups and the public alike or it 
bestows benefits to none. The Capture Theory does not 
exclude the possibility that benefits of legislation are 
being shared among interest groups. 
The Capture Theory has been subject to rigorous 
analysis in the United States of America, based upon 
legislation of i.ndividual states. Only in a few instances 
are these theories applied to a non-USA legislature 1 and 
none to a non-USA and non-European legislature, such as the 
one conducted by the present researcher. The present 
1.Professor K J Button has written a paper on the 'Economic 
theory of regulation and the regulation of the United Kingdom's 
bus industry', The Antitrust Bulleton, Fall 1989. 
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analysis advances the understanding of the theories of 
economic regulation and tests their applicability in the 
present Hong Kong legislative and social environment. 
Findings from this research may be useful to economists, 
lawyers and legislators in understanding the nature of 
economic legislation in Hong Kong. Further, as Hong Kong 
will undergo dramatic political changes in 1997 when its 
sovereignty reverts back to China, research of this nature 
could form the base of comparative research in political 
economy. 
A critical evaluation of the present research problem 
Not every problem is appropriate for empirical studies, 
and not every human behaviour can be guided by knowledge 
obtained using scientific methods. A research problem, such 
as the present one, in addition to being empirically 
grounded, should also be clearly and specifically 
articulated. An appropriate research problem should possess 
these attributes 1. 
1. the problem is defined properly, is labelled and 
described accurately; 
2. the problem is posed in testable terms; 
3. the problem is connected logically to the environment 
1.p.19 Research Methodology & Business Decisions, John W. Buckley 
and others, National Association of Accountants, 1976. 
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from which it is drawn - and the solution can be applied 
within that environment; 
4. the problem has been screened against the existing body 
of knowledge to assure of its uniqueness, i.e., it has not 
been solved previously; 
5. the solution to the problem must be viewed as making a 
potential contribution to the body of knowledge, i.e., the 
problem must be material. 
The present research problem is able to fulfil the 
above five conditions. It has been properly defined, is 
solvable, is connected with the environment, has not been 
solved previously and its findings would make a contribution 
to the existing body of knowledge. 
Reasons for using the Securities and Futures Commission 
Ordinance for this research 
Most of Hong Kong's legislation is economic in nature. 
However, a piece of economic legislation, if adopted for use 
in the present research, should exhibit all or most of the 
following characteristics 
a) The legislation must be an economic legislation having 
material effects on clearly defined economic activities of 
Hong Kong. A piece of insignificant economic legislation 
would not attract the attention of interest groups. 
b) It is desirable for the chosen legislation to create or 
5 
formulate a regulatory system which exhibits some degree of 
similarity with that of the USA. The Capture Theory is 
developed by Stigler using the USA regulatory models and 
the Public Interest Theory is rooted in the western economic 
system. The investigation of a regulatory system using 
theories developed from a completely different economic and 
legislative environment may yield interesting results but 
may, at the same time, render comparison and generalization 
difficult and the conclusions inconclusive. Some degree of 
commonality is desirable. 
c) The Hong Kong regulatory agency created by the 
legislation must be generally known by both the public and 
interest groups. An unknown or relatively obscure 
regulatory agency may present difficulties to a researcher 
in collecting useful data. 
d) The legislation must have, as one of its main 
objectives, the protection of the interest of the general 
public. 
Having considered the above characteristics which 
should be exhibited by the targeted legislation the 
researcher is of the opinion that the Securities and Futures 
Commission Ordinance is the most appropriate legislation for 
the present analysis. The researcher forms the above 
opinion after considering the following. 
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a) The Hong Kong stock market, with a market 
capitalization of HK$ 2,240,547 millions in June 1994, is 
second in Asia after the Tokyo exchange. The SFC Ordinance 
is an important legislation affecting the Hong Kong 
securities industry. There is no doubt that this 
legislation has a material economic impact on Hong Kong as 
well as for other financial centres in the South East Asia 
region. 
b) Among the economic legislation of Hong Kong the SFC 
Ordinance is both unique and pioneering. For the first time 
in Hong Kong's regulatory history an independent agency 
(away from the government bureaucracy) is being set up for 
regulating economic activities. No other independent agency 
of this nature is currently being established in Hong Kong. 
The setting up of this independent agency, the Securities 
and Futures Commission, has brought the regulatory system of 
Hong Kong closer to those of the USA, the UK and other 
industrialized countries. 
c) Representations from 21 associations, 64 companies, 
26 individuals and 4 government departments were received 
before the securities review report was compiled. The 
subsequently drafted legislation had undergone full 
consultation with all market participants before it became 
7 
law 1. The intent, purposes and effects of the SFC 
Ordinance were well publicized to the people affected, i.e. 
the various interest groups and private investors. No other 
Hong Kong economic legislation has received such public 
attention. 
d) As mentioned before in subsection C the SFC 
Ordinance was drawn up following closely the recommendations 
of the Report of the Securities Review Committee of 1988. 
Members of the Securities Review Committee were appointed 
with the terms of reference of reviewing the work of the 
securities industry and specifically "to recommend what 
changes are desirable to ensure the integrity of the markets 
and to protect investors" 2 The SFC Ordinance is one of 
the few Ordinances in Hong Kong which specifically states as 
one of its objectives the protection of the public interest. 
Section 4 (e) of the Ordinance states that the SFC 
Commission is "to take all reasonable steps to safeguard the 
interests of persons dealing in securities or trading in 
futures contracts or entering into property investment 
arrangements". The unambiguous investor protection 
objective in the SFC Ordinance has rendered this piece of 
1.Appendix 3, The Report of the Securities Review Committee, 
1988. 
2.p.8 the Report of the Securities Review Commission, Hong Kong 
Government Press, 1988. 
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legislation the most appropriate law to be used in the 
present analysis. 
The research method employed 
After defining the research problem and identifying the 
economic legislation to be used the other equally important 
task for the researcher is to select an appropriate research 
method. Within the social science discipline, researchers 
are known to employ one of the three research methods - the 
archival research, survey research and experiments. 
Archival research is the systematic investigation of 
recorded information relating to a research problem with a 
view to acquiring insights, discovering relationships or 
forming opinion. Recorded information can be obtained from 
original documents or official files and records. A 
researcher who uses this information for his analysis is 
conducting a primary archival research. Alternatively a 
researcher may employ data which was previously collected 
and developed by other investigators. 
secondary archival research 1 
This is called 
Survey research is the process of obtaining information 
1.p.8 Business Research: Concepts and Practices, Robert F. 
Murdick, International Textbook Company Penn., 1966. 
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from a population or a sample of a population with a view to 
describing the characteristics, evaluating the effects of an 
action or obtaining explanations of certain behaviour of a 
population. Personal interviews and questionnaire responses 
are tools which are commonly employed for this research 
method. Most surveys have a central thesis of finding 
relationships among variables or the determination of the 
existence of patterns of relationships among variables 1 
Empirical data collected through surveys should either 
provide grounds for accepting or rejecting hypotheses 
originally set for the surveyor provide insights for 
research problems. 
An experiment based on social phenomena is not unlike 
any other experiment based on natural phenomena. The 
purpose of an experiment is to study a specific reaction or 
effect 2. It is the production of an effect which is the 
experiment and the object of the experiment is to determine 
what (if any) effect can be identified in the dependent 
variables as due to the treatment of the independent 
variables. One of the major differences between experiments 
of natural scientists and those of social scientists is that 
social scientists must interact with their subjects while 
1.p.2 survey and Opinion Research 
2.p.201 Survey and Opinion Research 
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natural scientists need not do so. 
As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, three methods 
are commonly employed by researchers of social science for 
collecting data --- experiments, archival research and 
survey research. Each method is evaluated in the coming 
paragraphs to ascertain their appropriateness for the 
present analysis. 
Experimentation is being used increasingly in social 
science researches. It is so because social science 
researchers are beginning to realize that under certain 
circumstances experimentation is most effective in obtaining 
dependable knowledge about social intervention 1 This 
research method is frequently employed by public sector 
researchers who wish to determine the potential effect of 
public policies. In the private sector marketing 
researchers also frequently employ this research method. In 
a social science experiment "one or more treatments 
(programs) are administered to some set of persons (or other 
units) drawn at random from a specified population; and that 
observations (or measurements) are made to learn how some 
relevant aspect of their behaviour following treatment 
differs from like behaviour on the part of an untreated or 
1.p. 24 Social Experimentation, H W Riecken & R F Boruch, 
Academic Press, Inc., 1974. 
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control group also drawn at random from the same population" 
1 An important aspect of a social science experiment is 
that of the 'programme' which is to be administered to the 
randomly selected group. A researcher could not employ this 
research method if he is constrained by his research 
environment from designing an effective programme. The 
second aspect of a successful experiment is that of the 
quality of the personnel administering the programme. Staff 
involved in the programme should be specially selected and 
trained 2. Further, the high cost of administering a social 
science experiment may also deter many researchers from 
using this technique. In the present analysis, the 
researcher is not adopting the experimentation method 
because 
a) An effective programme is almost impossible to 
devise. Basically the effect of an SFC action on the 
securities industry cannot be duplicated in a laboratory 
environment. Alternatively if field experimentation is 
used, it is difficult to isolate the effect of an SFC action 
from the control group. 
b) Because of the limited resources available to the 
researcher it is doubtful whether he could employ competent 
1.p.3 Social Experimentation, edited by H W Riecken & R F 
Borouch; Academic Press Inc., 1974. 
2.p.18 Social Experimentation, H W Riecken & R F Boruch, Academic 
Press, Inc., 1974. 
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and highly trained personnel for carrying out the 
experimentation. 
cl The cost of carrying out such an experiment may be 
so inhibitive that it is not reasonable for it to be funded 
by a private researcher who has limited support. 
For the second research method, the archival research, 
the researcher is of the opinion that this method cannot be 
employed; or, if being employed, this method will not 
produce unbiased and complete results. The researcher takes 
the following observations into consideration when arriving 
at this conclusion: 
al The SFC Ordinance has only been in place since May 
1989. Only limited data are available because of the short 
history of this legislation. 
bl The SFC Ordinance regulates financial services, the 
effectiveness of which could not be easily quantified or 
measured in monetary or physical terms, unlike similar 
analyses in the USA for utilities industries. 
cl Previous archival research in this area was mainly 
carried out by researchers in the USA. These researchers 
had the advantage of comparing data collected from States 
which are with and without a certain piece of economic 
legislation. Researchers from other countries, however, are 
not in such an advantageous position. Hong Kong is small 
and it has a homogeneous legislature. It would not be 
13 
possible to adopt a similar archival research method. 
The last research method, the survey method, is the 
most appropriate one to be employed for the present analysis 
given the present constraints. The researcher takes the 
following into consideration when he comes to this 
conclusion: 
a) The population relating to the securities industry 
has a high literacy rate, is receptive to answering 
questionnaires and is usually not afraid of giving honest 
opinion, if the research is conducted by a respectable body 
or person and anonymity is assured. 
b) This research method is more cost effective than 
other methods, given the resource constraint. 
The Survey 
Three surveys, each on an identified group, are 
conducted. The groups identified for the present analysis 
are a) private investors, b) professional investors and c) 
stock brokers. Private investors represent the interest of 
the investing public while the latter two are interest 
groups 1. The securities industry has other interest groups 
1.Haddock and Macey treat the general stockholders as an interest 
group, albeit weak interest group, in their analysis of insider 
trading laws, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, 
with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, vol.XXX(2) 
Journal of Law and Economics, Oct. 1987. 
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which are equally affected by the SFC Ordinance. However, 
for testing the effect of the legislation in investor 
protection it is only necessary to study the effect of the 
law on the general public and major interest groups. It is 
not necessary to repeat the analysis for all interest groups 
affected by the SFC Ordinance. The essential task for the 
researcher is to identify major interest groups which 
possess diverse interests, but not necessarily conflicting 
interests, in the legislation and to investigate the 
effectiveness of each in capturing legislative benefits. 
The present researcher is not alone in the selection of such 
groups for study. George A. Jarrell of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of the USA had used similar group types 
for his analysis of the deregulation of the New York Stock 
Exchange 1. Haddock and Macey (1987) also used such groups 
in their analysis of insider trading regulation of the USA 
2 
The interest of the general public is represented by 
the interest of individual private investors who deal in 
securities for their own accounts. They are members of the 
1.Changes at the Exchange 
Deregulation; George A Jarrell, 
vol.XXVII (October 1984) . 
The Causes and Effects of 
Journal of Law and Economics, 
2.Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an 
application to Insider Trading Regulation; Haddock & Macey, 
vol.XXX(2) , Journal of Law and Economics, October 1987. 
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'general public'. As observed by the securities Review 
Commission, these investors are not especially risk averse. 
They seldom possess the expert knowledge or the 
efficiency of professional investors and, as a group, are 
cohesively weak, with diffuse interests and, with the 
exception of a few consumer groups, are not likely to form 
themselves into an interest group for the bargaining of 
legislative benefits. Under the Capture Theory, private 
investors, as a group, lose out on capturing legislative 
benefits. However, under the Public Interest Theory, 
private investors (the general public) should always be the 
winners in capturing legislative benefits. 
Professional investors are firms or individuals 
(unlikely) who manage unit trusts, funds or portfolios of 
securities for fees and commissions. One of their most 
important duties is to "acquire information about a firm, an 
industry, or a group of firms or industries and to develop 
skills for evaluating the information they obtain" 2. In 
Hong Kong there are only about 35 firms of professional 
investors managing 497 unit trusts and funds which in total 
1.p.36 Report of the Securities Review Commission 1988. 
2.p.318 Journal of Law and Economics, October 1987, Regulation on 
Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an Application to Insider 
Trading Regulation, Haddock & Macey. 
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command an asset value of US$ 21,835 millions 1. Most of 
the assets of these trusts and funds, however, are not 
invested in Hong Kong. Professional investors, as a group, 
are extremely cohesive because of their small number. They 
possess a strong mutual interest of having a tightly 
regulated and highly efficient securities industry. They 
They are, in general, risk averse and dislike surprises. 
are likely to form themselves into a group for the 
bargaining of legislative benefits. The managers of unit 
trusts in Hong Kong have formed an association, the Hong 
Kong Unit Trust Association. In 1986, members of this 
association had accounted for 80% of the total turnover 
value in the Unified Exchange 2 leaving a mere 20% for 
local investors. This figure may have changed because of 
the passage of time but the economic bargaining power of 
this association is demonstrated. This association had 
made representation to the Securities Review Committee in 
1988 3 Under the Capture Theory, the benefits of the SFC 
Ordinance should be captured by this interest group. There 
are only 24 active professional investors (fund managers) 
dealing in the Hong Kong market. Because of the small 
1.p.4 The Hong Kong Unit Trust Yearbook 1992, The Hong Kong Unit 
Trust Association, published by Longman Group (Far East) Limited. 
2.p.6 Journal of the Chinese Manufacturers' Association, 1987 
second issue. 
3.Appendix 3, Report of the Securities Review Committee, 1988. 
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population size, their survey returns may not be 
statistically significant. However, because of their 
enormous importance in the Hong Kong securities market they 
are included as an interest group. 
Stock brokers are traders of securities dealing in the 
Unified Exchange. The Unified Exchange is the only 
authorized stock exchange in Hong Kong 1. It is operated by 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the Exchange 
Company) for its stock broker members. Members of the 
Exchange Company are a formidable group. They lobby 
actively for political and legislative benefits. There were 
520 members (stock brokers) in the Exchange Company in 1989 
and their number has grown to 854 by June 1994 2. The 
number of stock brokers, as compared with the number of 
professional investors, is much larger. Their association, 
the Hong Kong Stock Brokers Association Limited, is in 
theory less cohesive than the Hong Kong Unit Trust 
Association due to the larger population size of the former. 
The Hong Kong Stockbrokers Association Limited has also 
attempted to influence the legislative process by making 
representation to the Securities Review Committee in 1988 3 
1.s.27 Stock Exchange Unification Ordinance Cap.361. 
2.Member List, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, September 
1989, and 1994. 
3.Appendix 3, Report of the Securities Review Committee, 1988. 
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This group favours an unhindered market, lax legislative 
control and an unfettered trading environment. 
Objectives of the surveys 
Three surveys were conducted, each of an interest 
group. The central thesis of the three surveys is to 
evaluate the impacts of the SFC Ordinance on the three 
interest groups of professional investors, private investors 
and stock brokers. Dictated by its functions 1 the SFC 
Ordinance should have considerable impact on the following 
aspects of the securities industry : 
a) the enactment and enforcement of law relating to 
securities for the protection of investors; 
b) the supervision of market intermediaries (eg. stock 
brokers) and self regulated bodies (eg. the stock 
exchange), for the purpose of protecting investors ; 
c) the ensuring of the integrity of securities and 
securities dealings for the protection of investors. 
The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is an 
independent agency created by the Securities and Futures 
Commission Ordinance for discharging the function of 
investor protection. The effectiveness of the SFC Ordinance 
in protecting investors is reflected in the effectiveness of 
1.Section 4, SFC Ordinance. 
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the SFC, the independent agency. The effectiveness of the 
SFC is reflected in the ways in which it discharges its duty 
and exercises its powers. The three hypotheses are 
formulated so as to test the effectiveness of the SFC from a 
wide spectrum. In order to ensure that the present findings 
reflect accurately the effectiveness of the SFC all major 
functions of the SFC are within the scope of the present 
analysis. 
Arising out of the three functions are the three 
hypotheses formulated by the researcher to be tested in the 
present analysis: 
Hypothesis 1: That the Securities and Futures Commission 
has caused the making and enforcement of appropriate law and 
regulations for protecting the interest of the general 
public, i.e. private investors. 
Hypothesis 2: That the Securities and Futures Commission 
has adequately supervised the stock exchange, a self 
regulated body, for protecting the interest of the general 
public, i.e. private investors. 
Hypothesis 3: That the Securities and Futures Commission 
has adequately supervised listed companies and their 
management for protecting the interest of the general 
public, i.e. private investors. 
Sampling methods 
20 
Three surveys are conducted, each on an interest group, 
i.e. the private investor group which represents the 
interest of the general public, the professional investor 
group which represents the interest of funds operators and 
the stock broker group which represents the interest of 
securities dealers. Due to the difference in group size, 
different sampling methods are employed for each. For the 
private investor group, because of its very large group size 
the random sampling method is used. In order to avoid bias 
in the random sampling process, a good random sample should 
be drawn "either entirely at random, or at random subject to 
restrictions which, while improving the accuracy, are of 
such a nature that they do not introduce bias into the 
results" 1 In the present analysis, the sample is not 
selected at random from the population of Hong Kong because 
of the likely low response rate. Instead, the researcher 
requests 60 stock brokers each of whom to send five 
questionnaires to five of their clients. The stock brokers 
are asked specifically to send the questionnaires to the 
first five of their personal clients who they deal with on 
the day which they receive the questionnaires. They are the 
first five personal clients who come to or call the brokers' 
office for deals irrespective of their background or the 
1.p.10 Sampling Methods for Censuses and Surveys, 3rd Edition, 
Frank Yates, Charles Griffin & company Limited, 1971. 
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nature of their deals. A total of 300 questionnaires were 
sent. 
For the professional investor group, due to its small 
group size, the researcher is able to send questionnaires to 
all of them who maintain an office in Hong Kong. Those who 
do not maintain an office in Hong Kong are unlikely to be 
active in the Hong Kong securities market or to have a good 
understanding of the Hong Kong legislation affecting 
securities. A total of twenty four questionnaires were 
sent. The mailing list was compiled from the "Hong Kong 
Unit Trust Yearbook 1988" published by the Hong Kong Unit 
Trust Association. 
For the stock broker group, because its group size is 
not as small as the professional investor group or as large 
as the private investor group the researcher decides to use 
the systematic sampling method. Systematic sampling 
"consists of selecting every kth individual after the 
original individual is selected at random" 1. In this case 
the member list of the Unified Stock Exchange 1989 is used. 
Every second member on the list is selected, starting from 
the first member. Members who hold two or more seats are 
only sent questionnaires once. A total of 250 
1.p.348, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science, D. J. 
Palumbo, Meredith corporation 1969. 
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questionnaires were sent. Dormant members are not excluded 
from the mailing list. Their dormant status cannot create 
any bias in their responses to this questionnaire. 
Limitation due to population size 
Out of the three interest groups targeted for the 
present analysis, both the private investor group and the 
stock broker group have viable population size from which 
representative samples could be drawn. For the professional 
investor group, although it is included as an interest group 
due to its importance to the industry, the population size 
of this group (24 companies) is too small for sampling. 
Thus, all members of this group are sent questionnaires. 
Unless all or a substantial number of them responded to the 
questionnaire, the data from this group of investors should 
be treated with caution. Throughout this research, data 
collected from professional investors are treated with 
caution and are regarded as of persuasive importance only 
(i.e. of a supportive nature). The analysis is being 
carried out with stronger reference to the stock broker 
group representing an interest group and the private 
investor group representing the interest of the general 
public. 
End of Chapter 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONS 
In this chapter the economic theories of regulation are 
reviewed. Economic regulations may be in the form of 
legislation or rules. Legislation is written law enacted by 
the state. It is highly compulsory. Those in breach of the 
legislation may have to suffer punishments from the state. 
Rules are usually less compulsive. They are usually set by 
quasi-governmental bodies exercising the power vested upon 
them through legislation. Self-regulated bodies may also 
set informal codes of conduct which are more coercive by 
nature but are still compulsory for members of the industry 
regulated. However, both types of regulation may have 
important economic impact on society in general and the 
industries regulated in particular. 
Many generations of economists have studied the general 
economic impact of regulations. Theories explaining the 
rationale of regulation are, at times, philosophical 
arguments. In the late fifties and early sixties economists 
began to adopt an analytical approach to the study of the 
economic impact of regulation. This new approach gives rise 
to some unexpected findings which prompt economists to find 
new ways of explaining the impact of economic regulations. 
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The early theory adopts the 'public interest' argument. 
It says that economic regulations are enacted for the 
protection of the interest of the general public. Later, 
Stigler challenged this theory and put forward his Capture 
Theory. The Capture Theory, in essence, says that economic 
regulations are there to protect the interest of politically 
cohesive groups which in most cases are the industries 
themselves. Stigler published his paper, the "Theory of 
Economic Regulation", in 1971 1 
Before Stigler's publication in 1971, there were 
already several important publications on the empirical 
studies of the economic impact of regulations. These 
studies were mostly conducted by economists from the United 
States of America analyzing the economic impact of state 
economic legislation. These analyses are difficult to 
duplicate in other countries because the United States of 
America is one of the few countries in the world which is 
economically homogeneous but legislatively diverse. 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY 
The Public Interest Theory is derived from the concept 
of natural justice and natural law. These in turn are 
1.The Theory of Economic regulation. George J. Stigler, Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management science, V.3 1971. 
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derived partly from the 'concept of nature' of the 
Renaissance and partly from religious background 1. This 
set of highly conceptual moral standards has manifested 
itself in positive law because a set of natural laws would 
only consist of legal concepts devoid of any content. A set 
of derived positive law would, of course, embody in it the 
normative value of natural right and natural justice or 
simply - public interest. 
The concept of public interest is extremely vague. 
Bonbright says that "One is tempted to say that the so 
called standard of public interest is not a real standard at 
all; that, instead, it is a mere form of words of highly 
emotional content, invoked as an instrument of persuasion by 
people who have at heart much more immediate interests ... " 
2 However, he says that dismissing the concept of public 
interest or social welfare out of hand because of its 
undeterminable nature would go too far. He gives the 
following reasons for adopting the Public Interest Theory 
when writing his 'public utility rate theory' 3 These 
reasons can equally be applied in the present analysis when 
1.p.179 Max Weber, edited by J E H Eldridge, printed by Thomas 
Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1971. 
2.p.29 Principles of Public Utility Rates, J C Bonbright, 
Columbia University Press, 1961. 
3.p.29 ibid 
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adopting the Public Interest Theory 1 
1. "Public utility economics may usefully accept as 
"given" those basic conceptions of social welfare that 
prevail in the country and in the time period under review. 
At least in Western Europe and in the United States, this 
would mean, among other things, the identification of the 
public interest with the welfare of the people in the 
community or nation, the state being regarded merely as an 
instrument for the attainment of this welfare. 
2. The public utility economist is justified in going 
a long way toward the acceptance, as final for his 
restricted assignment , of widely held goals of economic 
policy that a social scientist or social philosopher might 
properly regard as subjects for intensive and critical 
analysis. An economist is under no obligation to present 
either an elaborate defense or an elaborate critique of the 
standard." 
The Public Interest Theory is given further support by 
a group of modern political scientists who collectively are 
called 'modern' or 'analytical' pluralists for they 
scientifically and analytically study the economic and 
1.p.29 Principles of Public Utility rates, J C Bonbright, 
Columbia University Press, 1961. 
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political action of interest groups in society 1 
Arthur F Bent1y, one of the most important modern 
pluralists, writes that group interests in society are the 
most basic elements for analysis. He thinks that only group 
interests would be an issue and individual interests are 
fictitious. The gains and losses to a single individual are 
immaterial. Groups would have a degree of power or pressure 
more or less equal to the number of members in that group. 
The larger, more general interest would defeat the smaller, 
more narrowly defined and more intense interest 2. He 
concedes that legislatures may at times work imperfectly 
favouring the more intense interest but eventually the more 
general interest would win out. 
Posner relegates the modern pluralists to the Capture 
Theory camp because they propose that regulation would only 
serve group interests 3 However, as stated in the 
previous paragraphs, these theorists also conclude that 
eventually the weaker larger interest will prevail over the 
smaller though more intense interest. Their thesis predicts 
1.p.118 The Logic of Collective Action, Olson M., Harvard 
University Press, 1965. 
2.p.121 The Logic of Collective Action, Olson M., Harvard 
University Press, 1965. 
3.p.341 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974 
VS. Theories of Economic Regulation, R A Posner. 
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that ultimately the public interest will be served. 
Conceptually the modern pluralists should belong to the 
Capture group but their ultimate conclusion (public interest 
will ultimately be served) put them squarely in the Public 
Interest group. 
The Public Interest Theory of regulation has been held 
by a succession of economists from the late nineteen century 
to the present day. This theory is largely of a normative 
nature. The theory says that markets may fail to operate 
efficiently. Such market failures may be caused by many 
factors such as monopoly, imperfect information, high set-up 
costs, etc. The departure from the socially ideal outcome 
has provided the rationale for legal intervention 1 Law in 
general and statute in particular are regarded by economists 
as being enacted for the correction of market 
imperfections. These imperfections are usually attributed 
to the market structure or the product nature of the 
industry. However, regulatory agencies now appreciate that 
market imperfections are industry unique. For example, 
market imperfections in the financial services industry are 
basically not caused by its market structure or its product 
nature but caused mainly by the inadequate and asymmetric 
I.Theory of Economic Regulation, R A Posner, Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 1974 VS. 
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information about its products, the potential principal-agent 
relationship and issues relating to conflict of interest and 
the fiduciary role of the financial institutions. With such 
diversity in market imperfections among industries it is now 
appreciated that legislative interventions for correcting 
these imperfections could, and should, come in many forms 
and guises. 
CAPTURE THEORY 
The Capture Theory states that economic regulations are 
there for the promotion of group interest rather than for 
the protection of the interest of the general public against 
the defects and inefficiencies of the market economy. In 
the words of George J. Stigler, " ... as a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefits. III Marxists are early supporters 
of this theory, arguing that capitalists capture all the 
benefits of economic regulations. The modern pluralists are 
more moderate in their stance, emphasizing the influence of 
interest groups when formulating government policies or 
enacting economic statutes. Some political scientists are 
more specific. They state that "0ver time regulatory 
agencies come to be dominated by the industries regulated" 
1.p.3 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971, V3, 
George J. Stigler. 
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1 
Stigler and Friedland, building on earlier work by 
political economists, published their paper which gave an 
account of the effects of regulations on the United States' 
electricity utility industry from 1907 to 1937. By 1937 the 
majority of states in the USA already had regulating 
agencies for electrical utilities 2 Data from unregulated 
states beyond 1937, they say, could not be used with 
confidence because by that time the threat of regulation was 
already latent in the unregulated states. They use the 
following model for their analysis : 
log P = a + b log U + clog Pf + dH + e log Y + fR, 
where 
p = average revenue per KWH, in cents; 
U = population in cities over 25,000 (in thousands); 
Pr = price of fuel (in dollars per BTU equivalent ton of 
bituminous coal); 
H = proportion of power from hydroelectric sources; 
Y = per capita state income, in dollars; 
R = dummy variable, 0 if an unregulated state, 1 a regulated 
1.p.341 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 1974, 
VS. Theories of Economic Regulation, Richard A Posner. 
2.p.1 - 16 The Journal of Law and Economics, V 5 1962, What can 
Regulators regulate? The Case of Electricity, George J. Stigler 
and Claire Friedland. 
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state. 
The model is put to rigorous analysis aiming at finding 
out the regression coefficient of the dummy variable 
representing regulation or by the difference in the 
coefficient of multiple determination including and 
excluding regulation. The results show that regulation can 
only provide explanation for about 2 % of the changes of 
average revenue per KWH and 1 % of the changes in output in 
1922. Similar results are obtained for the other years 
under study. They conclude that no effect of regulation can 
be found in the average level of rates paid by users of 
electrical utilities. 
Secondly, they examine the rate structure for finding 
out the possible influence of regulation. They expect that 
the numerous small consumers would be given lower rates than 
bulk consumers due to the political popularity of this 
policy (public interest theory?). However, they discover 
that the rate structure for domestic consumers seems to be 
independent and not regulation-related. They further test 
the average ratio of charges per KWH to domestic users as 
compared to charges to industrial users for the 1917 to 1937 
period. Again they could not find any economic effect of 
regulation for domestic users. However, commercial and 
industrial users seem to be enjoying slightly lower rate 
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levels during the period. 
Thirdly, they examine the effects of regulation on the 
return to stockholders. They find that there is a slight, 
though statistically insignificant, effect of regulation on 
market values of stocks of the utilities companies under 
investigation. 
Stigler and Friedland conclude that they are unable to 
find any significant regulatory effects on the electrical 
utilities industry of the United States during the period of 
study. They postulate that the ineffectiveness of 
regulation may be caused by two circumstances, the first 
being that the individual utility system had not been in 
possession of any large amount of long run monopoly power, 
and, the second being that the regulatory body was incapable 
(not unwilling) of forcing the utility to operate at a 
specified combination of output, price, and cost. 
Using the Stigler and Friedland technique, Raymond 
Jackson discovers that the data from the electrical 
utilities industry in the United States for the years ~940 
and 1950 are in line with the Stigler and Friedland 
findings. However his analysis reveals that in ~960, both 
consumer users and commercial and industrial users were 
having lower average rates with regulation than without it 
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1 
These studies indicate that regulation confers no short 
or medium term economic benefits to ordinary household 
consumers of electricity in the United States of America. 
However, industrial and commercial consumers do enjoy some 
benefits, in terms of lower rates, through regulation. Only 
after 45 years of regulation does economic regulation for 
electrical utilities show any appreciable effect of lowering 
rates paid by ordinary household consumers 2 
Other studies by economists on the telephone service in 
Michigan and local gas distributions in Baltimore also 
reveal that regulations for these industries do not lower 
rates for the general consumers. Regulations also fail to 
decrease the power of natural monopoly in these industries 
and may even have increased it 3. Moore uses a different 
technique in analyzing the price paid by consumers of 
electricity from 1952 to 1962. He calculates the estimated 
monopoly prices of the firms and compares them with actual 
prices for electricity paid by residential consumers. He 
1.p.156 The Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, Producer 
Protection and Government Regulation, William A Jordan. 
2.p.156 The Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, Producer 
Protection and Government Regulation, William A Gordan. 
3.p.160 - 163, the Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, Producer 
Protection and Government Regulation, William A Jordan. 
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concludes that regulation has reduced the prices of 
privately-owned electrical utilities by less than 5%. He is 
of the opinion that regulation has no or very little effect 
on price 1 
The analyses of the impact of economic regulations 
mentioned earlier do cast doubt upon the validity of the 
Public Interest Theory. However, these analyses do not in 
themselves propose or put forward any workable alternative 
hypothesis. 
In 1971, Stigler published his paper 'the Theory of 
Economic Regulation'. It is regarded by some economists as 
a pathbreaking article 2. The central thesis of his paper 
is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. 
Stigler says that those regulations, which are undoubtedly 
onerous on the industries, can also be explained by the same 
hypothesis which explains beneficial legislations. 
The first insight put forward by Stigler is that the 
state is a provider of economic benefits. These benefits 
1.p.156 the Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, Producer 
Protection and Government Regulation, William A Jordan. 
2.p.343 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974 
V5, Theories of Economic Regulation, R A Posner. 
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may only be provided upon the payment of prices. The price 
paid by the industry is in the form of votes and resources. 
Votes are for the continuing success of the politicians and 
their party and resources are for the reward of the persons 
who administer the party. 
The second insight is that, in general, industries 
would have a positive demand price (schedule) for the 
services of government. 
According to Stigler there are four types of benefits 
which a government may supply (at the right price) to the 
bidders of legislation. The direct provision of money 
subsidy is the first and the most obvious type of benefit. 
However, industries usually do not seek this favour unless 
the list of beneficiaries can be limited by an acceptable 
device. 
The second type of benefit which a government may 
confer upon an industry is the barrier of entry to the 
industry. Stigler proposes that every industry or 
occupation which has enough pOlitical power to utilize the 
government will seek to, through legislation or otherwise, 
control entry to its industry. Further, the regulatory 
policy will often be so fashioned as to retard the rate of 
growth of new firms. 
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The third type of benefits are those measures which 
affect substitutes and complements. For example, the butter 
producers would seek measures from the government to 
suppress margarine producers and encourage the production of 
bread. 
The fourth type of benefit is the fixing of prices for 
the products of the industry. Where there are no 
diseconomies of large scale for firms of the industry, price 
control is essential to achieve more than a competitive rate 
of return. For example, the prohibition of interest on 
demand deposits is one form of price fixing. 
In providing empirical evidence for his hypothesis 
Stigler analyses the economic effects of the regulation of 
the motor trucking industry in the United States during the 
thirties. The railroad industry was, at the time, the main 
competitor of motor trucking. One of the methods by which 
motor trucking was combatted during the period was the 
enactment of adverse state legislation against the motor 
trucking industry. He finds that the regulations on weight 
of trucks at that period were less onerous, the larger the 
truck population in farming, the less competitive were the 
trucks to railroads, and the better was the highway system. 
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Stigler recognizes that not every industry will have a 
significant demand for the service of the government. It is 
possible that for some industry the fortunes of its members 
would not be significantly enhanced even upon the enactment 
of favourable legislation. However, in general, he 
postulates that "most industries will have a positive demand 
price (schedule) for the services of government" 1 
Stigler says that the nature of the political system 
enables an industry to employ the political machinery to its 
own ends. Political decisions are made by representatives 
who, once in office, will have ample discretion of action, 
regardless of the interests of their constituents. Unlike a 
market decision, which involves only interested members of 
the society, a political decision, in theory, should involve 
all members of the community, irrespective of their interest 
in a certain issue. However, most issues concern a sector 
of the community only and the rest of the community is 
participating in a passive mode. In order to make a correct 
decision voters should acquire full knowledge for each 
issue; knowledge being a costly thing for the voters, most 
of them would have little incentive to acquire it. Most of 
the time voters are not as well informed as consumers in the 
1.p.10 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971 V3, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, George J Stigler. 
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market system because consumers in the market are being 
offered good monetary incentives for acquiring information. 
Due to the participation of uninformed or ill-informed 
voters the expressions of preferences in voting will be less 
precise than the expressions of preferences in the market 
place. That does not mean that legislators or voters' 
representatives will be able to supply to industries or 
interest groups any piece of legislation bidded for. There 
may be political issues which are of such importance to the 
general voters that the supply of legislation opposing such 
interest will put the representatives' political career in 
jeopardy. In such cases the representatives will have no 
benefits to supply to the bidders. This explains why some 
industries are not regulated. However it does not explain 
why some legislations are clearly onerous to the industry 
regulated. 
Stigler says that the bidders of regulations must be 
prepared to pay for the regulations in two ways, votes and 
resources. Votes to be rallied by the bidders to support 
the re-election of the representatives and resources to 
reward the politicians. Stigler suggests that much of the 
compensation to the legislative leaders takes the form of 
extra-political payments or simply bribes. 
In the paper Stigler uses the term 'cost of 
obtaining regulation' when referring to votes and resources 
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paid by bidders of state legislation to legislators or 
political parties. This concept of 'cost' may be extended 
to embrace the meaning of 'consideration' in the common law. 
'Consideration' as defined in law is "Some right, interest, 
profit or benefit accruing to the party, or some 
forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, 
suffered or undertaken by the other" 1. Consideration in 
this sense includes not just benefits received but also loss 
or forbearance to be undertaken by the bidders of 
regulation. Voters who refrain from causing an uproar or 
refrain from voting for other candidates are giving 
consideration to the legislator or politician. From this 
concept one may argue that for every law-making session 
there are at least two bidders 2. The first bid is from the 
general voters (some members of the industry to be regulated 
may also be general voters) and the other bid is from the 
industry to be regulated or some other interest group. 
Consideration from the general voters to the legislators is 
the 'prevention of voting for the other party or candidates' 
or 'prevention of a public uproar' or even 'public 
admiration of the legislators' righteousness' . 
1.Currie v. Misa (1875) 
2.Peltzman has already envisaged the multi-bidders situation and 
Peltzman and Stigler share the opinion that regUlatory agencies 
will not exclusively serve one economic interest. Peltzman: 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 1976. 
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Consideration from the industry, of course, will be votes 
and resources. If the consideration provided for by the 
general voters (general public) is sufficiently attractive, 
the industry will not be awarded any beneficial legislation 
and sometimes onerous legislations on the industry may even 
be enacted favouring the general voters. 
This very slight extension of Stigler's theory (by the 
present researcher) comfortably explains why many 
legislations are clearly onerous or harmful to the industry 
regulated. However the concerted effort of industries 
regulated and the sufficiently large number of uninformed or 
misinformed general voters render onerous legislations on 
industries a rarity. Stigler is pessimistic in his paper 
and writes in the concluding paragraph: ·Until the basic 
logic of political life is developed, reformers will be ill-
equipped to use the state for their reforms, and victims of 
the pervasive use of the state's support of special groups 
will be helpless to protect themselves.· 1 
At about the same time, in 1972, William A. Jordan 
published his paper, 'Producer Protection, Prior Market 
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation'. In the 
paper Jordan surveys the then existing literature on the 
1.p.18, Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science, 1971, V3, 
George J. Stigler. 
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economic impact of regulation. After assessing most of the 
available empirical evidence from various industries he 
concludes that "Overall, remarkably little of the available 
evidence suggests that consumers are protected by 
regulation. In contrast, the producer-protection hypothesis 
yields implications that, by and large, are consistent with 
what is found to have occurred as a result of regulation."l 
His conclusion is similar to Stigler's findings. 
Sam Peltzman, in his article published in 1976, adopts 
Stigler's Theory of Economic Regulation and subjects it to 
rigorous analysis 2. He uses the following model: 
M =n.f - (N - n) .h 
where 
n = number of potential voters in the beneficiary group 
f = (net) probability that a beneficiary will grant support 
N = total number of potential voters 
h = (net) probability that he who is taxed (every non-n) 
opposes. 
Peltzman's analysis yields the following findings: 
1. Even if a single economic interest receives all the 
1.p.151 the Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, Producer 
Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government 
Regulation, William A. Jordan. 
2.p.211 The Journal of Law and Economics, 1976 VXIX(2) Aug., 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Sam Peltzman. 
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benefits of regulation, it must be less than a perfect 
broker would obtain. The best organized cartel will yield 
less to the membership if the government organizes it than 
if it were organized privately. This is in line with 
Stigler's suggestion that the political process 
automatically admits powerful outsiders to the industry's 
councils. The regulatory agencies will not exclusively 
serve a single economic interest. 
2. Regulation will tend to be more heavily weighted towards 
"producer protection" in depressions and towards "consumer 
protection" in expansions. 
3. Government intervention and regulation are both normal 
goods. The income elasticity of producer protection ought 
to be less than that of consumer protection which makes for 
an increased consumer share of the total surplus as demand 
(income) increases. 
4. The tendency of regulation to change prices 
infrequently, sometimes called "regulatory lag," ought to be 
stronger when demand changes than when costs change. 
5. In a growing, technologically progressive industry, 
producer protection ought to yield to consumer protection 
over time, even if, on average, there is no effect. 
6. Elastic demand and economies of scale create a bias 
favourable to consumers. 
7. Regulation should reduce conventional measures of owner 
risk. By buffering the firm against demand and cost 
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changes, the variability of profits (and stock prices) 
should be lower than otherwise. To the extent that the cost 
and demand changes are economy-wide, regulation should 
reduce systematic as well as diversified risk. 
Jack Hirshleifer, in his comment on Peltzman's paper 1 
points out that there are two things wrong with taking the 
regulator's goal as majority maximization. Firstly, the 
regulators themselves constitute an interest group. They 
should, therefore, also be aiming at wealth maximization. 
If wealth is the ultimate goal, majority maximization can 
only be an instrumental and partial aim. The politician 
should be willing to accept some risk of defeat in exchange 
for a sufficient direct or indirect monetary payment. He 
also points out that Peltzman's identification of the 
regulator with the elected politicians is too radical a 
simplification. 
Secondly, Peltzman's economic approach to politics 
naturally tends to assume constitutionality, ie a set of 
prearranged rules to be adhered to by players. However, 
Hirshleifer points out that the highest and biggest game of 
all is non-constitutional politics. This biggest game of 
1.p.241 The Journal of Law and Economics, 1976 V XIX(2) Aug, 
Comment on Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Jack 
Hirshleifer. 
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social interaction is subject only to the law of nature. In 
this game there are no property rights, and the ultimate 
arbiter is the physical force of individuals or of the 
coalitions they can form. 
PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY REVISITED 
All is not lost for the Public Interest Theory. In 
1974, Edwards and Edwards publish their paper on the 
'Measuring the Effectiveness of Regulation: The Case of Bank 
Entry Regulation'. In their paper, they discuss two 
problems. These problems are generally ignored in studies 
of the impact of economic regulation but often undermine 
their results. They are: (1) the failure to take complete 
account of the indirect effects of regulation; and (2) the 
oversimplified treatment of the behaviour of regulators 1 
The earlier study by Peltzman of bank entry regulation is 
reviewed. Peltzman uses the following model: 
where: 
Et = the rate of formation of new banks in period t; 
Pt - 1 = the expected rate of return on invested capital in 
banking (adjusted for risk) in period t-1; 
1.p.445 Journal of Law and Economics, V XVII (2) Oct. 1974, 
Measuring the Effectiveness of Regulation: The case of Bank Entry 
Regulation, Linda N. Edwards and Franklin R. Edwards. 
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Zt =all variables (other than regulation and lagged expected 
profits) that determine entry (or capital formation) in 
period t; 
Rt = a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 in the 
unregulated period (1921 to 1935), and the value 1 in the 
regulated period (1936 to 1962). 
Peltzman estimates the value of k in this equation to 
be .57 which means that the rate of entry during the period 
of regulation is only about half as large as it would have 
been had there been no regulation. 
Edwards and Edwards argue that the value of k as 
estimated by Peltzman is erroneous. Firstly, the 
restriction on entry based upon the integrity of the 
financial statements will cause firms to report higher 
profits. This is one of the indirect effects. Given 
exactly the same economic performance for the industry 
during the two periods, the profit rate used in the equation 
during the period of entry restriction will be higher than 
the period of free entry. As a consequence, the model 
predicts too great a desired rate of bank formation during 
the period of regulation and causes the overestimation of k, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable. By ignoring the 
indirect effects of regulation on profit rate, Edwards and 
Edwards estimate that Peltzman has overstated the 
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restrictive effect of regulation by almost 45%. 
Secondly, Edwards and Edwards propose that bank 
regulators are themselves a group and are associated with 
maximization of their personal welfare. They incorporate 
this behaviour element to Peltzman's model and find out that 
this enhanced model causes an adjustment of Peltzman's 
results by 12%. Oversimplification of regulators' behaviour 
has again caused an overestimation of the effects of 
regulation. 
In conclusion they state that, by taking into account 
the indirect effects and the behaviour of regulators, the 
Public Interest Theory of regulation better explains the 
behaviour of bank regulators than does the Capture Theory of 
regulation. Their findings suggest that bank regulators 
permit more entry when the profits of existing banks rise 
which is consistent with the enhancement of the welfare of 
the public. 
Spiller, in his recent paper, 1 has given the 
regulators a special role in the 'interest group' theory of 
regulation. He proposes that the Capture Theory has 
1.p.65 Journal of Law and Economics, VXXXIII (1) Apr. 1990, 
Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-
Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed", 
Pablo T. Spiller. 
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oversimplified the relationship between politicians and 
regulators. The assumption that there is no necessary 
divergence between politicians' optimal policies (as 
responses to interest groups' demands) and their 
implementation may not be valid. Policies are seldom 
implemented by politicians themselves. Instead, they are 
delegated to regulators. The two may not have a 
convergence of interest. On many occasions the interests 
and wishes of the politicians may not be in line with those 
of the regulators. At times, both politicians and interest 
groups may have to compete for the regulators' favour, who 
themselves are maximizers of "interest". The politicians 
reward the regulators by increasing the budgets of the 
agencies while interest groups reward the regulators by 
giving favourable appointments to regulators after the 
regulators leave the agencies. 
Spiller presents an agency model in his paper, 
which Congress, the interest group and the regulator are the 
parties. In the model, Congress tries to influence the 
regulator through the regulator's budget. The budget for 
the regulator will be increased (a reward) for favours done 
to the politicians. The interest group also attempts to 
influence the regulator, in this case, through direct 
transfer of benefits, such as patronage appointment of the 
regulator after he is de-commissioned. The model is tested 
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by analyzing the determinants of the career path of 
bureaucrats. Thus, the probability of going to work 
(directly or indirectly) for the industry should correlate 
with the agency's budget during the regulator's last period 
at the agency. 
Spiller's model is tested against the data set composed 
of the career path of regulators for the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Civil Aeronautical Board and Federal 
Communications Commission and a measure of discretionary 
budgets. Among other things the results suggest that 
discretionary budgets and postagency employment at the 
regulated industry are negatively correlated. Increases in 
discretionary budgets seem to reduce the probability of 
going to work for the regulated industry after leaving the 
agency. The assumption that both Congress and the interest 
group are bidding for favours from regulators is apparently 
being given some support. 
The Public Interest Theory receives renewed attention 
with the publication of a number of recent studies which 
report that the personal ideologies of legislators matter a 
great deal in explaining particular cases of economic 
legislation and that the capture model does not do well in 
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these circumstances 1. Kalt and Zupan in their model about 
the ideological behaviour of legislators, test the 
hypothesis that ideology is just another good : as the price 
of "shirking" falls, shirking increases. Here, shirking 
means the deviating from the mandate of a politician's 
constituency by a politician for putting forward his 
viewpoints in a public issue. Kalt and Zupan try to trace 
the demand curve for shirking and, if it exists, to find out 
whether it is negatively sloped. 
Kalt and Zupan use the ADA (Americans for Democratic 
Action) rating, which reflect legislators' ideological 
leanings, to isolate the on-the-job ideological consumption 
by senators (the ideology residual). The ADA rating is 
thought to reflect the following : 
ADA rating = f (Constituents' Demographic-Economic 
Characteristics and Ideological Preferences) + Error 
= Fitted Rating + Senator-Specific Residual 
The senators' ADA ratings are broken down into two parts, a 
fitted part reflecting underlying constituents' interests 
and a senator-specific residual. The residual is a measure 
of the distance between a senator's actual positioning 
(voting) on a bundle of issues faced while in office and 
1.p.103 the Journal of Law and Economics V XXXIII(l) Apr. 1990, 
The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing For 
Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, Joseph P. Kalt 
and Mark A. Zupan. 
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where his constituents would like to have him be (prefer him 
to vote) . They represent the problem of on-the-job 
consumption by senators in a marginal cost-benefit 
framework. The marginal cost of shirking (MCS) is dependent 
upon the following : the costs of monitoring and retaliation 
of the constituent (M), the barrier to entry (B) and 
alternative sources of support of the senator (A). 
MCS = MCS(M, B, A, S) where S = level of senator's shirking. 
Increases in M, Band S will lower a senator's marginal cost 
of shirking. Rational politicians will equate marginal cost 
of shirking (MCS) to marginal benefit of shirking (MBS). 
Solving implicitly for the inverse of MBS yields a demand 
for shirking in term of MCS 
S = S(MCS, I) 
where I = the intensity of a senator's ideological 
preference. 
S = S(M, B, A, I) 
The hypotheses to be tested are SM' SB' SA' and SI > 0 
The ADA senatorial ratings in the ninety-fifth Congress 
(~977-78) are applied to the model. All the variables have 
signs that are consistent with the hypothesis that senators 
are rational ideological shirkers. Senators take more on-
the-job ideology when they are not subject to a re-election 
constraint; the higher is their committee power; the greater 
is their brandname capital; the more heterogeneous is their 
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electorate etc. 
This paper has attempted to illustrate the downward-
sloping demand curve for shirking and has collected 
empirical results supporting the hypothesis that politicians 
(legislators) do engage in on-the-job shirking. Such 
activities are not relevant to the wish or desire of their 
constituents (including interest groups) but are dependent 
on the legislators' personal ideological preferences. In 
other words, ideology matters and at times may surpass the 
interest of interest groups. This and other research in 
this area does cast doubt about the universal adaptability 
of the Capture Theory. 
In the UK the regulation of the financial services 
industry lends support to the public interest theory. In 
the last two decades, banks and building societies in the UK 
are under increasing legislative pressures. These 
legislative interventions are tilted in favour of consumers. 
Hall observes that in the UK "Support for the capture, as 
opposed to the public interest, theory of regulation is less 
easy to find in banking and building society regulation. ,,1 
First, to the dismay of banks, the UK clearing banks' 
1.p.169, Surveys in Monetary Economics, V.2, edited by C J Green 
& D T Llewellyn, "Financial Regulation in the UK: Deregulation or 
Regulation", by M J B Hall, Basil Blackwell Ltd., UK, 1991. 
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interest rate cartel was abolished in 1971. It was followed 
by further legislative intenventions in the financial 
services industry aiming at formalizing supervision in the 
industry. In 1982 a deposit protection scheme was forced 
upon the unwilling banking industry. A similar deposit 
protection system was forced upon the building societies in 
1987 which, at that time, was already operating a voluntary 
scheme. Moreover, in general, the UK banking and financial 
services industry has become more tightly regulated since. 
It is fair to conclude that for the UK financial services 
industry substantial legislative benefits have been bestowed 
on the general public through legislative interventions in 
recent years and that the Public Interest Theory apparently 
has, in this instance, been given support. 1 
ECONOMIC LEGISLATION ON FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
Most of the early analyses of economic regulation 
relate to utility industries. In the seventies and eighties 
several papers were published applying the theories of 
economic regulation to the financial services industry. 
Edwards and Edwards published their paper "Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Regulation the Case of Bank Entry 
1.p.170, Surveys in Monetary Economics, V.2, edited by C J Green 
& D T Llewellyn, "Financial Regulation in the UK: Regulation or 
Reregulation?" , by M J B Hall, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991. 
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Regulation"l in 1974. The content of this paper has already 
been discussed in previous paragraphs when Peltzman's model 
is discussed. Jarrell published a paper on "Change at 
the Exchange: The Cause and Effects of Deregulation" 2 The 
content of this paper will be discussed in the coming 
paragraphs when deregulation is discussed. In 1987, Haddock 
and Macey published a paper on "Regulation on Demand: A 
Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider 
Trading Regulation" 3. They argue that " ... while sanctions 
against some sorts of insider trading may be desirable, the 
insider trading laws are not motivated primarily by concerns 
for efficiency, nor are they mistaken" 4 They believe that 
the proper mode of analysis is to adopt the private interest 
model in a form elaborated by Peltzman for analyzing the 
action of the securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of 
the United States of America. 
In their analysis they recognize that two interest 
groups, insiders and stock market professionals, are 
1.vol.XVII(2) Journal of Law and Economics (Oct. 1974) 
2.Change at the Exchange: The causes and Effects of Deregulation, 
Gregg A. Jrrell, The Journal of Law and Economics, October 1984. 
3.Regulation on Demand: A private Interest Model, with an Appli-
cation to Insider Trading Regulation, by David D Haddock and 
Jonathan R. Macey, Journal of Law and Economics, October 1987. 
4.ibid. 
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rivalling for insider trading profits. Insider trading laws 
are a reflection of the heterogeneous interests of these 
diverse groups. According to the relative cohesiveness of 
interest groups, the profits of insider trading laws are 
sometimes reaped by insiders, sometimes by market 
professionals, rarely by stockholders and never by the 
general public. The policy options of the SEC can be 
represented by a curve called the "Policy selection 
opportunity" curve where every position of the SEC in this 
curve generates positive support and negative support from 
interest groups. The larger the potential benefits to be 
reaped by the agency's action the more an interest group can 
be expected to invest in influencing the agency. The curve 
may be in many dimensions and in various shapes. However, 
for the sake of simplicity, Haddock and Macey demonstrate 
the curve in a two dimensions round or oval shape manner. 
The SEC would not take a position inside the boundary of the 
curve because such a position would not maximize the 
benefits of both interest groups and it follows that the SEC 
would not be maximizing its political support. The SEC will 
select a point in the boundary where a tangent line can be 
drawn (point D in the diagram). In the case of a round 
curve, it will be at the point where the slope of the 
opportunity curve is minus forty-five degrees. At this 
point one more unit of support from one group is gained only 
by sacrificing a unit from another. At any other point the 
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To maximize its support, SEC uses its discretion to pick 
point D at the PSOF line. At D, another unit of support 
from one group is gained only by sacrificing a unit from 
the other. 
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SFC is not acting rationally as it is sacrificing more units 
of support than it is gaining. It follows that neither 
group is fully satisfied and both groups would have some 
complaints about the agency's action. The boundary curve 
may move outward if the cost for each group to generate 
support for the SEC decreases. The curve may also be 
flattened. Such instances would provide an opportunity for 
the SEC to give favours to one group which could give it 
more political support than it would have lost to the other 
rivaling group. 
Haddock and Macey use the model to explain the effect 
of the Chiarella Decision~. The court decided that there 
is no obligation to "disclose where the person who has 
traded on inside information was not [the corporation's] 
agent ... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom 
the sellers [of the securities) had placed their trust and 
confidence."2 A portion of the "policy selecting 
opportunity" curve is truncated by the court in favour of 
market professionals by the aforementioned decision. The 
SEC has to realign its position to maximize its political 
support. The model predicts and explains two phenomena. 
First, there is an increased willingness of the exchange to 
~.Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980). 
2.ibid 
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cooperate with the SEC to bring prosecution of insider 
trading. Indeed, more prosecutions of insiders have been 
brought. Second, after Chiarella, market professionals have 
reasons to lobby Congress for higher penalties against 
insider trading violations. This they obtained by joining 
the forces of market professionals and the more active 
private traders. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act was 
enacted on 1984. However, the more active traders would not 
agree that market professionals be immunized from insider 
trading penalties. 
Haddock and Macey contend that a Peltzmanian political 
support model is "an insightful way to examine the tradeoffs 
facing the SEC" and that the analysis accounts for the 
recent upsurge of activities against insiders and the 
passage of new legislation providing more onerous penalties 
for offending insiders. 
One noteworthy insight provided by Haddock and Macey is 
that interest groups may join together if they possess 
compelling mutual interest. This joining of hands is not 
the same as the merger of interest groups. These interest 
groups remain as separate entities and continue to exercise 
restraints against each other, as in the case of preventing 
market professionals from obtaining immunity from insider 
trading. This concept is similar to the concept of 'winning 
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coalition' put forward by Sharkey, which is discussed more 
fully later on in this chapter. 
CAPTURE THEORY IN RELATION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INDUSTRY 
As stated earlier Capture Theory apparently fails to 
explain fully the impact of an economic legislation on 
interest groups of the financial services industry. This 
failure may be attributable to the following factors. 
First, market imperfections of the financial services 
industry are unlike those of the utilities industry. In the 
utilities industry market imperfections are generally caused 
by the monopolistic or oligopolistic structure of the 
industry. These imperfections are manifested in the less 
than competitive product prices of the utilities. In the 
financial services industry, market imperfections are mainly 
caused by the sophisticated nature of its services and 
products. These imperfections are manifested in the problem 
of inadequate consumer information, the problem of asymetric 
information, the difficulty of ascertaining the quality of 
financial contracts at the point of purchase, the imprecise 
definition of products and contracts, the under-investment 
in information by consumers, agency costs and potential 
principal-agent problems, issues related to conflict of 
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interest, etc. 1 The major concern for consumers of 
financial services industry is, therefore, not with the 
prices of products and services but with the imprudent acts 
of the service providers. 2 While consumers of the utilities 
industry demand to be protected against monopolistic or 
oligopolictic product prices, consumers of the financial 
services industry demand to be protected against the 
imprudent acts or sub-standard services of service 
providers. With different consumer demands and market 
imperfections, the legislation and regulatory framework for 
each industry could well be different. Therefore, the 
correlative relationship between interest groups and 
legislative benefits, which the "Capture Theorists" observed 
in the utilities and the trucking industry, may not be found 
in the financial services industry. 
Second, "Capture Theorists" generally follow a 
polarized "legislative versus legislative-free (self-
regulatory)" model. The model adopts the premise that 
legislative intervention is the usual method for correcting 
market imperfections. The model does not entertain the 
1.p.2, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Spring 
1995, Regulation of Retail Investment Services, David T. 
Llewellyn. 
2.p.45, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 3 
No.1, Consumer Protection in Retail Investment Services: Protec-
tion Against What?, David T. Llewellyn. 
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eventuality that an industry is regulated partially by 
legislation and partially by practitioners (self-regulated) 
with built-in safeguards preventing interest groups (apart 
from the general public) from capturing legislative 
benefits. A polarized Capture Theory model could well be an 
appropriate model for the utilities industry which has few 
producers and no market intermediaries and practitioners. 
However, there are many firms and market intermediaries and 
practitioners in the financial services industry. The 
Capture Theory model, which ignores the forces of the market 
intermediaries and professionals, may, therefore, not be an 
adequate model for the financial services industry. 
Further, It is recognized that in the financial services 
industry lilt is never a question of either 'legislative 
regulation' (with no practitioner input) or exclusively 
self-regulation in the absence of any legislative framework. 
These are polar cases at the extremes of a spectrum and 
neither polar case is tenable. Always and everywhere 
regulation of financial services is a mix of legislation, 
and elements of practitioner-based regulation. IIl Devoid of 
the premise of polarization one may not be able to apply the 
Capture Theory model to the financial services industry to 
its fullest extent. 
1.p.4, Journal of financial Regulation and Compliance, Spring 
1995, Regulation of Retail Investment Services, David T. 
Llewellyn. 
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Third, the premise of competition among interest groups 
and the general public for legislative benefits - a basic 
premise of the Capture Theory model - may not be a correct 
premise for the financial services industry. Regulation of 
an industry may enhance the efficiency of the industry 
regulated. These extra benefits may come from a) the 
correction of market imperfections which reduce consumer 
welfare; b) the economies of scale which come from the 
collective authorisation and monitoring of firms by a single 
regulatory agency; and c) the confidence in minimum 
standards in the industry which reduces or eliminates the 
phenomenon associated with the "Akerlof's Lemons paradigm".l 
In some instances these benefits may be higher than the 
accounting costs due to regulation. Under the conditions 
that there are net legislative benefits and that interest 
groups and the general public are not worse-off due to 
regulation, interest groups and the general public could be 
sharing rather than competing for legislative benefits. If 
such were the case for the financial services industry the 
Capture Theory model, which assumes a competitive 
environment where each group is vying for the full share of 
the legislative benefits, may not be a satisfactory model. 
1.p.3, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Spring 
1995, "Regulation of Retail Investment Services, David T. LLewel-
lyn. 
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APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORIES TO DEREGULATION 
Both the Capture theory and the Public Interest theory 
attempt to explain the rationales behind economic 
regulations. However, from the seventies, there is an 
increasing trend of deregulation in many industries. Such a 
trend is more observable in the utilities industries and the 
financial services sector. 
Theorists generally suggest that deregulation would 
enhance efficiency. First, inefficiency generated from the 
imperfect competition of firms in the industry regulated 
would be curtailed. Second, dynamic inefficiencies such as 
low productivity growth, slow technological innovation, and 
the poor quality of management would also be reduced due to 
a more responsive environment. However, some writers, while 
recognizing inefficiency created by regulation, argued that 
deregulation would not create first-best outcomes because of 
the presence of the diseconomies of density, as in railroads 
and telecommunciations. 
Jarrell, in his paper 1, using the political support 
1. Changes at the Exchange: the Causes and Effects of 
Deregulation, Journal of Law and Economics, vol.XXVII(2) Oct. 
1984. 
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model of Stigler and Peltzman, tries to explain the 
phenomenon of deregulation in the US securities industry. 
Jarrell contends that the principles underlying the 
political support model explain regulation as well as 
deregulation. An agency, in this case the SEC, would 
abandon rate and entry regulation when the maximum political 
support generated from the upholding of the regulation falls 
below the potential support which would be generated by 
deregulation. Using the model Jarrell shows that the 
emergence of low-cost alternatives to block trading on the 
New York Stock Exchange and backward integration by 
institutional traders into brokerage business prove to be 
the forces behind deregulation. The model predicts that 
these two changes reduce the net demand for redistribution, 
in the form of regulation. The SEC responded by completely 
deregulating rates in 1975. 
However, the political support theory of Stigler and 
Peltzman apparently cannot provide convincing theoretical 
support for some instances of deregulation. K J Button 
examines the deregulation of the United Kingdom's Bus 
Industry in the current theories of economic regulation. 
This industry is selected because it has undergone a full 
cycle of legislative interference, from no regulation to 
regulation to deregulation. 
63 
The UK bus industry is characterized by monopolistic 
competition and until the late seventies was under strict 
legislative control. In 1978, major legislative reforms 
took place to liberalize both entry and fare control. 
Unlike the US securities industry, the UK bus industry has 
undergone no major changes in the nature of its market. The 
technology relating to the bus industry is unprogressive. 
The supply side of the industry remains unchanged while 
there may be a decline in the demand. The public interest 
theory does not seem to be able to explain the full 
regulation cycle experienced. The Capture Theory can do no 
better. Although deregulation in the seventies does benefit 
the operators afterwards, initially the operators opposed 
the reform and actively campaigned against it. 
The UK banking and financial services industry is 
another case in point. It has undergone a cycle of 
regulation, deregulation and reregulation. 1 However, unlike 
the UK bus industry the banking and financial services 
industry were subjected to substantial pressures before the 
start of the deregulation process. These pressures were 
"largely a response to competitive pressures and financial 
innovations rather than dramatic policy changes designed to 
1.p.168 Surveys in Monetary Economics, V.2, Edited by J Green & D 
T Llewellyn, "Financial Regulation in the UK: Deregulation or 
Reregulation?", by M J B Hall, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991. 
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force the pace of change".l Using Jarre1l's argument, the 
deregulation of the UK banking and financial services 
industries should be the outcome of a structural change of 
the market which, in turn, reduces the political support for 
regulations. However, Hall observes that, at the time of 
the deregulation, "new limits were placed on societies' 
(building societies) ability to diversify into new markets 
and to undertake new activities, and a new formalized 
supervisory framework was established".2 Hall calls this a 
"reregulation" of the industry. One is confronted with a 
dilemma when deregulation and reregulation take place at the 
same time. Jarrell's argument, which explains deregulation 
due to the lack of political supports for regulation, is 
unable to explain the concurrent occurance of the 
deregulation and reregulation process of the financial 
services industry. 
An alternative theory which can more completely explain 
both regulation and deregulation, and perhaps, reregulation, 
under this condition is required. Button suggests that the 
'winning coalition' theory of Sharkey does provide a more 
1.p.223, Surveys in Monetary Economics, V.2, edited by C J G 
Green & D T Llewellyn, "Structural Changes in the British 
Financial system, by D T Llewellyn, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991. 
2.p.166, Surveys in Monetary Economics, edited by C J Green & D T 
Llewllyn, "Financial Regulation in the UK: Deregulation or Rereg-
ulation?" , by M J B Hall, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991. 
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complete explanation 1. Sharkey's 'winning coalition' model 
is based on the theory of cooperative games. Given a set 
of players, a set of winning coalitions and a set of 
regulations, the game demonstrates the characteristics of 
the model. The model predicts that regulation is likely to 
occur in a condition in which the unregulated market can no 
longer be supported by a coalition which supports the status 
quo. The same applies to deregulation. The theory further 
predicts that consumers or other players who are temporary 
members of a coalition with the producers or firms may 
defect to another coalition excluding the producers or 
firms. This theory seems to be able to explain both public 
interest regulations and capture regulations. 
While regulatory reforms are still evolving and 
theorists are still arguing about the impetus behind the 
phenomenon of deregulation C Wins ton , using data from 
previous studies2 , conducts a comprehensive assessment of 
deregulation generally in the USA. In his paper he compares 
the quantitative predictions of previous regulatory reforms 
with the actual economic outcomes. His analysis reveals 
1.0utline of a Positive Theory of Regulation, W W Sharkey, 
Proceedings from the Tenth Annual Telecommunication Policy 
Research Conference, edited by Gandy & others, Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, N.J., USA, 1983. 
2.Winston, C., "Economic Deregulation Days of Reckoning for Mi-
croeconomists", Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXI (Septem-
ber 1993), pp.1263 - 1289. 
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that the predictions that deregulation leads to lower prices 
and significant welfare gains to consumers is generally 
correct. However, these benefits are not derived from the 
exploitation of labour or the sacrificing of profit from 
producers, as predicted by theorists. In fact producers 
usually gain from deregulation. These gains may come from 
the return of profits which had previously been dissipated 
" due to regulation or because the deregulation process has 
entailed higher efficiency. Both of these gains may more 
than compensate for the loss of the producers to consumers 
in the deregulation process. Winston estimates that there 
may be a 7 to 9 percent improvement of the GNP of the USA 
due to regulatory reforms. While Winston's analysis does 
not specifically address the theoretical divergence of the 
Public Interest Theory and Capture theory, it does confirm 
that deregulation bestows economic benefits to the public. 
Whether these benefits come from the producers or are due to 
higher efficiency accrued to the deregulation process is 
unclear. 
SUMMARY OF THE THEORIES 
The theory of economic regulation has undergone a 
thirty year development, from the early sixties when doubt 
was first cast upon the traditional public interest theory 
to the present. Using empirical findings from utilities, 
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financial and transport industries, Stigler and Peltzman 
derive their political support model. This model does 
provide a good explanation for the pro-producer economic 
legislation. However, soon after the development of the 
Stigler-Peltzman model researchers started to doubt the 
universal applicability of the model. The hypothesis that 
regulatory agencies, at times, seemed to have a life of 
their own, practicing ideological shirking at the expense of 
their supporters has been given some support. The model, 
however, cannot explain why economic regulation is only 
found in some sectors of the economy and not others. If the 
model applies, then, pro-producers legislation should be 
found evenly over the whole economy. Also, the model cannot 
adequately explain some obviously public-spirited 
legislation, especially the environmental protection 
legislation which sprang up in the eighties. With the 
current trend of deregulation and, perhaps, reregulation in 
many western economies, the model seems to be hopelessly 
inadequate. While the model can be stretched to explain 
some deregulation, in other instances, like the deregulation 
of the UK Bus industry and the deregulation and reregulation 
of the UK Financial Services Industry, the model fails. The 
"failure" of the Stigler-Peltzman model does not mean the 
demise of the Capture Theory or that the Public Interest 
Theory should be automatically accepted. Theorists are now 
trying hard to find a theory which can explain both the 
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public interest elements and the capture elements in economic 
legislation. The Winning Coalition theory of Sharkey which 
internalized interest groups seems to be providing a bridge. 
End of Chapter 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SECURITIES LEGISLATION OF HONG KONG 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF INVESTORS 
The securities industry of Hong Kong is regulated by 
common law and legislation. In recent years the investing 
public has demanded more and more securities legislation for 
their protection. This is due partly to the globalization of 
securities trading and partly to the growth in fraud-
related activities in securities. 
Investor protection has long been a policy of the Hong 
Kong government. In April 1962, the Companies Law Revision 
Committee for reviewing the law relating to corporations was 
given, inter alia, the following terms of reference : 
"To consider and make recommendations as to the 
revision of the Company Legislation of Hong Kong, and 
in particular to recommend as soon as possible whether 
legislation for prevention of fraud in relation to 
investments is required and if so, the form which it 
should take." 
The report, which was submitted in June 1971, 
recommended that dealers of securities and their 
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representatives be licensed, the separation of clients' and 
dealers' money, the regulation and supervision of stock 
exchanges, the introduction of compensation funds, the 
control of the publication of prospectuses inviting public 
subscription, the suppression of insider dealings, etc. 
This report was instrumental in the enactment of the first 
legislation regulating the securities industry - the 
Securities Ordinance of 1974. A new department in the 
Government, the Securities Commission, was duly set up for 
enforcing the new legislation and overseeing the activities 
of stock exchanges. The part of the Companies Ordinance 
which was concerned with the issuance of prospectuses in 
public offers was substantially amended. 
In 1981, anticipating that Hong Kong would be one of 
the world's centres for securities dealings, the Stock 
Exchange Unification Ordinance was enacted. This ordinance 
provided for the establishment of a single, unified stock 
exchange, replacing the four exchanges which were then 
operating independently of each other. The four exchanges 
were : Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Kam Ngan Stock Exchange, 
Far East Stock Exchange and the Kowloon Stock Exchange. In 
June 1986 the trading floors of the four exchanges were 
abolished. Instead, a new company, the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong Limited, was set up by members of the four 
exchanges for running a unified exchange in one single 
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premises. The four old exchange companies were subsequently 
wound up voluntarily. One year after the setting up of the 
Unified Exchange, a major worldwide financial crisis rocked 
the foundations of the securities industry of Hong Kong and 
elsewhere. 
THE DAVISON REPORT 
On 19 October, 1987, the New York stock market plunged 
a massive 22.6%. Other major markets followed suit. In 
Hong Kong, after a 11.3% fall on 19 October, both the stock 
exchange and the futures exchange were closed for 4 days by 
the management of these Exchanges. When the markets 
reopened on 26 October, the stock market dropped a massive 
33%. The event did not stop at the stock exchange. The 
futures exchange, which traded mainly in stock index futures 
(Hang Seng index), was the hardest hit. Many futures 
brokers were in default - unable to meet their obligations 
to their clients and fellow brokers. 
In order to maintain the confidence of investors in 
Hong Kong and/or possibly bowing to pressure from futures 
traders, the government decided to put together a rescue 
package which altogether amounted to HK$4 billion. All 
futures contracts were honoured either by the futures 
brokers or, if they were in default, by the rescue fund. 
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There was no massive default on the stock exchange; only a 
few brokers, who were also futures brokers, stopped trading. 
After the crisis, the integrity of the professionals in 
the securities industry and the modus operandi of the 
exchanges were called into question. In November 1987, the 
Governor of Hong Kong appointed a committee for carrying out 
a review of the securities industry. The committee was 
headed by I. H. Davison. The committee submitted its report 
in May 1988. The following is an analysis of the report. 
SALIENT POINTS OF THE REPORT 
1. Objectives of the Hong Kong securities markets 
The Report discussed at length the objectives of the 
securities markets of Hong Kong. It stated that "if Hong 
Kong harbours ambitions to be a regional or international 
market, it is necessary to go further by ensuring that its 
system caters for overseas investors and intermediaries, 
that its regulatory regime broadly satisfies prevailing 
international standards and that its markets develop in 
scope and depth." 1 "We believe that Hong Kong should aim 
to be the primary capital market for the south East Asian 
1.p.18 the report 
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· " reglon .... "In doing this, we adopted as our starting point 
the needs of Hong Kong as an international financial centre" 
1 This premise of aspiring to be the major, if not the 
first, regional financial centre is important as most of 
the recommendations found in the Report are with this 
undertone. The appropriateness of this basic assumption 
will be explored in later paragraphs. 
2. Summary of Findings 
a. The committee formed the view that the October 
market crash in Hong Kong was triggered by falls elsewhere. 
"Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that overseas 
investors were amongst the largest sellers in October. We 
accept that becoming a corner of the so-called "global 
marketplace" carries risks, but we believe October 
demonstrates that these probably cannot be avoided in any 
case." 2 Moreover, the futures market, which exacerbated 
the crisis, was exonerated. "We formed the view that, while 
the futures market had weaknesses which went beyond the lack 
of risk management controls, it could not be blamed for the 
crash, although it did undoubtedly severely complicate its 
1. p.13 the report 
2.p.25 The report 
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course because of the extraordinary level of defaults" 1 
b. The committee observed that the concept of self-
regulation and market self-discipline has failed to develop 
in Hong Kong. But it stated that "there is no alternative 
to practitioner-based regulation." "We do so because we 
wish above all to avoid the danger of straight-jacketting 
the securities markets by a strict statutory regime which 
might all too easily lead to insensitive or heavy handed 
over-regulation." 2 However, the Report promulgated checks 
and balances at every level of the system. There should be 
a two-tier system of supervision, with one single authority 
on top, as an ultimate regulator; and the exchanges, 
regulating their own affairs, keeping a watching brief over 
market participants. Against this background, the Report 
warned that regulatory controls can all too easily reach a 
state where they hamper rather than facilitate an efficient 
market. It urged regulators to be vigilant in keeping a 
proper balance between the benefits and costs of regulating. 
c. The committee further observed that an inside group 
has treated the stock exchange as a private club rather than 
a public utility. 
1.p.159 the Report 
2.p32 the Report 
It formed the view that the executive 
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staff of the HKSE were ineffective, lacking adequate 
knowledge and experience. The Report recommended that 
independent members be admitted to the governing board of 
the exchanges and the recruitment of independent, well-paid 
and qualified staff for the exchanges 1. It recommended 
that the SEHK be restructured, with membership tightened and 
that existing members be immediately retrained. 
d. Although prohibited by statute the committee noted 
that some forms of short selling were practiced in Hong 
Kong. The pros and cons of short selling were discussed, 
comparing it with similar activities in other major markets. 
The Report proposed that, with the necessary safeguards and 
regulations, short selling should be permitted 2 
e. The committee observed that the stock settlement 
system, based upon a 24-hour cycle, had failed to function 
properly. It proposed a rolling "T+3" system 3. The Report 
stated that Hong Kong should take active steps for 
developing a central clearing and settlement system, built 
on a system of uncertificated book-entry transfers 4 
1.p.35 the Report 
2.p.83 the Report 
3.p.111 the Report 
4.p.117, 123 the Report 
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f. The committee noted serious shortcomings in the 
listing arrangements. Responsibilities for vetting an 
application for listing were split among the exchange, the 
Securities Commission and the Registrar General. The Report 
proposed that the SEHK listing department be given the sole 
responsibility for vetting applications for listing provided 
that it is able to discharge such duties impartially and 
effectively. The Listing Department of the SEHK should be 
strengthened within 12 months of the publication of the 
Report. The exchange should review its policies towards the 
pricing of new shares and the practice of "listing through 
the back door" - the acquisition of non-active listed 
companies by unlisted companies to circumvent the listing 
requirements 1 
g. The committee observed that the surveillance of 
members of the SEHK was cursory. The exchange management 
had not introduced proper management and regulatory 
arrangements for monitoring its members. The Report stated 
that there is an urgent need for improving the SEHK 
surveillance activities towards its members. It recommended 
a system of tendering monthly returns, paying periodic 
inspection visits, early warning signals, large exposures 
1.p.BB - 90 the Report 
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reporting and exception trading reporting. It proposed that 
the regulatory authority should review the development of 
SEHK's surveillance arrangements within 12 months of its 
establishment. 
h. The committee observed that the tripartite structure 
of the futures trading system (ie the futures exchange, 
clearing house and guarantee corporation) had obstructed the 
development of an adequate risk management system. It 
stated that Hong Kong's unique experience of the October 
collapse was due to poor risk management and lax credit 
controls in the futures market at every level. It stated 
that the collapse was caused by an ineffective system 
rather than the inherent features of the HSI futures 
contract 1. The HSI contract should not be dropped on 
regulatory grounds provided that sufficient safeguards and 
risk management controls are in place to prevent a 
recurrence of the crash of 1987. The whole system of 
futures trading should be revamped. 
i. The committee observed that the Securities 
Commission was passive, inactive and without direction. The 
office of the Commissioner of Securities had become "too 
1.p.1S8 the Report 
78 
much of a registry and too little of a watchdog" 1 
GENERAL COMMENT ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT 
1. The Report has an underlying assumption that the Hong 
Kong securities market is aiming at becoming a regional or 
international market. Recommendations in the Report are 
being made with this basic premise in mind. While this is a 
perfectly logical and admirable aim, the Report has ignored 
the harsh political reality. 
After the signing of the "Joint Declarations" by the 
British and Chinese Governments in 1981, Hong Kong is 
destined to succumb to Chinese rule after 1997. Since the 
"Declaration", Hong Kong is suffering from a series of 
confidence crises. The crisis was further aggravated by the 
"Tien An Mun massacre" of June of 1989. Local interest in 
the securities market has been seriously undermined by the 
uncertainties in the political scene. In 1983, local 
pension funds invested 38% of their money in the Hong Kong 
securities market. In 1989, only 23% of the funds were 
invested in Hong Kong. As a common precaution, Hong Kong 
funds are now appointing emergency or alternative trustees. 
1.p.228 the Report 
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These are legal entities located offshore, which would, when 
the need arises, replace the Hong Kong-based trustees taking 
full responsibility of trust schemes 1 
Many financial institutions are now making preparations 
for moving all or a substantial portion of their operations 
from Hong Kong to other financial centres in the region. 
Such moves are prompted partly by the high cost of 
experienced personnel due to the mass exodus of experienced 
professionals to other countries and partly due to political 
risk. "Hong Kong's attraction as a regional financial 
centre is under serious threat and many banks have taken 
steps to reduce their reliance on the territory in case the 
political situation deteriorates". This is a statement made 
by the Chairman of the Foreign Bank Representatives' 
Association 2 
with the above scenario in place, it is unrealistic to 
assume that significant advancement could be made in 
internationalizing the Hong Kong securities market without 
at the same time improvement of the political atmosphere. 
The present aim, in the short and medium term, should be to 
retain and to revitalize the investment interest of the 
1.SCMP and Oriental Daily, 5/4/90 
2.SCMP 9/4/90 
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local populace; the majority of them are going to stay with 
Hong Kong for good or bad. 
For the longer term, say 10 years hence, since Hong 
Kong will become a part of China in 1997, it is essential to 
take steps in establishing Hong Kong as the leading 
financial centre of China. The Report had made a one 
sentence statement about this issue, "It might also be 
important to Hong Kong's role vis-a -vis China as it could 
fill a gap in China's financial infrastructure." 1 China's 
economy must improve in the coming years, either due to a 
change of government or due to the natural gyration of 
economic cycles. On a longer term basis, Hong Kong should 
be preparing to take on a leading role as the leading 
financial centre of China and also of the South East Asia 
region. Hong Kong is not without competitors. Already, 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (just north of the Hong Kong 
border) has established a securities market alongside one in 
Shanghai. The necessary legislation has already been 
enacted 2. Without firm policy from the government, Hong 
Kong may very well lose out in the long run. 
Of course Hong Kong should not shy away from the 
1.p.24 the Report 
2.March 1990, the Securities Journal, The Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Limited. 
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inevitable globalization of securities markets. 
Internationalization of investments cannot be resisted. 
However, the policy-makers should set as their primary goal 
the establishment of Hong Kong as the most important 
financial centre of China. 
2. The Report recognized the importance of free 
enterprising spirit in ensuring the success of Hong Kong as 
a financial centre 1 The Report further recognized the 
importance of self-regulated bodies in the securities system 
and believed that "there is no alternative to practitioner-
based regulation" 2 The Report also recognized that self-
regulation and market self-discipline had failed to develop 
in Hong Kong. With such importance attached to self-
regulation in the securities industry, the Report, however, 
devoted only a page in discussing this issue. It proposed 
that "On the development of codes of conduct for the 
protection of investors, ... trade associations such as the 
Hong Kong Stockbrokers Association should play a leading 
role." 3 Apart from such general comments, the Report 
failed to make any specific recommendations for the future 
development of these self-regulated bodies or to propose 
l.p.6 the Report 
2.p.32 the Report 
3.p.327 the Report 
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plans for these SR bodies to take over some of the 
regulating activities from regulators, now or in the future. 
Without a concerted effort from both the industry and 
the regulator, the further development of self-regulated 
bodies as supervising mechanisms may not take place. 
Definite policy regarding this issue must be stated and even 
law established to prompt the development of a practitioner-
based system. Without the simultaneous development of self-
regulation in the securities industry, the new regulatory 
body could not properly take on its role as a "watchdog"; 
and instead, must be contented with the role of a "blood 
hound" . 
3. The Report criticized the Office of the Commissioner of 
Securities for having "became too much of a registry and too 
little of a watchdog at a time when the reverse was needed." 
1 The Report further stated that the Commission was poorly 
funded, inadequately managed and not effective. The Report 
recommends the establishment of a new statutory body outside 
the civil service staffed with full-time professional staff 
to watch over the securities industry. The new regulating 
body, which will be assisted by an advisory committee, will 
be directly accountable to both the Governor and the 
1.p.228 the Report 
83 
Legislative Council. The government should not be 
represented on the board of this new body or its advisory 
committee. The new body will have a high degree of autonomy 
for its operation, with only a yearly sanction by the 
Legislative Council when it presents its budget for 
approval. 
Since this new body is vested with all the statutory 
power of regulation, it is important for it to steer a 
proper course. The Report stated that "Recent events in 
Hong Kong have in our view demonstrated beyond doubt that 
checks and balances are imperative at every level of the 
system. This fundamental principle underlies the structure 
we propose." 1 The Report stated that "If absolutely 
necessary it (the government) can overrule the SC (new body) 
- if need be by direction but preferably by sheer political 
authority." 2 While recognizing the importance of 
maintaining checks and balances at all levels, the Report, 
however, did not address the issue of checks and balances 
for the new regulator. The new regulator will be at the 
apex of the regulatory hierarchy. Leaving this powerful 
body, which can exert enormous influence on the securities 
industry, without external checks and balances is wholly 
1.p.34 the Report 
2.p.241 the Report 
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unsatisfactory. Political sanctions, if any, which may be 
exerted upon the new body, may be too weak, and come too 
late. 
SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE REPORT 
1. The first set of recommendations relates to the 
restructuring of the governing bodies of the stock exchange. 
The Report recommends that membership of the governing 
council of SEHK allows corporate representations. A small 
number of independent members from the public should be 
invited to be members of the council of SEHK for providing 
checks and balances to other members of the council. The 
number of such appointments is to be decided. A full-time, 
well paid chief executive should be appointed and the 
Chairman of the Council should devote a substantial 
proportion of his time to SEHK affairs. 
These recommendations are long overdue. Before the 
crash in 1987, the governing council of the SEHK did not 
allow corporate representatives to sit on its committee. As 
corporate members of the SEHK account for a growing portion 
of the trading volume in the exchange, it is unreasonable to 
bar them from managing the exchanges. 
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The Chairman of the Council is recommended to devote a 
substantial portion of his time to the management of SEHK. 
However, he will not be paid for his effort. This is 
unrealistic. The Chairman should also be remunerated for 
his effort if he is expected to take up full-time duties. 
2. The second set of recommendations relates to the 
management of the stock exchange and the training of its 
members. The Report recommends that the regulatory body 
screens and approves appointments of key management 
personnel. The duty of the chairman of the council should 
be externally orientated while the paid chief executive 
takes care of internal matters. The Listing Committee, 
Investigations Committee and Disciplinary Committee should 
all include non-SEHK members for ensuring public protection. 
Immediate steps should be taken to train members. 
These recommendations again provide checks and balances 
for the exchange. However, it is important that these 
checks and balances should not be indiscriminately exercised 
or unnecessarily onerous. In order that the exchange be 
able to properly discharge its function, either as a forum 
for raising capital or as a self-regulated body, it is 
important that interference by the regulators should be kept 
to a reasonable level. 
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3. The third set of recommendations relates to the 
operation of the stock market. The Report recommends that, 
with the necessary safeguards, short selling of stock and 
shares should be allowed. Listing procedures should be 
improved. Non-active listings should be delisted. 
These are overdue recommendations. Short selling of 
stocks and shares should already be allowed when the futures 
exchange launched its Hang Seng Index futures contracts in 
May 1986. Only in 1993 was "limited selling" allowed for 
the first time in the exchange. Disallowing short selling 
in the cash market while permitting "long" positions in the 
Heng Seng Index Futures is an anomaly. 
4. The fourth set of recommendations relates to the dealing 
system of the stock exchange. The Report recommends a T+3 
system for the settlement of scripts. The maximum period 
for completion of share transfers should be reduced to 14 
days or less before the central clearing system is 
introduced. Active steps should be taken to develop a 
central clearing and settlement system, building on a system 
of uncertificated book-entry transfers. This system should 
be supported by a central risk-taker. A guarantee should be 
provided by the clearing house substituting itself as a 
counterparty to broker trades. 
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These recommendations, in short, create a mega 
corporation, entrusting it with the functions of clearing, 
registration and the provision of credits. 
At present, the costs of clearing and settlement are 
borne by individual brokers who pass these costs on to 
customers in the form of commissions and charges. However, 
by world standards, commissions and charges relating to the 
dealing of securities in Hong Kong are comparatively low. 
One finds that the clearing and settlement procedures under 
the present system are efficient in terms of money cost. To 
establish a new mega corporation which embraces all clearing 
activities will involve economic as well as social costs:-
the economic costs of setting up and running this 
corporation and the social cost of allowing a monopoly 
situation to develop. Furthermore, unlike other overseas 
markets, most brokerage houses in Hong Kong are located 
within a walking distance of each other, in the Central 
District. 
The present recommendation of establishing a central 
clearing system is made without a careful analysis of the 
costs and benefits. The Report did not approach the issue 
with a sufficiently analytical approach. Without sufficient 
cost justifications, these recommendations are groundless 
and unconvincing unless the reduction of risk of default to 
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traders is paramount. 
5. The fifth set of recommendations relates to the 
restructuring of the HK Futures Exchange and the enhancement 
of its management. The Report recommends that the governing 
Board of the HKFE should be broadly based with independent 
members. The chief executive of the futures exchange should 
be of a high calibre. All dealers of the futures exchange 
should be rescreened. 
In view of the fact that the crisis in October 1987 was 
caused mainly by a defective trading system of the futures 
exchange, these are exceptionally mild recommendations. 
Since futures trading has high inherent risk it is 
reasonable for the authority to exercise a vigilant control 
over activities of the futures market to ensure the 
integrity of the market and its intermediaries. If the 
authority is incapable or unable to implement a system for 
reducing the risk of counterparty default by brokers and 
traders, futures trading should be discontinued. 
6. The sixth set of recommendations relates to the 
management of risks in the trading of futures. The Report 
recommends that the clearing house of the futures market 
should be a counterparty to every trade. Business risks of 
the clearing house should be assumed by a fund made up of 
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deposits from clearing members (risk creators). Further, 
this risk should be transferred externally to a banking 
syndicate or an insurance conglomerate or both. The 
clearing house should be allowed to call in extra funds from 
clearing members as the need arises. 
These recommendations are probably made bearing in mind 
the massive default of futures brokers during October 1987. 
The clearing house has the duty of ensuring that the 
proposed risk management system of the futures exchange 
could, at least, withstand a market crash (or upswing) of a 
magnitude similar to the one in October 1987. This is not 
an unreasonable requirement given the present political 
situation in Hong Kong. 
7. The seventh set of recommendations relates to the 
restructuring of the futures clearing house and the 
enhancement of dealing practices. The Report recommends the 
reviewing of the membership hierarchy of the Clearing House. 
A high confidence factor in setting margin levels should be 
adopted by the clearing house. Intra-day settlement should 
be introduced if volumes and open positions build up again. 
Brokers should be obliged to collect a "good faith" deposit 
before executing orders. The HKFE and its clearing house 
should set limits on gross open positions. 
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These are reasonable recommendations. 
8. The eighth set of recommendations relates to the 
supervision of futures firms. The Report recommends that 
the financial positions of each firm should be evaluated by 
the clearing house and HKFE every trading day. Large 
traders should be identified by name. An early warning 
system about the integrity of futures brokers should be 
implemented. Speculative position limits should be 
introduced. 
None of these recommendations are unduly burdensome in 
view of the risks associated with futures trading. 
9. The ninth set of recommendations relates to the 
creation of a new securities commission, its objectives and 
mode of operation. The Report recommends that a statutory 
body, apart from the civil services, should be established. 
This new body should be empowered with complete authority 
over the regulating of the securities industries and matters 
relating to investments. It will have authority to 
investigate and bring summary proceedings for statutory 
offences. It will have the responsibility of reporting 
annually to the Governor and submitting its annual budget to 
the Finance committee of the Legislative Council. 
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In view of the previous failure of the government to 
regulate the securities industry, it is only a matter of 
common sense that a new body, apart from the government, 
should be set up for taking over the duty of supervision of 
the securities industry. However, the Report fails to 
address the issue of checks and balances for this new body. 
This issue has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs 
under General Comments. 
10. The tenth set of recommendations relates to the 
regulation of intermediaries. The Report recommends the 
revision of the registration process of market 
intermediaries. The minimum capital requirements of dealers 
should be reviewed with a view to adequately reflecting 
risk-related capital needs. An early warning system of 
capital inadequacy should be introduced. Business conduct 
rules or codes should be developed to combat malpractice. 
Relating the capital of market intermediaries to their 
business (ie risk) is, in principle, a suggestion in the 
right direction. However, the volume of trade in securities 
markets varies greatly from day to day and from month to 
month. It is, therefore, difficult to come out with a 
workable formula for estimating the capital requirements for 
each market intermediary. Before one accepts the 
recommendation of developing an elaborate system of 
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calculating capital requirements, one should first examine 
the failure rates of market intermediaries, the adequacy of 
the present compensation funds and the viability of broker 
insurance. All these issues have not been adequately 
addressed in the Report. 
It is doubtful how far a business code, not supported 
by law, could improve the trading practices of 
intermediaries. Without the authority of the law the 
effectiveness of such a code depends, to a large extent, on 
the authority of the self regulated bodies enforcing its 
code. Already the committee has observed that Hong Kong has 
failed to develop authoritative self regulating bodies. 
11. The eleventh set of recommendations relates to the 
marketing and listing of securities. The Report recommends 
that all current legislation which touches upon and is 
concerned with the marketing of securities should be 
consolidated and rationalized. The vetting of prospectuses 
should be the sole responsibility of the SEHK. 
At present, prospectuses are scrutinized by no less 
than three bodies, i.e. the Company Registrar, the Office of 
the Commissioner of Securities and the listing department of 
the stock exchange. Such duplication of duties is totally 
unnecessary and wasteful. These are reasonable 
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recommendations. 
12. The twelfth set of recommendations relates to the 
continuing obligations of listed companies. The Report 
recommends that listed companies should be encouraged to 
disclose additional information besides that required under 
statutes. Material shareholdings should be disclosed. 
Directors dealing in shares of their own companies should be 
monitored and controlled. 
These are reasonable recommendations. However, one 
should note that the Companies Ordinance is at present under 
review. 
13. The last set of recommendations relates to 
miscellaneous issues. The Report recommends the revision of 
the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers. Margin trading should 
be regulated. The concept of insurance coverage for market 
intermediaries should be pursued further by both the 
exchanges and the new regulatory body. Steps should be 
taken to develop an effective debt market. SEHK and HKFE 
should be more closely coordinated for the exchange of 
information. 
For margin trading, the present practice of allowing 
each broker to make his own rule and accept his own risk 
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seems to work well. As long as the financial positions of 
intermediaries are properly monitored it may not be wise to 
implement rules which may hinder rather than facilitate 
business activities. 
OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION ORDINANCE 
(SFC) 
The Davison Report was published in May 1988. After 
the Report was published a year long consultation period 
ensued. The subsequently drafted legislation had undergone 
full consultation with all market participants. The intent, 
purposes and effects of the SFC Ordinance are well 
publicized among the people affected, i.e. the various 
interest groups and private investors. No other economic 
legislation in Hong Kong had received such pUblicity. 
The Securities And Futures Commission Ordinance [Cap. 
24] was enacted in May 1989. The short title of the 
Securities And Futures Commission Ordinance declares that 
the SFC Ordinance is to "establish the Securities And 
Futures Commission and to amend the law relating to dealing 
in securities and trading in futures contracts ... ". The 
Ordinance has, of course, to fulfil this aim. However, 
besides establishing the Securities And Futures Commission, 
the Securities And Futures Commission Ordinance also 
provides for additi~nal registration requirements for 
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registered persons, regulation of registered persons' 
business and special provisions relating to exchange 
companies and clearing houses. 
The Securities And Futures Commission Ordinance is the 
immediate outcome of the Davison Report. Chapter 9 of the 
Report together with Appendix 26 have laid down the exact 
form and power of the new statutory body. Other 
recommendations of the Davison Report, unless they are 
incidental to the establishment of the SFC, are not the 
immediate concern of the new legislation. The Ordinance is 
but a small step towards the full implementation of the 
Report. 
Part 2 of the SFC Ordinance provides for the 
establishment of the SFC Commission as suggested by the 
Report. Unfortunately the statute also took on the 
shortcomings of the Report. By design, the Commission is 
directly accountable to the Governor and indirectly 
accountable to the Finance committee of the Legislative 
Council - for the purpose of its annual funding. That being 
the case, the Commission is an autonomous body whose 
activities are largely unchecked, by either the civil 
services or by the general public. The Financial Secretary 
may, to some extent, influence the Commission by asking the 
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Commission to explain to him its policy 1. However, such 
influence may be too weak or too late. If, as suggested by 
the Report, the outgoings of the Commission are to be met 
mostly from levies on securities transactions, the control 
over the Commission by the Finance Committee may also turn 
out to be weak and ineffective. 
Part 3 provides for the establishment of a Securities 
And Futures Appeals Panel. This panel is empowered to deal 
with matters relating to the refusal, forfeiture, revocation 
or suspension of registration of registered persons. Other 
matters, such as the inappropriate exercise of power or the 
non exercise of power by the SFC, are not appealable. 
The jurisdiction of the Appeals Panel should be 
extended to embrace matters arising out of the exercise, or 
the non exercise of the power of the Commission. 
Part 4 stipulates additional registration requirements 
for registered persons and their agents. The onus of 
proving that a person is a proper person to be registered or 
continue to be registered as a registered person lies with 
the applicant or the registered person as the case may be 
rather than with the SFC, as in the past. 
1.s. 13 SFC Ordinance 
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Further, after prior consultation with the Financial 
Secretary, the Commission is empowered to lay down 
additional financial requirements for registered persons. 
This power of the SFC gives rise to uncertainties for 
registered persons because they could not be certain of the 
financial resources required for staying in the securities 
business. Given the contentious nature of this issue the 
financial resources requirements for registered persons 
should be stipulated in subsidiary legislation which, when 
changed, would invoke some form of legislative scrutiny. 
Part 5 is concerned with the supervision of registered 
persons. Under Part 5 the SFC is empowered to enter and 
seize records of a registered person without a court order. 
Further, SFC personnel may compel a person to answer 
questions relating to securities transactions. This power 
of demanding information has exceeded the power normally 
enjoyed by the civil services and is arousing concern from 
human right groups. The SFC has, so far, not been able to 
show causes for needing this power. Even if such power is 
granted to the SFC the exercise of such should be subject to 
external checks and balances. This part of the legislation 
should be amended to take away the sections offensive to 
human rights unless there are strong arguments for behaving 
otherwise. However, it is noted that similar powers are 
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held by supervisory authorities elsewhere, notably in United 
Kingdom (ie. in the Serious Fraud Office) . 
Under Part 5, the SFC is required to supervise the 
activities of registered persons. However, if a registered 
person is at the same time a member of the exchange he will 
be under dual supervision, from both the SFC and the 
exchange. The supervision activities of these two bodies 
are more likely than not to overlap. Valuable resources are 
wasted and such duplication of supervisory activities may 
even cause unnecessary disruptions to the business 
activities of registered persons. The legislation should 
make clear the duties of both the SFC and the exchange in 
supervising registered persons. 
Part 6 is concerned with the delegation of some of the 
duties of the SFC to the exchange. If the delegation of 
duties is properly performed the problems of overlapping 
supervisory activities may have been solved. Besides the 
delegation of duties the SFC may, under this section, 
regulate the management and operation of the exchange and 
the clearing houses. The SFC may even issue an order 
suspending some or all of the functions of the governing 
bodies of the exchanges and clearing houses. It is not 
expected that this power of the SFC will ever be used but 
the mere possession of such power will "persuade" the 
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exchanges and the clearing houses to be more co-operative 
than in the past. Before the October stock crash there were 
frequent allegations from corporate members of the exchanges 
that the senior management of the exchanges treat the 
exchanges as their own private club without regard to the 
interest of the public. These accusations may have arisen 
out of the conflict of interest among the factions in the 
exchanges. However, with the SFC acting now as a 
"watchdog", equipped with proper teeth, the exchanges should 
now more likely than not function like a public body more 
than in the past. 
Section 7 is concerned with the financing of the SFC. 
Although it is intended that the outgoings of the SFC be met 
by levies on securities transactions, the Ordinance still 
provides for the financing of the SFC from the general 
revenue of the Government. In Hong Kong charges incidental 
to securities dealings are still low in international terms. 
However, this competitive advantage may soon be eroded if 
there are no controls over the imposition of market levies. 
It is unrealistic to require the SFC to "earn" its own 
living but the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council 
should be allowed to restrict or impose conditions on the 
SFC for raising revenue through levies. 
Part 8 is concerned with minor issues of enforcing the 
100 
various provisions of the Ordinance and immunity from legal 
responsibilities for persons acting under the relevant 
Ordinance. 
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION ORDINANCE BY SECTIONS 
The following paragraphs give a section by section 
analysis of the Securities And Futures Commission Ordinance. 
Part 1 
Section 1: It contains the short title of the Ordinance. 
Sub-clause (2) states that the Ordinance will come into 
operation on a day to be appointed. The day appointed was 
13 April, 1989. 
Section 2 It contains the interpretations of certain 
words and expressions used in the Ordinance. Should the 
meanings of words not defined under this clause be called 
into question the Interpretation and General Clauses 
Ordinance may provide guidance. If the definitions 
contained in this Ordinance are in conflict with those 
provided by the Interpretation and General Clauses 
Ordinance, the definitions provided by this Ordinance shall 
prevail. 
Part 2 
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Section 3 It provides for the establishment of a body 
corporate known as the Securities And Futures Commission. 
This body is a legal entity capable of suing and of being 
sued and possesses a common seal. 
apart from the Government. 
It is a legal person 
This is to implement the recommendations found in 
paragraph 9.35 of the Report which requests the 
establishment of a new statutory body to assume the roles of 
the three regulatory bodies: the Securities Commission, the 
Commodities Trading Commission and the Office of the 
Commission of Securities. The Report observes that the 
remunerations offered under the civil services are 
unattractive to qualified professionals and there are 
constraints under the Government system. 
Section 4 This section states the functions of the 
Commission. The Commission is to uphold all law relating to 
securities, to report insider dealings to the Financial 
Secretary, to supervise investors in securities and 
properties, to promote integrity in the securities industry, 
to encourage the development of the futures market, to 
promote the development of self-regulatory bodies etc. 
Furthermore the Commission has the functions of protecting 
investors in other areas of investments as long as they are 
within the ambit of "property investment arrangement". 
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These provisions are the outcome of the recommendations in 
paragraph 9.66 of the Report. 
Section 5: This section stipulates the constitution of the 
Commission and, in addition, covers matters such as 
appointment, resignation and removal of directors of the 
Commission. 
The constitution of the Commission follows the 
recommendations in paragraphs 9.37 - 9.41 and 9.55 of the 
Report. All appointments and removals of directors of the 
Commission are to be made by the Governor. This is in line 
with the underlying principle that the Commission should be 
highly autonomous and not be accountable to the civil 
service. 
Section 6: This section provides for the establishment of 
committees to assist the Commission in the discharge of its 
duties. 
Section 7: This section allows the SFC to recruit staff on 
such terms and conditions as it may deem fit. 
This is to implement the suggestions in paragraphs 9.42 
- 9.48 of the Report. 
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Section 8: This section provides the SFC with the general 
power of holding land, to make contracts, to receive and 
expend moneys, to borrow money (with the consent of the 
Financial Secretary), to publish etc. 
Section 9 : This section provides for the delegation and 
sub-delegation of the Commission's functions. 
Section 10: This section provides for the establishment of 
an Advisory Committee. This Committee does not possess any 
executive function and is purely of an advisory nature, 
advising the Commission on any matter of policy. 
Members of the Committee are appointed by the Governor 
after consultation with the Commission. Two executive 
directors of the Commission may sit on the Committee. The 
Committee is not totally independent from the Commission and 
one may harbour doubts about the effectiveness of its advice 
to the Commission. 
Section 11 : This section enables the Governor to give 
policy directions to the Commission. This is in line with 
the recommendation made in paragraph 9.55 of the Report. 
Directors of the Commission are appointed by the 
Governor and he also has the power of issuing directives to 
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the Commission. This is an important check and balance 
mechanism for the Commission. AS one would expect the 
Governor's intervention will be infrequent. There are other 
indirect check and balance mechanisms such as the yearly 
funding exercise and the Financial Secretary's indirect 
intervention. These are provided for in other sections. 
Section 12: This section requires the Commission to 
prepare a yearly report on its activities and have the 
report sent to the Financial Secretary who will table it in 
the Legislative Council. This follows the recommendation 
made in paragraph 9.55 of the Report. 
This is another check and balance mechanism, albeit 
indirect and always belated. If the Council is not pleased 
with the work of the Commission, the most it could do is to 
withhold public funding. However, it is possible that a 
substantial part of the funding of the SFC could come from 
market levies. 
Section 13 This section requires the Commission to 
furnish to the Financial Secretary information on its 
policies as required. This check and balance mechanism is 
not found in the Report but is incorporated for the better 
accountability of the Commission. However, the SFC is only 
obliged to answer if asked. The effectiveness of this 
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section as a check and balance mechanism is relying very 
much on the vigilance of the Financial Secretary. 
Sections 14 - 16 These sections require the Commission to 
keep accounting records, audit the accounts and submit to 
the Governor for his approval a yearly budget which shall be 
tabled before the Legislative Council. The recommendation 
made in paragraph 9.58 of the Report stated "we recommend 
that the new SC Chairman should develop and submit its 
annual budget to the Finance Committee of the Legislative 
Council" . 
Section 17: This section allows the Commission to invest 
surplus funds in a manner approved of by the Financial 
Secretary. 
Part 3 
Section 18 This section provides for the establishment of 
an Appeals Panel. The panel consists of independent members 
appointed by the Governor. The Report suggests that "the 
new SC's determinations may need to be subject to appeal, 
although we would restrict this to really important matters 
(such as licence revocation) and would prefer that appeals 
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should be on procedures and not on merit" 1 
implements the suggestion. 
This provision 
However, the Ordinance does go further than the Report. 
Section 22 provides that the Tribunal hearing an appeal may, 
by way of a case stated, refer it to the Court of Appeal, 
for the Court's opinion on any question of law relating to 
the appeal. However, on the question of facts, there are no 
appellate procedures. In order to appeal to the High Court 
the appellant must obtain leave from the Tribunal. Section 
22 was not on the original bill. It was added because the 
public was concerned with the exercise of the power by the 
Commission 2 
Sections 19 - 21: These provisions deal with matters in 
relation to appealable issues, the hearing of appeals and 
proceedings regarding appeals. 
Section 22 This provision provides for appeals as 
discussed in section 18. 
Part 4 
1.p.251 the Report 
2.The bill was gazetted on 13 January, 1989 
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Sections 23 - 24 These sections introduce additional 
provisions relating to applications for registration and the 
furnishing of information under the Securities Ordinance and 
the Commodities Trading Ordinance. These sections implement 
paragraph 10.18 of the Report which suggests that applicants 
should demonstrate to the satisfaction of the authority that 
they are "fit and proper persons" to be registered. 
In the Securities Ordinance, it is up to the authority 
to demonstrate that an applicant is not a fit and proper 
person to be registered. An applicant will be automatically 
registered unless he is shown to be not "a fit and proper 
person". Under sections 23 - 24, the onus is shifted to the 
applicant. He is to prove himself to be a "fit and proper 
person" . 
Section 25 This section provides that persons registered 
under the Securities Ordinance and Commodities Trading 
Ordinance will continue to be so registered until revoked or 
suspended. This dispenses with the requirement of yearly 
renewal of registration. It implements the recommendations 
in paragraphs 10.25 and 10.26 of the Report. 
Section 26 : This section enables the Commission, when 
making enquiry about the misconduct of registered persons, 
to apply the criteria in section 23 (fit and proper etc.) 
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Section 27 This section requires registered persons to 
notify the Commission of the whereabouts of records legally 
required to be kept. The Commission may request the 
registered person to use an alternative venue for keeping 
records if a location is found unsuitable. 
For the purposes of investors' protection and revenue 
collection the Securities Ordinance requires registered 
persons to keep various records relating to their business. 
This section makes further requirements for the location of 
these records. 
Sections 28 - 29: These sections enable the Commission, 
after consultation with the Financial Secretary, to make 
rules requiring registered persons to maintain specified 
financial resources. The Commission may, if requested by 
any person to whom such rules apply, by direction adapt the 
rules to the circumstances of that person or his business. 
Paragraphs 10.42 - 10.64 of the Report discussed the 
financial requirements of registered persons. While the 
Report recognizes that the net worth requirements and the 
liquidity requirements of registered persons are not 
unreasonable when compared with other centres, they "do not 
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adequately reflect risk-related capital needs"l. In this 
respect, it recommends that the minimum capital requirements 
should be reviewed at an early stage and that the Commission 
should consider introducing a system of early notification 
for capital inadequacy. This section empowers the 
Commission to implement these recommendations. 
Part 5 
Section 30 This section enables the Commission to 
exercise certain supervisory powers over registered persons 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the various 
ordinances relating to securities are being complied with. 
The powers include the power to enter business premises and 
the power to inspect and make copies of records and the 
power to require the production of documents. 
This section implements Paragraphs 9.100 - 9.104 of the 
Report. The Report proposes that the "Initial 
investigations should be carried out by expert SC staff 
vested with appropriate powers". "The general duties of 
inspectors will include examining papers, documents and 
accounts and interviewing officers of the companies and 
others. If the facts of the case merit it, the inspectors 
1.p.277 the Report 
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may prepare evidence for subsequent prosecution or call for 
a further more closely focused investigation."l 
Section 30 aims at giving sufficient power to the 
Commission for carrying out investigations. This is one of 
the controversial sections in the Ordinance. In 
investigating complaints, investigators are vested with the 
power of entering premises of registered persons where 
records are kept without going through any judicial process. 
Normally a law enforcement agent may only enter and search 
premises after obtaining a search warrant from a magistrate. 
The legislators are making an exception for crimes committed 
under the SFC Ordinance or related ordinances. 
Sections 31 - 32: These sections enable the Commission to 
obtain information relating to the acquisition, disposal etc 
of securities and futures contracts. The information so 
demanded includes names and addresses of persons acquiring 
or disposing of securities. A person who, without cause, 
fails to comply with the disclosure order will commit an 
offence of contempt of court. 
The power provided by this section assists 
investigators. Without this provision, a person is not duty 
1.p.253 the Report 
111 
bound to divulge information concerning their clients or 
beneficiaries. 
Section 33: This section enables the Commission to conduct 
investigations concerning certain activities which are not 
in the interest of the investing public and are in breach of 
the SFC and other relating ordinances. Where an 
investigation is conducted, the person investigating is 
given powers to require certain persons to produce 
documents, to require from them explanations as regarding 
records and to require them to attend and truthfully answer 
questions relating to the matters. A person must answer 
questions put before him but is afforded protection in 
relation to self incrimination as the answers could not be 
used against him in legal proceedings. 
The kind of power which should be given to the 
Commission in relation to investigation is not specifically 
discussed in the Report. In the absence of specific 
recommendations, the legislators have armed the Commission 
with very extensive investigating powers. The right of 
maintaining silence is taken away from the investigatees. 
This is, of course, another controversial issue. With a few 
exceptions, the law of Hong Kong generally respects the 
right of an individual to maintain silence in the face of 
accusations or incriminating evidence. Faced with the 
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public's concern over this issue, the legislators amended 
the bill, allowing legal representation for the 
investigatees when attending investigations. 
When a person is convicted on a prosecution instituted 
as a result of an investigation under this section, the 
court may order that person to pay the whole or part of the 
costs or expenses of the investigation. This is altogether 
unusual for Hong Kong law. If the SFC mounts an all out 
investigation which results in a conviction for an offence 
of a technical nature, ego the non-registration of a dealer 
who deals in Hong Kong on overseas securities for overseas 
clients, the accused may be asked to pay millions of dollars 
in investigation fees because of the complicated nature of 
the business, although the fine for the offence may only 
amount to a few hundred dollars. 
Section 34: This section enables the Commission to make 
rules requiring any registered person to make annual returns 
to the Commission. 
Section 35: This section enables the Commission to request 
parties concerned to produce computerized information in a 
legible form. 
Section 36 This section enables a magistrate to issue a 
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warrant authorizing investigators to gain entry to premises 
for investigation under this Ordinance. The warrant may 
confer authority for searching, seizing and removing of any 
record or document. This section affects registered persons 
as well as non-registered persons. 
Section 30, which enables investigators from the SFC to 
enter and search premises without a warrant, only applies to 
business premises of registered persons. Section 36 applies 
generally to other premises and business premises of non-
registered persons. 
Section 37: This section makes it an offence to destroy or 
conceal any record relevant to an investigation. 
Section 38 This section provides that the powers 
conferred by sections 39, 40 or 41 are exercisable only 
where it appears to the Commission that the exercise of such 
power is desirable in the interest of the investing public, 
or that the registered person concerned is not a fit and 
proper person. 
Sections 39, 40 and 41 These sections enable the 
Commission, by notice in writing to a registered person, to 
restrict the registered person's business activities, 
restrict the registered person's ability in dealing with his 
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assets and require the registered person to maintain his 
assets. 
Sections 42, 43 and 44: These sections provide for the 
issuance, withdrawal, substitution and appeal etc of the 
prohibiting notice under sections 39, 40 or 41. 
Sections 45 - 46: These sections enable the Commission to 
petition the High Court for a receiving order or for the 
winding up of a registered person. 
Part 6 
Section 47: This section enables the Commission to request 
the Governor in Council to make transfer orders transferring 
certain functions of the Commission to the exchange company. 
These are functions relating to the registration and 
supervision of registered persons. 
Section 48: This section enables the Commission, the 
exchange companies and clearing houses to supply information 
to each other and empowers the Commission to require an 
exchange company or a clearing house to provide it with 
information. The supply of information under this section 
is protected against legal liability. 
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This section is to implement the recommendations in 
paragraph 13.57 of the Report which states that the senior 
management and surveillance staff of the two Exchanges and 
their respective clearing agencies should co-operate fully 
and there should not be any obstacles to a proper and full 
exchange of information. 
Section 49: This section instructs the exchanges to serve 
written notice on the Commission for their intention to 
close or reopen the exchanges other than in the ordinary 
course of business. 
No doubt, such a requirement for the exchanges 
originates from the much disputed closures of both exchanges 
in October 1987. At that time the Commissioner had no legal 
power to demand the reopening of the exchanges. The 
Commission's power to open or close the exchanges is now 
made available by section 50. 
paragraphs 9.97 - 10.00 of the Report deal with this 
matter. It says, "It should be better to place the 
Exchanges under an obligation to give the new SC prior 
notice of any intention to close (or reopen) a market. We 
would hope that, if it queried or disagreed with the 
proposed action, the new SC or the Administration would be 
able to use its authority to bring about a pause or 
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reversal" . 1 
Section 50: This section empowered the Commission, after 
prior consultation with the Financial Secretary and a prior 
request had been made to the institution concerned, to serve 
a restriction notice in the following circumstances 
a) to require an Exchange Company or Clearing House to 
amend, withdraw or revoke its memorandum or articles or 
association in a manner specified by the Commission or to 
take a course of action regarding the management, conduct or 
operation of its business; and 
b) to prohibit certain acts by an Exchange Company or 
Clearing House as regards such management or operation. 
This power is to implement the comment on paragraphs 
9.95 - 9.96 of the Report which says, "Most important are 
the powers the new SC will have to regulate the management 
and operation of the Exchanges and the Clearing House ... 
the watchdog (new SC) has to be able to act swiftly, 
decisively and, where necessary, with great force if 
problems develop in the Exchanges or with their members. ,,2 
Suggested powers for the Commission are listed in Appendix 
1.p.252 - 253 the Report 
2.p.251 - 252 the Report 
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26 of the Report. 
Section 51 This section empowers the commission to make 
suspension orders regarding the exercise of the functions of 
a Board of Directors or governing body of an exchange 
company or a clearing house, the functions of the members of 
such Board or body or a committee established by it, or the 
functions of the chief executive officer of an exchange 
company or a clearing house. 
This is an extension of the power under section 50. 
Instead of making an prohibition order, the Commission may 
issue a suspension order instead. 
Part 7 
Section 52: This section enables the Commission to impose 
a levy on every purchase or sale of securities recorded on 
the Unified Exchange or notified to it under its rules. The 
rate of the levy is specified by order of the Governor in 
Council as a percentage of the consideration. 
This section implements the recommendation in 
paragraphs 9.56 - 9.58 of the Report which says, "Linked to 
accountability is funding. We believe that the new SC 
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should be funded to a significant degree by the market". 1 
Section 53 This section provides for the financing of the 
operations of the Commission out of the general revenue of 
the government. 
This section makes provision for furtherance of the 
recommendations mentioned in section 52. 
Section 54 : This section enables the Commission to make 
rules providing for the payment to the Commission of fees 
and other charges. Fees and charges may be fixed at levels 
sufficient to effect the recovery of expenditure incurred, 
or likely to be incurred, by the Commission. 
This section makes provision for furtherance of the 
recommendations mentioned in section 52. 
Part 8 
Section 55: This section enables the Commission to apply 
to the High Court for an injunction order to restrain a 
registered person from breaching any of the rules or orders 
made under section 28 or 29 or under Part 5 of the 
1.p.239 the Report 
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Ordinance. 
Section 56 This section provides immunity from legal 
responsibilities for persons acting under the relevant 
Ordinances. 
Section 57 This section imposes legal liability to 
company directors who consent to a corporation committing an 
offence under the SFC Ordinance. 
Sections 58 - 59 These sections are concerned with the 
evidence and the preservation of secrecy relating to the 
enforcement of this Ordinance. 
End of Chapter 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter the research technique, the design of 
the present analysis and the method of carrying out the 
analysis are discussed. 
Reasons are provided in Chapter 1 ,the Introduction 
Chapter, for employing the survey research method for this 
research out of the three commonly used research methods, 
the experiment, the archival research and the survey 
research. Reasons have also been provided for conducting 
the survey with the three interest groups - the private 
investors, the professional investors and the stock brokers 
of the Unified Exchange. 
Selection of the Information-collecting technique 
The researcher is now required to make a decision as to 
which information-collecting technique is to be employed, 
the face-to-face interview method or the mail questionnaire 
technique. 
A review of past research in Public Interest Theory and 
Capture Theory is conducted with a view to finding helpful 
precedents which may help the researcher in deciding which 
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information-collecting technique is to be employed. However, 
the researcher is unable to find any precedent after an 
exhaustive study. 
After reviewing the constraints, inter alia the time 
and funding problems, faced by the researcher he is of the 
opinion that the mail questionnaire technique would be more 
appropriate for the present analysis. When employing the 
mail questionnaire technique: a) the time taken for 
conducting the survey would be shorter as all questionnaires 
are sent out at the same timei b) the manpower needs would 
be smaller as interviewers are not requiredi c) certain 
personal and financial questions, such as those requested in 
section 1 of the questionnaire, may be more accurately 
answered because of the anonymous nature of the responsesi 
and d) data collected could be more reliable because 
respondents would have ample time to give considered 
responses. 
The mail questionnaire technique for collecting 
information is often regarded as possessing certain 
drawbacks, among them the low response rate. However, when 
efficiency is defined as overall response rate and 
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completeness of response per unit, Backrack and Scobe 1 are 
of the opinion that a properly administered mail 
questionnaire could be as efficient as personal interviews 
in studies where the researchers believe, on reasonable 
grounds, that the universe they desire to sample is skewed 
away from the normal adult population distribution in the 
direction of higher social status/or higher income. In the 
present analysis, the recipients of the questionnaires are 
investors and stock brokers. Most of them should be in the 
higher income group and/or be of a higher social status. 
Another drawback for using the mail questionnaire 
technique is that only literate persons could respond. And 
even among literate persons, some, for example, white-collar 
workers, are more likely to reply than others. This issue 
would not cause difficulties for the present survey. 
Questionnaires are sent to investors and stock brokers. 
They are literate members of Hong Kong society. 
The Design of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed after an exhaustive 
study of the following materials --- literature relating to 
1. Stanley Backrack and Mary Scobe, "Mail Questionnaire 
Efficiency: Controlled Reduction of Non-responses." Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, Summer 1967, p.266. 
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economic regulations, the Report of the Hong Kong Companies 
Law Revision Committee 1971, the Report of the Securities 
Review Committee 1988, previous economic research 
questionnaires, and the SFC ordinance (Cap. 24). 
Personal interviews with market participants of the 
securities industry were also conducted to assist in the 
design of the questionnaire. The researcher conducted 
informal personal interviews with 5 private investors, 5 
stock brokers and 2 securities analysts for ascertaining the 
issues which might be helpful in solving the particular 
problem at hand. The materials assembled and opinions 
collected were studied carefully to determine the items 
which would be of the most importance and relevance. 
Questions were constructed with reference to these 
observations. 
The type, format and length of each question and of the 
questionnaire were given careful consideration. It was 
considered unwise to construct a questionnaire requiring 
more than 15 minutes to fill in or covering 10 or more pages 
1 The questionnaire was designed with these constraints in 
mind. Only short and simple sentences were used in the 
questionnaire. Questions which were too difficult for a 
1.Keith Howard and John A Sharp, The management of a Student 
Research project, Hants: Gower, 1983, p.138. 
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person possessing a minimum education 1 were discarded. 
Questions requiring considerable thinking or expert 
knowledge were also avoided. 
The design and pretesting of the questionnaire took 
several months. During that period, the researcher 
solicited and obtained an approval from the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic for sending the questionnaires under its name. 
The researcher hoped that the response rate would be higher 
if the name of an established institution was used. Apart 
from this the Hong Kong Polytechnic played no part in the 
research. 
The resultant questionnaire contained 6 sections, with 
35 questions covering 6 pages. The Likert scaling was used 
in Q.7 to Q.20 and Q.23 to Q.33, a total of 25 questions out 
of the 35 questions in the questionnaire. This scaling 
method is commonly used by researchers in questionnaires for 
measuring the attitude of respondents. A Likert scale 
requires respondents to indicate a degree of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement set by the surveyor 2. For 
the 25 questions using this scaling method, a five-point 
1.Hong Kong has adopted a system of providing a minimum of 9 
years' of compulsory education to each person of schooling age. 
2.Aker, D.A.& Days G.S., Marketing Research, 3rd edition, John 
Wiley & Son Inc., 1986, p.218. 
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scale was used. The respondents were asked to choose one 
among the "strongly agree", "agree", "neutral", "disagree" 
and "strongly disagree" headings. 
The Contents of the Ouestionnaire 
The main objective of the questionnaire is to ascertain 
the effectiveness of the SFC Ordinance in protecting the 
general public. An independent agency, the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC) , is incorporated by the SFC 
Ordinance for discharging the functions found in the 
legislation. The following are the functions of the SFC 
Ordinance to be discharged by the SFC. 
1. Law Making and Enforcing -- The SFC is required to 
consider and suggest reforms of the laws relating to 
securities, futures contracts and property investment 
arrangement 1 Further, it has the responsibility of 
ensuring compliance with the relevant Ordinances so far as 
they relate to securities, futures contracts and property 
investment arrangements 2 
2. Promotion of Self Regulation 
1.S.4(1) (f) SFC Ordinance. 
2. s. 4 (1) (b) SFC Ordinance. 
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The SFC is to promote 
and develop self-regulation by market bodies in securities 
and futures industries 1 
3. Regulation of the Stock Exchange and the Clearing Houses 
The SFC is to be responsible for supervising and 
monitoring the activities of the Exchange Companies and 
Clearing Houses 2 
4. Regulation of Market intermediaries -- The SFC is to 
promote and to ensure that the integrity of registered 
persons (stock brokers and their representatives) is 
maintained and to regulate registered persons' business 3 
5. Guarding the Interests of investors The SFC is to 
take all reasonable steps to safeguard the interests of 
persons dealing in securities or trading in futures 
contracts or entering into property investment arrangements 
4 
6. Regulation of Dealing Activities -- The SFC is to 
suppress illegal, dishonest and improper practices in 
1. s. 4 (1) (k) SFC Ordinance. 
2.s.4 (1) (d) SFC Ordinance. 
3.s.4(1) (h) SFC Ordinance; Part IV and V of SFC Ordinance. 
4.s.4(1) (e) SFC Ordinance. 
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securities, futures trading, property arrangements, and the 
provision of investment advice or other services relating to 
securities, futures contracts and property investment 
arrangements 1 
The questions in the questionnaire were designed to 
ascertain the effectiveness of the legislation in protecting 
the interest of the general public and of the interest 
groups. Effectiveness is measured by the level of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction accruing to each interest 
group due to the discharging of the functions stated in the 
SFC Ordinance. The researcher assumes that the higher the 
level of satisfaction enjoyed by an interest group, the more 
benefits it has enjoyed and vice versa. 
The Ouestionnaire -- the final version 
The final version of the questionnaire has a total of 
35 questions printed on 6 pages. Questions are grouped in 
six sections. Except for the GENERAL INFORMATION section, 
which deals with general background matters, other sections 
are designed to each cover a major function of the SFC. 
These sections are : 
1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
2. LAW AND REGULATIONS FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
1.S.4(1) (g) SFC Ordinance. 
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3. THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG 
4. STOCK BROKERS AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES 
5. LISTED COMPANIES 
6. SECURITIES DEALINGS 
Section 1 -- GENERAL INFORMATION 
This section aims at obtaining background information 
from respondents. Respondents are asked about the locality 
of their activities, local or both local and overseas (Q. 
1), years of experience (Q. 2), frequency of activities (Q. 
4), level of activities (Q. 5) and purpose of investment (Q. 
6). Question 3 is a control question. Respondents are 
asked in question 3 for whom they are investing in Hong 
Kong. Their responses should match the characteristics of 
the interest group they are belonging to. For example, if 
professional investors replied that they are investing for 
themselves only (not for their company) their questionnaire 
would be discarded. 
Section 2 -- LAW AND REGULATIONS FOR THE SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY 
This section aims at ascertaining the level of 
satisfaction accruing to each interest group relating to the 
law making and enforcement activities of the SFC. There are 
altogether 4 questions in this section. All questions in 
this section carry a 1 to 5 scale to be checked off by 
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respondents. A "1" represents a strong agreement with the 
statement while a "5" represents a strong disagreement. In 
between are the various levels of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction. Questions relating to the law governing 
the securities industry (Q. 7), vigilance in the enforcement 
of such law (Q. 8), the role which should be played by 
professional bodies in making rules and regulations for the 
securities industry (Q. 9, Q. 10) are all incorporated. 
Section 3 : THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG 
This section aims at ascertaining the level of 
satisfaction accruing to respondents regarding the 
supervision of the Exchange (Q. 12, Q. 17), the activities 
of the Exchange regarding new listings (Q. 14, Q. 15, Q. 16) 
and the insuring of stock brokers against their financial 
defaults (Q. 13). The activities of the Exchange are now 
under the strict guidance of the SFC 1 
Section 4 -- STOCK BROKERS AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES 
This section aims at ascertaining the level of 
satisfaction accruing to respondents relating to the 
regulation of stock brokers and other market intermediaries 
by the SFC. Capital adequacy of stock brokers is a cause of 
1.Part VI, SFC Ordinance. 
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concern among professional investors 1. A question on the 
capital adequacy of stock brokers is included (Q. 20). Two 
questions (Q. 21, Q. 19) about malpractice of stock brokers 
and two questions (Q. 18, Q. 19) about the services rendered 
by stock brokers are included in this section. 
Section 5 -- LISTED COMPANIES 
This section aims at ascertaining the level of 
satisfaction accruing to respondents in relation to the 
SFC's activities in supervising listed companies. Interests 
of investors are vested in listed companies. Seven 
questions about listed companies are incorporated. Four 
questions about disclosure of information by listed 
companies (Q. 23 - 26), one question about the discharge of 
duties by directors of listed companies (Q. 27), one 
question about the power of shareholders in approving major 
transactions (Q. 28) and one question about take-over 
activities are included. 
Section 6 -- SECURITIES DEALINGS 
This section aims at ascertaining the level of 
satisfaction accruing to respondents in relation to the 
suppression by the SFC of illegal, dishonourable or improper 
conduct in securities dealing. One question about margin 
1.p.275 the Report of the Securities Review Committee, 1988 
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trading (Q. 30), one about short selling (Q. 32), and two 
about commissions and charges are included (Q. 33, Q.34). 
The last two questions (Q. 34, Q. 35) are general questions 
asking for the respondents'general comments. 
Pretesting the Questionnaire 
The final version of the questionnaire was pretested 
before the bulk printing of the questionnaire. Five private 
investors and 40 securities professionals 1 were asked to 
respond to the questionnaire. Qf the 40 securities 
professionals, about three quarters of them are stock 
brokers and the rest executives in investment companies --
professional investors. Forty of the pretesters had a 
tertiary education while the rest were secondary school 
leavers. All respondents were able to complete the 
questionnaire within the time limit of 15 minutes. As a 
result of the pretesting, some questions were replaced and 
some rephrased. 
Statistical Analysis employed 
After the collection of data, the next important task 
is to subject the data to analysis using statistical methods 
1.The researcher was, at the time, a lecturer and subject leader 
of an educational programme jointly organised by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. and Hong Kong Polytechnic. 
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to estimate some property of the population that is sampled 
and to test the three formulated hypotheses. It is 
necessary to employ statistical methods because a survey 
conducted with a sample involves incomplete information 
about the population and, therefore, it is necessary for the 
researcher to ascertain the degree of confidence for the 
data collected. 
The researcher uses two unrelated statistical 
techniques for analyzing his empirical data. The first and 
more important technique, binary choice modelling, is 
employed to test the three hypotheses stipulated in chapter 
one. The second technique, the chi-square statistical 
method, is employed to find out the other characteristics of 
the data collected. 
Binary choice modelling 
'Binary-choice models assume that individuals are faced 
with a choice between two alternatives and that the choice 
they make depends on the characteristics of the 
individuals,1. 
Assuming one has the information from a representative 
1.p.274 Econometric Models and Economic forecasts, Second Edi-
tion, R S Pindyck & D L Rubinfeld, McGraw-Hill Book Company 1981. 
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group of persons about the choice made by each person of the 
group and the attributes which affect each in the making of 
their choices, then one could estimate an equation which 
could make prediction about the behaviour of an individual 
not in the group. The usual regression analysis technique 
is employed. In the present analysis the researcher is 
building a model which estimates the 'supportiveness' of the 
SFC by private investors and interest groups. 
Binary models of the same nature are employed in 
testing all the hypotheses. Each hypothesis has a group of 
questions in the questionnaire for testing the effectiveness 
of the SFC in discharging one of its major functions. Most 
of the responses to the questions in the questionnaire are 
in fact dichotomous in nature. The responses can be 
simplified into 'yes' or 'no' categories, or following the 
terms used in the questionnaire, 'agree' or 'disagree'. A 
'Yes' indicates support for the SFC and a 'No' no support 
for the SFC. When a variable is dichotomous in nature one 
may represent it as the dummy variable or the dependent 
variable in the binary-choice model. The attributes, the 
independent variables, are not required to be dichotomous in 
nature. The objective of the model is to estimate the 
likelihood that an individual will support or not support 
the SFC. Once the equation is estimated and the 
coefficients of the independent variables are calculated, 
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the likelihood of a person supporting the SFC can be 
estimated. In the present analysis, a fictitious respondent 
who is the 'Mr. Average' is invented. This 'Mr. Average' 
takes on averages of all the responses of that sample as his 
responses. These 'averages' are fed into the model to 
estimate the likelihood of 'Mr. Average' supporting the SFC, 
expressing it in a probability ratio of between 0 and 1. 
The probability of 'Mr. Average' for the private investors 
group may be compared with the probability of 'Mr. Average' 
for interest groups and the group which has the higher 
likelihood of supporting the SFC will be the group deriving 
higher satisfaction from the SFC. 
For models involving dichotomous response variables, 
there are three commonly used approaches for formulating 
such models 1. These are: 
1. The linear probability model, 
2. The logit model (non-linear), 
3. The probit model (non-linear). 
It is vital for the researcher in any statistical 
analysis to specify the correct model. Statistical 
inference made from an analysis would be doubtful or even 
1.p.468,Basic Econometrics, Second Edition, D N Gujarati, McGraw 
Hill, 1988. 
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meaningless if an incorrect model is specified. There are 
two different aspects to specifications 1. The first 
concerns the specification of the correct set of variables 
in the model and the correct ascertainment of their 
interdependency. This is done from the outset when 
reviewing the literature and designing the research. The 
second, which is the more immediate concern of this section, 
is to decide whether to use linear or non-linear probability 
modelling. The problem with the linear probability model is 
that the independent variables in the function are used to 
approximate a probability number. For the case of 
dichotomous dependent or dummy variables in the model the 
assumption of linear relationship may be incorrect. If the 
linear probability model is used the dependent variable, 
which is calculated as a probability of an event happening, 
may exceed 1 or be less than O. Probabilities not 
satisfying the 0 to 1 constraint cause difficulty in 
interpretation. Such an anomaly occurs because while the 
dependent variable is assumed to be dichotomous the 
independent variables are assumed to be continuous. For the 
present analysis, the dependent variables are dichotomous in 
nature while the independent variables are assumed to be 
continuous, although following a Likert Scale of 5. Because 
of the foregoing reasons non-linear logit and probit 
l.p.31, Linear Probility, Logit, and Probit Models, J H Aldrich & 
F D Nelson, Sage Publications 1984. 
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probability models are used instead of the linear 
probability model. 
The Probit and Logit Models 
To overcome the difficulties mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, it is necessary to translate the values of the 
independent variables, which may range from 1 to 5 in the 
present analysis, to a probability which ranges in value 
from 0 to 1. The use of the cumulative distributive 
function (CDF) will provide such a transformation 1. The 
CDFs which are commonly chosen to represent the 0 - 1 
response model are (1) the logistic and (2) the normal, the 
former giving rise to the LOGIT and the latter to the PROBIT 
(or normit) model. In the case of the Logit model, the 
original regression form of the linear probability model of 
Pi = Beta1 + Beta2Xi 
where Xi = value of the independent variable 
P1 = 0 or 1 , 0 for support of the SFC while 1 for 
non-support is now transformed to the following, using the 
cumulative probability function 
Pi = 1 / 1 + e-(Beta1 + Beta2Xi) 
1.p.280 Econometric Models and Economic forecasts, R S Pindyck & 
D L Rubinfeld, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981. 
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or Pi = 1 I 1 + e- Zi 
and the odds ratio of P = Pi I 1 - Pi 
= 1 + e Zi I 1 + e- Zi = e Zi 
and taking the natural log of the above formula one 
has 
= Beta1 + Beta2Xi 
L is the Logit and hence the Logit model. 
The Logit model exhibits the following features 1 
1. As P goes from 0 to 1, the Logit goes from 
-infinity to +infinity. Although the probabilities lie 
between 0 and 1, the logits are not so bound. 
2. Although L is linear in X, the probabilities 
themselves are not. This is in contrast with the Linear 
Probability Model where the probability increases linearly 
with X. 
3. Beta2' the slope, measures the change in L for a 
unit change in X; in the present analysis, it tells how the 
log-odds in favour of supporting the SFC change as the 
independent variable changes by a unit. The intercept 
Beta1 , is the value of the log-odds in favour of supporting 
the SFC if the independent variable is zero. The value of 
the intercept has no meaning for the present analysis 
1.p.482 Basic Econometrics, 2nd Edition, D N Gujarati, McGraw-
Hill Book Company, N.Y. 1988. 
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because the independent variable has at least a value of 1 in 
the 1 to 5 Likert Scale. 
4. Once the intercept (Beta1) and the coefficients 
(Beta 2 , Beta3 ... ) are estimated, the probability of 
supporting or not supporting the SFC by a certain person, 
who expresses his opinions through the values of the 
independent variables, can be calculated. The same 
principles apply to a group of persons who express opinions 
as one. 
In the Probit Specification, instead of the logistic 
CDF in the Logit model, the normal CDF is used. The 
estimating model which emerges from the normal CDF is called 
the Probit model. Aside from the different definition of 
the dependent variables and a different formula for the 
variances, the reciprocals of which are to be used as 
weights, the analysis proceeds exactly as that of the logit 
formulation 1 The interpretation of the Probit model is 
the same as that of the Logit model. Except for a slight 
difference in magnitude, the coefficients for both the Logit 
and Probit models exhibit the same sign and direction and 
the probability estimations (Pi) of both are the same. 
1.p.?1 Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models, J H Aldrich 
& F D Nelson, Sage publications, USA 1984. 
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Model Specifications 
For testing the first hypothesis "That the Securities 
and Futures Commission has caused the making and enforcement 
of appropriate law and regulations for protecting the 
interest of the general public i.e. private investors" the 
following model is used for the Logit and Probit analysis : 
y = C + B1X1 + B2X2 +B3X3 
where 
Y = 0 or 1, 0 for agreeing that law enforcement is 
adequate for protecting investors, 1 for not 
C = a constant 
Bi = coefficients 
Xl = opinion on the adequacy of the present law 
X2 = opinion on whether or not Self Regulated Bodies 
should make rules for protecting investors 
X3 = opinion as to the legalizing of rules of Self 
Regulated Bodies 
For testing the second hypothesis "That the Securities 
and Futures Commission has adequately supervised the stock 
exchange, a self regulated body, for protecting the interest 
of the general public, i.e. private investors" the following 
model is used for the Logit and Probit analysis : 
Y = C + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 
where 
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Y = 0 or 1, 0 for agreeing that exchange has made 
adequate effort to protect investors, 1 for not 
C = a constant 
Bi = coefficients 
Xl = opinion on the question of closer supervision of 
the exchange by the SFC 
X2 = opinion on the suggestion that the exchange be 
given a role in determining the initial subscription price 
X3 = opinion on whether or not listed companies have 
already been properly scrutinized by the exchange 
For testing the third hypothesis "That the Securities 
and Futures Commission has adequately supervised listed 
companies and their management for protecting the interest 
of the general public, i.e. private investors" the following 
model is used for the Logit and Probit analysis : 
Y = C + B1X1 + B2X2 
where Y = 0 or 1, 0 for prompt disclosure of sensitive 
information to investors, 1 for not 
C = a constant 
Bi = coefficients 
Xl = opinion on whether or not directors of listed 
companies have properly discharged their duties towards 
investors 
X2 = opinion on whether or not in takeovers and mergers 
the interest of shareholders is protected. 
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Chi-square analysis 
The researcher intends to employ the chi-square 
analysis to ascertain the degree of confidence and the other 
characteristics for the collected data. This statistical 
method was devised by an English statistician Karl Pearson 
who used the Greek letter chi for an index of variation. 
Since the index is commonly used as a square, it is 
generally known as Chi-square, symbolized by X2 . Chi-square 
analysis is suitable for solving multiple classification 
problems and testing hypotheses on a normal distribution 1 
The chi-square can also be used to solve classes of 
correlation problems for counting variables. 
The analysis assumes that there is a finite number, 
denoted by k, of possible outcomes of an experiment. These 
possible outcomes are represented by k cells. The 
experiment is performed n times, and the results are 
expressed by recording the observed frequencies of outcomes 
in the corresponding cells. The problem then is to 
determine whether the frequencies are compatible with those 
expected from some postulated theory. The general method 
1.p.269 Basic Statistics for business and Economics, Paul G. Hoel 
and Raymond J. Jessen, John wiley & Sons, inc., 1971. 
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for testing compatibility is based on a measure of the 
extent to which the observed and expected frequencies agree. 
This measure, called chi-square, is defined by the formula : 
x
2 
= 
where 0i and ei denote the observed and expected frequency, 
respectively, for the ith cell, and k denotes the number of 
cells. Thus, increasingly large values of x 2 may be thought 
of as corresponding to poor experimental agreement 1 
The present research analysis is concerned with 
multiple classification problems. The reliability of the 
findings depends upon the probability distribution of the 
observed frequency and the expected frequency of a null 
hypothesis that "the observed frequencies are compatible 
with the frequencies expected of evenly distributed 
replies". The chi-square distributions for returns of each 
category are calculated. The researcher, observing 
generally accepted norms in statistical analysis of this 
nature, is using a confidence level of 90% for analyzing the 
collected data. 
End of Chapter 
1.p.269 - 271, Basic Statistics for Business and Economics, Paul 
G. Hoel and Raymond J. Jessen, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1971. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Chapters one and two describe the research method and 
the research technique employed for collecting the data 
needed in testing the effectiveness of the Securities and 
Futures Commission in investor protection. The survey was 
conducted in December 1989 and the results of that survey 
are presented in this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into 5 sections. The first 
section presents the findings relating to the background of 
the respondents. Data about the level of experience, the 
frequency of dealing, for whom the deal is done, the 
percentage of Hong Kong securities in their portfolio and 
the reasons for investing in Hong Kong securities are 
presented. 
The second section presents the findings relating to 
the adequacy and enforcement of law and regulations relating 
to securities. Data about the adequacy of the law, the 
level of vigilance in enforcing the law and the role of self 
regulated bodies are presented. 
The third section presents the findings relating to the 
regulatory function of the SFC in the stock exchange. Data 
about the adequacy of protection of investors by the 
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exchange, the adequacy of supervision of the exchange by the 
Securities and Futures Commission, the insuring of stock 
brokers, the power of limiting new listings, the role of the 
exchange in the determination of share subscription prices 
of new listings, the scrutinizing of new listings and the 
closure of the stock market in time of turmoil are 
presented. 
The fourth section presents the findings relating to 
the regulating of market intermediaries by the SFC. Data 
about the adequacy of financial information from 
professionals for the general public, the training of market 
intermediaries, the capital adequacy of stock brokers and 
sharp practices and methods of curbing sharp practices are 
presented. 
The fifth section presents the findings relating to the 
supervision of listed companies and the management of listed 
companies for investor protection. Data about the 
disclosure of information by listed companies, the 
competence of listed company directors, the power of 
shareholders in approving major transactions and the 
protection of investors in take-over situations are 
presented. 
The sixth section encompasses miscellaneous issues 
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which were mentioned in the Report of the Securities Review 
Committee of 1988 but which have not been dealt with in 
other sections. These items of interest, although not 
directly related to the present analysis, are important for 
understanding the issue at hand. Data about margin trading, 
short selling, brokerage and charges, the cost of 
supervising the industry and the methods of ensuring an 
orderly market are presented. 
Besides submitting the findings in a written form they 
are also presented in the form of BAR CHARTS and TABLES. In 
order to avoid repeating the same information time and time 
again, only charts are incorporated in the text. Tables are 
separately placed in attachment B. 
SECTION ONE 
GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE RESPONDENTS RELATING 
TO SECURITIES DEALINGS 
There are altogether six questions in this part of the 
questionnaire. The following paragraphs present the data 
and their findings : 
Investment Activities - Most private investors invest 
only in the Hong Kong market while most brokers invest 
both in the Hong Kong and overseas markets. All 
responding fund managers engage in both the Hong Kong 
and overseas markets. International fund operators are 
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becoming active in the Hong Kong market and it could now 
be regarded as an integrated component of the world 
financial system. If this status is to be maintained 
the financial activities in and the supervision of the 
Hong Kong securities market should be of international 
standards. 
Experience - One generally expects that fund managers 
are more experienced than private investors. However, 
data from the survey paint a different picture. At the 
time of the survey most fund managers have less than 
five years of experience with the local market. This 
may be caused by the short history of the Hong Kong 
market as an international market. Most brokers and 
private investors have more than 10 years of experience 
with the local market. The findings of a share 
ownership survey conducted by the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong Limited 1 corroborate the above observations. 
The Stock Exchange survey reveals that only 19% of Hong 
Kong share owners are novices while the remaining 81% 
of them have more than two years of experience in the 
stock market, out of whom 40% came into the market 10 
years or more ago. 
Frequency of dealing - Brokers are found to have the 
highest frequency in dealing. This is not altogether 
1.P.18 Shareownership Survey in Hong Kong 1989, Summary and 
Comparison, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, 1990. 
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unusual as dealing is their business. However, the 
findings reveal that only 47.6% of them deal everyday. 
This is not expected because they are supposed to deal 
on each working day. Further investigation reveals 
that out of the 679 stock brokers in the exchange, 162 
of them (23.8%) are dormant members 1. Dormant members 
are those members of the exchange who have stopped 
trading in the exchange. 
Proportion of HK securities in portfolio - Private 
investors have a higher proportion of their securities 
portfolio in Hong Kong securities than fund managers 
and brokers. However, among private investors, 40% of 
them have less than 50% of their portfolio in Hong Kong 
securities. Likewise only 15% of fund managers invest 
more than 50% of their portfolio in Hong Kong 
securities. This finding is in line with the finding 
of the stock exchange survey mentioned earlier which 
revealed that only 14% of the share owners place more 
than half of their total investment (including real 
property, precious metals, currencies etc) in local 
stocks 2. Perhaps this phenomenon is explained by the 
higher than normal political risk associated with 
1. 'Members List', The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, 
January 1990. 
2.p.15 Shareownership Survey in Hong Kong 1989, Summary and 
Comparison, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd, 1990. 
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investment in Hong Kong. 
Reasons for investing in HK securities - Most of the 
investors in Hong Kong, including fund managers or 
private investors, choose capital appreciation as their 
dominant reason for investing in Hong Kong securities. 
As Hong Kong does not subscribe to double taxation and 
dividend is paid free of any local tax encumbrance, 
this investor mentality is perhaps partly explained by 
the speculative nature of the market and partly by the 
lack of long term commitment by investors. This 
finding is again corroborated by the findings of the 
earlier mentioned stock exchange survey. The stock 
exchange survey reveals that good company prospects, 
gain in stock price and good capital growth are the 
first, second and third foremost reasons for investing 
in local stocks. Good dividend yield ranks only tenth 
in their survey. 
The diversification of investment activities (Chart 5.1; 
Table 5.1) 
Question ONE aims at ascertaining from respondents 
their investment activities. 
For private investors (PI), 58% of them invest only in 
the Hong Kong market while 30% invest both in Hong Kong and 
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overseas markets. For stock brokers (SB) , the situat i on i s 
reversed, 30~ of them invest only in the Hong Kong market 
whil e 56.5~ invest both i n Hong Kong and overseas. For 
professiona l i nvestors (PRO), all of them invest in both 
local and overseas markets. 
The level of local experience (Chart 5. 2; Table 5. 2 ) 
Question 2 aims at ascertaining from respondents the i r 
local investment experience. For PI, 19.4~ of them have 
less than 5 years of experience in Hong Kong, 80.6~ of them 
have 5 years or more and 50~ have more than la years. 
For SB , 90.4~ of them have 5 years or more of local 
experience while 71.4~ have more than la years. For PRO, 
the majori ty of them (57 . 1~) have less than 5 years of local 
experience whi l e onl y 1 has more than 10 years. 
For whom the respondents are investing (Chart 5 . 3 ; Table 
5 . 3) 
Question 3 requests the respondents to state for whom 
they are investing. 
For PI, most of them (75~) invest for themselves, 
friends and re l atives. Ni ne PI respondents (25~) state that 
they invest both for themselves and for their company . None 
of the PI state that they invest for their company only . 
For SB, 42.9~ of them invest both for themselves and 
for their friends and re l atives, 47.6~ invest both for the 
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company and themselves while 9.5% for the company only. 
For PRO, all of them either invest for their company or 
both for their company and themselves. 
only f o r themselves. 
None of them invest 
Frequency of activi tie s in the s t o ck market ( Cha r t 5 . 4 ; 
Table 5 . 4 ) 
Question 4 aims at finding out from respondents their 
frequency of activity in the local market. 
For PI, 44.4% of them deal infrequently ( less than 
monthly), and 66.6% or 2/3 deal every month or frequently. 
Only 19.4% of them deal everyday. 
For SB, 1 9% of them deal infrequently (less than 
monthly) . 81% deal every month or frequently. Only 47.6% 
deal every working day. 
For PRO, 40% of them deal everyday while 60% dea l every 
week. The level of activity for PRO is higher than that of 
PI and SB. 
The amount of Hong Kong securities under control 
5 . 5 ; Table 5.5 ) 
(Chart 
Question 5 aims at finding out from respondents the 
proportion of Hong Kong securities in their portfolios. 
For PI, 61.1% of them have mo re than half of their 
securities portfolios (securities only, excluding other 
investments) in Hong Kong securities. This is corroborated 
with the find i ngs from question 1 which reveal that 58% of 
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the PI respondents invest only in Hong Kong. 
For SB, 38. 1 % of them have more than half of their 
securities portfolios in Hong Kong securities. Again this 
is in line with the findings in question 1 which reveal that 
30% of the SB invest only in Hong Kong. 
Fo r PRO, on l y 14 . 3% of them have more than half of 
their securi ties i n Hong Kong securities. 71.4% of the PRO 
have only 10 30% of their securities in Hong Kong 
securities. 
Reasons for inv esting in Hong Kong Securities (Chart 5 . 6 ; 
Table 5.6) 
Questions 6 aims at finding out from respondents their 
reasons for investing in Hong Kong securities. 
For PI, 74.3% of them invest in Hong Kong securities 
because of capital appreciation. 
For SB, 57.9 of them invest in Hong Kong securities 
because of capital appreciation . 
For PRO, most of them give multiple reasons1 . However, 
capital appreciation (5 indications out of a tota l of 1 6 
indications) and portfolio diversification (6 out of a total 
1 .multiple reasons returns could not be captured by the computer 
programme and all the forms under this category were manual l y 
tabulated. 
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of 16) are among the favoured reasons . Yield in dividend (2 
out of 16) is the l east favoured. 
SECTION TWO 
LAW MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 
There are altogether four questions (Q.7 - Q.10) in 
th i s section. Questions 7 and 8 are key questions for 
testing the first hypothesis. Question 7 attempts to find 
out from respondents the adequacy of the present law while 
question 8 the adequacy of law enforcement. The other 
questions in this section refer to rules and regulat i ons of 
self regulated bodies. The following are the observations 
from the findings : 
Adequac y of the Law - Under the Capture Theory, 
benefits of economic legislation are captured by 
interest groups. As such one expects to find from the 
results that the fund managers group, a most cohesive 
group, is most satisfied with securities l egis l ation 
while the stock brokers group, a less cohesive interest 
group, l ess satisfied and l astly, the private i nvestors 
group dissatisfied. The findings, however , do not 
support this supposition. Instead, one finds that the 
fund managers group is dissatisfied with the present 
l aw govern i ng the securities industry. The private 
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investors group is divided in its opinion whereas the 
stock brokers group is rather satisfied with the 
existing law. Securities legislation seems to have 
confered a lot of benefits on stock brokers, some on 
private investors and none on fund managers. On the 
enforcement of law a similar pattern is observed. Fund 
managers show a high level of dissatisfaction while 
stock brokers and private investors are general l y 
satisfied . These observations illustrate that 
producers and consumers are dividing up the l egislative 
benefits between themselves. 
On the issue of professional bodies acting as self 
regulated bodies for protecting investors, all three 
groups are in favour of this suggestion. However, fund 
managers are against the idea of having the force of 
law backing the investor protection function of self 
regulated bodies. This outcome cannot be expl ained by 
the Capture Theory since under the theory se l f 
regulated bodies, as interested bodies, should welcome 
economic legislation which would be for their benefits. 
Adequacy of the present law (Chart 5 .7; Table 5 .7) 
Question 7 aims at finding out from respondents their 
opinion about the adequacy of the current law governing the 
securities industry. 
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For PI, their opinion is divided. There are as many 
respondents agreeing as there are disagreeing that the 
present l aw is adequate . 
For SB, there are more respondents (57.1%) agreeing 
than disagreeing (23.8%) that the present law is adequate. 
23.8% of them strongly agree while none strongly disagree. 
For PRO, there are more respondents (71.4%) disagreein g 
than agree i ng (28 . 6%) that the present law is adequate . 
Adequacy of law enforcement (Chart 5. 8; Table 5. 8) 
Question 8 aims at finding out from respondents their 
opinion about the adequacy of enforcing the securities law. 
For PI, 50% of them agree that law enforcement is 
adequate whi l e 33.4% d i sagree. 
For SB, 47.8% o f them agree that the enforcement is 
adequate while 23.8% disagree. 
For, PRO, 14.3% of them agree that the enforcement of 
the law is adequate while 57.2% disagree. 
with law enforcement comes mainly from PRO. 
Dissatisfaction 
Role of prof e ssional bodies in protecting investors (Chart 
5 . 9 ; Table 5 . 9 ) 
Question 9 aims at finding out whether professional 
bodies such as the Stock Brokers Association or the Unit 
Trusts Association should play a role in making rules and 
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regulations governing their members for protecting 
investors. 
For PI, 83.4% of them agree that professional bodies 
should play a role whi le only 8.3% disagree. 
For SB, 76 . 1% of them agree that professional bodies 
should play a role while onl y 14.3% disagree. 
For PRO, 71 .4% of them agree that professional bodies 
should play a role while none disagree. 
All 3 categories of respondents j oin force o n this 
i ssue. 
Professional rules to be backed up by law 
Table 5.10) 
(Chart 5.10; 
Question 10 aims at ascertaining whether rules and 
regulations relating to securities made by professional 
bodies should have the force of law behind them. 
For PI 80% of them agree that such rules and 
regulations should be backed up by law while only 8.6% 
disagree. 
For SB, 65% of them agree that such rules and 
regulat i ons should be backed up by law while 25% disagree . 
For PRO, 42.8% of them agree that such rules and 
regulations shou l d be backed up by law whi l e 28 . 6% disagree. 
All 3 categories of respondents join force o n this 
i ssue with PI showing the strongest desire to have these 
rules and regulations by professional bodies legally 
enforceable. 
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SECTION THREE 
THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG 
There are altogether seven questions in this section. 
(Q.ll - Q.17). Questions 11 and 12 are key questions for 
testing the second hypothesis while other questions relate 
generally to other activities of the stock exchange. From 
the findings the following observations are made : 
The Adequacy of the Stock Ex change - The findings show 
that the issue of " the adequacy of the Exchange in 
discharging its function of investor protection" does 
not generate much diverse response from respondents . 
Responses are evenly distributed in the middle columns 
of "Agree", "Neutral " and "Not Agree". Generally the 
stock brokers are more satisfied with the working and 
supervision of the Exchange than private investors or 
fund managers. However, the disparities among interest 
groups are not significant. 
Closer supervision of the Ex c hange by the SFC - From 
the data it seems that the SFC has earned for itself a 
certain amount of goodwill . All three categories of 
respondents believe that the closer supervision of the 
Exchange by the SFC would enhance investor protection. 
Perhaps all three interest groups have derived benefits 
from the SFC before. 
Role of the Exchange - There is a general feeling among 
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investors that stock brokers should insure themselves 
against the risk of their own financial defaults. This 
demonstrates the apprehension and distrust from 
investors towards the Compensation Fund which is 
currently run by the Exchange. Even among stock brokers 
more of them than not are in favour of insuring 
themselves. Howeve r, in general, investors are not 
dissatisf i ed with the work of the Exchange. On the 
issue of the monitoring of listed companies most 
investors are satisfied with the work of the Exchange. 
Adequacy of the stock e x change (Chart 5.11; Table 5.11 ) 
Question 11 aims at finding out from respondents their 
opinion about the adequacy of th e stock exchange in 
protecting investors. 
For PI, 61.1% of them agree that the Stock Exchange has 
already made adequate efforts to protect invest o rs while 
35 . 9% disagree. 
For SB, 47 . 7% of them agree that the Stock Exchange has 
already made adequate effort while 33.4% disagree. 
For PRO, 28.6% of them agree that the Stock Exchange 
has already made adequate effort while 42.9% disagree. 
Closer supervi s ion of the Stock Exchange (Chart 5 . 12; Table 
5.12) 
158 
... 
lJ1 
'" Ol 
0 .11 
CHART 5.11 
ADEQUACY OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
----- --
50% ,-----------------------------------------------~ 
42.9% 42.9% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
4.8% 4.8% 
0% 0% 0% '--------'----'-- 0% 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
• Private Investor • Fund Mgr 0 Broker 
CHART 5.12 0 .12 
CLOSER SUPERVISION OF THE STOCK 
63.9 % 
60 % 
50% 
40 % 
30% 
20 % . 
10 % 8.3% . 9.5% 95 % 
0% 
0% 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Private Investor Fund Mgr 0 Broker 
Question 12 aims at finding out from respondents their 
opinions about closer supervision of the Stock Exchange by 
the SFC and the government for protecting investors. 
For PI, 72.2% of them agree that closer supervision of 
the Stock Exchange should give better protection to 
investors while only 8 . 4% disagree. 
For SB, 47.6% of them agree that closer supervision of 
the Stock Exchange should give better protection while 28.5% 
disagree. 
For PRO, 57.1% of them agree that closer supervision of 
the Stock Exchange should give better protection while 28.6% 
disagree. 
All three interest groups join forces on this issue. 
Insurance against financial default (Chart 5.13 ; Table 5.13) 
Question 13 aims at finding out whether the Exchange 
should request their members (stock brokers) to take out 
insurance against their possible financial default towards 
investors. 
For PI, 72.3% of them agree that stock brokers shou l d 
take out insurance while only 2.8% disagree. 
For SB, 42.8% of them agree while 33 . 4% disagree. 
For PRO, 71.4% of them agree while 28.6% disagree . 
All three interest groups join forces on this issue. 
Li miting the number of n ew listing s (Chart 5.14 ; Table 5 . 14 ) 
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Question 14 aims at finding out whether the Exchange 
should be given the power of limiting the number of new 
list i ngs and placements for the market in any given peri od. 
For PI, 58.3% of them agree that the Stock Exchange 
should have such power whi l e 25% disagree . 
For SB, 42.8% of them agree while 38.1% disagree. 
For PRO, 57 . 1% of them agree while 42.9% disagree . 
All 3 three interest groups join forces on this issue. 
Determination of share subscription price (Chart 5 . 15; Table 
5.15) 
Question 15 aims at finding out whether the Exchange 
should be given a role in determining share subscription 
prices of new listings in conjunction with the applicants 
and their advi sers. 
For PI, 62.9% of them agree that the Stock Exchange 
should be given such a role while 17.1% disagree . 
For SB, 47.6% of them agree while 28.5% disagree . 
For PRO, 28.6% of them agree while 76.5% disagree. 
Scrutinizing of Prospective Listed Companies by the Exchange 
before approval (Chart 5 . 16; Table 5.16) 
Question 16 aims at finding out whether companies 
applying to be listed a r e a l ways properly scrutinized by the 
Exchange before the i r app l ications are approved. 
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For PI , 52.7% of them agree that companies are always 
properl y scrutinized by the Exchange before their l ist i ngs 
are approved while 27.8% disagree. 
For SB , 42.9% of them agree while 14.3% disagr ee. 
For PRO, 57.1% of them agree while none disagree . 
Temporary closure of Exchange in financial turmoil 
5 . 17; Table 5.17) 
(Chart 
Question 17 aims to find out whether in time of 
exceptional financial turmoil the Stock Exchange should be 
temporarily closed for protecting investors. 
For PI, 16.7% of them agree that in time of exceptional 
financial turmoil the Exchange should be temporarily closed 
while 58.3% disagree. 
For SB, 23.8% of them agree while 57 . 1% disagree . 
For PRO, 100% of them disagree. 
SECTION FOUR 
STOCK BROKERS AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES 
Section four a i ms at providing information re l ating to 
the supervision of stock brokers by the Securities and 
Futures Commission . There are altogether five questions in 
this section (Q.18 - Q.22) From the results the following 
observations are made : 
Services Prov ided by Financial Intermediaries - There 
161 
CHART 5 . 17 
TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF EXCHANGE IN 
FINANCIAr-TURMOIL 60% .-------------~====~===---~~--------~ 
50% 
40% 
30% 
23.8% 
25% 
20% 
13.9% 
10% 
2.8% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Private Investor • Fund Mgr D Broker 
0 .17 
is a general consensus among respondents that services 
provided by financial intermediaries are inadequate. 
The survey reveals that half of the private investors 
and most of the fund managers know of dishonest or 
sharp practices by stock brokers. In past years, stock 
brokers or floor dealers were not required to undergo 
formal training before they were allowed to practise 
stock broking. Further, there is no continuing 
education or training of the market intermediaries 
during their career. This deficiency has been duly 
noted and addressed in the Davison Report (para. 
4.89). In combatting the dishonest or sharp practices 
by market intermediaries respondents overwhelmingly 
endorse the use of the law. Brokers, understandably, 
prefer to submit to the jurisdiction of the Exchange in 
sharp practice cases. 
Financial information from professionals (Chart 5.18; Table 
5.18) 
Question 1 8 aims to find out whether investors have 
a l ready received an adequate supply of financial information 
from stock brokers, investment advisers and other market 
intermediaries . 
For P I , 29.4% of them agree that they have already 
received an adequate supply of financial information from 
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stock brokers , investment advisers and other intermediaries 
while 53% disagree. 
For SB , 47.7% of them agree while 23.8% disagree . 
For PRO, 28.6% of them agree while 42 . 9% disagree. 
Training of the profes sionals (Chart 5.19; Table 5.19 ) 
This question aims to find out whether stock brokers, 
investment advisers and others in securities dealings are 
adequately trai ned . 
For PI, 28 . 6% of them agree that these professionals 
are adequately trained while 45.7% disagree. 
For SB, 42.9% of them agree while 42.8% disagree. 
For PRO , none agree while 42.9% disagree. 
Capital requirements of brokers (Chart 5.20 ; Table 5.20 ) 
Question 20 aims t o find o ut whether the capital 
requirements of stock brokers are adequate, from the point 
of view of investors and the brokers ' dealing counterpart 
(HK$l million for personal brokers and HK$5 million for 
corporate brokers irrespective of turnover) . 
For PI, 37 . 1% of them agree that the capital 
requirements of stock brokers are adequate while 28.6% 
disagree. 
For SB, 66.7% of them agree while 19% disagree. 
For PRO, none agree while 57.1% disagree. 
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Dishonest or sharp practice (Chart 5 .2 1; Table 5.21) 
Question 21 asks respondents whether they know of any 
dishonest or sharp practices by stock brokers and market 
intermediaries wh i c h are against the interests of the ir 
clients. 
For PI, 42 . 9% of them say that they know of such 
practices by stock brokers and market intermediaries while 
57.1% say that they do not know of such practices. 
Fo r SB , 42.9% of them know of such practices while 
57.1% do not know of such practices. 
For PRO, 83.3% of them know of such practices whi l e 
16.7% do not know of such practices. 
Curbing dishonest or sharp practices 
5.22) 
(Chart 5.22; Table 
Quest i on 22 asks respondents to choose the best method 
for combating d i shonest or sharp practices of brokers and 
market intermediaries : enacting law, sanctions by the stock 
exchange, sanc t i ons by their respective trade assoc iati on , 
sanct i on by quasi-governmental bodies or others. 
For PI, 65.7% of them favour enacting l aw while 28.6% 
favour sanction by the stock exchange. 
For SB, 25% of them f avour enact ing l aw while 65% 
favour sanct ion by the exchange . 
For PRO, 85.7% of them favour enacting law while 14.3% 
f avour sanct i on by the exchange. 
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SECTION FIVE 
LISTED COMPANIES 
Section five aims at testing the third hypothesis. 
There are seven questions in this section (Q.23 - Q.29). 
Questions 23, 24 and 29 are key questions for testing the 
hypothesis. From the results the following observations are 
made 
Behaviour of Listed Companies - The results indicate 
that almost all respondents are dissatisfied with 
listed companies in respect of the amount of 
information disclosed to investors and the promptness 
of their disclosures. Brokers and private investors 
exhibit similar levels of dissatisfaction whi l e fund 
managers are more aggravated. From the results it is 
strongly indicated that investors des ire to possess 
more vetting power in listed companies, especial l y 
during merger or take-over situat i ons. This points to 
the inadequacy of the SFC in upholding the interest of 
the general public and also of the interest groups 
under study. An explanation for this general 
dissat i sfaction from respondents is that listed 
165 
companies are act i ng as and behaving like an interest 
group. In other major world markets listed companies 
are in their thousands. Because of the large number of 
li sted companie s it may be d iffi cult for them to 
undertake group action bidding for legislative benefits. 
However, with only about 400 companies listed in Hong 
Kong, it i s possible that they are compact enough for 
behaving like an interest group. 
Disclosure of information by listed companies (Chart 5.23; 
Table 5.23) 
Question 23 aims to find out whether listed companies 
have adequately disclosed information to their shareholders. 
Fo r PI, 22.9% o f them agree that the amount of 
information d i sclosed by listed companies to their 
shareholders is adequate while 48.5% disagree . 
For SB, 28.6% of them agree while 52 . 4% disagree. 
For PRO, none agree whi l e 71 . 4% disagree. 
Prompt in disclosing sensitive information (Chart 5 . 24; 
Table 5.24) 
Question 24 aims to find out whether listed compan i es 
are prompt in d i sclosing sensitive information to the 
pUblic. 
For PI, 22.8% of them agree that listed companies are 
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p r ompt i n d i sclosing sens i tive information to the publ i c 
whi l e 57.2% disagree. 
For SB , 23.8% of them agree whi l e 57.2% d i sagree. 
For PRO , none agree while 71.4% disagree. 
Listing discouraged due to information disclosure ( Chart 
5.25; Table 5.25) 
Quest i on 25 a i ms to find out whether private companies 
wou l d be d i scouraged from seeki ng list i ngs if t h ey were 
compel l ed by l aw to d i sclose more information to t h e publ ic. 
For PI, 45.7% of them agree that private companies 
would be discouraged while 40% disagree. 
For SB, 33.3% of them agree while 52 . 4% disagree. 
For PRO, 57 . 1% of them agree whi le 14.3% disagree. 
Disclosure of shareholding above five percent (Chart 5.26; 
Table 5.26) 
Question 26 aims to fi n d out whether the law should 
requ i re t he disc l osure of l isted company shareholdi ngs above 
5 ~ o • 
For PI , 54.3% of t h em agr ee that the law shou l d require 
such d i sc l osure wh i l e 14.3% disagree. 
For SB , 47.6% of them agree whi l e 23.8% disagree . 
For PRO, 57.2% of them agree while 28.6% disagree . 
Directors discharge of duties (Chart 5.27; Table 5 . 27) 
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Question 27 aims to find out whether directors of 
l isted companies in HK have adequately discharged their 
duties towards investors. 
For PI, 17.2~ of them agree that directors of listed 
companies in HK have adequately discharged their duties 
towards investors while 45.7~ disagree . 
For SB, 28.6~ of them agree while 38~ disagree. 
For PRO, 14 . 3~ of them agree while 42.9~ disagree. 
More power for shareholders to approve transactions (Chart 
5.28; Table 5.28) 
Question 28 aims to find out whether shareholders of 
listed companies should be given more power to approve major 
transactions of their companies. 
For PI, 57.2~ of them agree that shareholders of listed 
companies shou l d be given more power to approve major 
transactions o f their companies while 2.9~ disagree. 
for SB, 47.6~ of them agree while 23 . 8~ disagree . 
For PRO, 71 . 4~ of them agree while none disagree . 
Protection of investors in take-overs (Chart 5.29; Table 
5 .29) 
Question 29 aims to find out whether in take-over 
situations the interests of investors are always being 
protected. 
168 
CHART 5.28 Q,28 
MORE POWER FOR SHAREHOLDERS TO APPROVE TRANSACTION 
60% 57.1% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20 % 19% 
10% 
4.8% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagr e 
• Private Investor . und Mgr 0 Broker 
CHART 5.29 0 .29 
PROTECTION OF INVESTORS I N TAKE-OVERS 
60% .-------------------------______ ~~~----------~ 
S7 . 
50 % 
40% 
30 % - - . ..... .. " 
20% 1 9~ . 
14 .3% 
10% 
S.7 % 4.8% 
0% 0% 0% 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
• Private Investor • Fund Mgr 0 Broker 
------------------------------------------------------- --- - ----- -
For PI, 20% of them agree that in the take-over 
situations the interests of investors are always being 
protected while 54.2% disagree. 
For SB , 23.8% of them agree while 47.6% disagree. 
For PRO, none agree while 71.4% disagree. 
SECTI ON SIX 
SECURITIES DEALINGS 
This sections aims at finding out from respondents 
their opinions about various subsidiary issues such as 
trading on margin, short selling, level of charges, cost of 
supervision and the means of ensuring a fair market. There 
are altogether five questions in this section (Q.30 - Q.34) 
From the results the following observations are made : 
Marg i n Trading In Hong Kong it is common for 
investors to trade on margin accounts. However, this 
form of investment activity may give rise to problems 
for investor protection. In a falling market situation 
an investor's securities portfolio pledged with a 
broker under a margin trading agreement may be the 
target for abuse. Under the margin trading agreement a 
broker may dispose of stock and shares pledged by 
customers at any bargain price. In a rising market 
situation, it is not unheard of that some less than 
honest brokers "borrow" without consent shares from 
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customers' portfolios for the purpose of covering their 
short positions. Most respondents, including brokers, 
agree t hat some form of legislative control on margin 
trading is needed. 
Short Selling - Short selling of stock and shares has 
l ong been prohibited by law in Hong Kong. It was once 
thought that short selling was a form of wagering 
activity which should not be allowed. However, with 
the introduction of the "Hang Seng Index Futures" 
contracts in the Futures Exchange in 1986 short selling 
of stock and shares could now be a genuine form of 
hedging activity for those who have taken up the "call" 
option of the HS Index futures contracts. Accordingly 
respondents to the questionnaires, 
their groupings, disagree that 
irrespective of 
the present law 
prohibiting short selling helps in protecting 
investors. The SFC has long been urged to rationalize 
the present law regarding short selling. The SFC, 
however, has reservations about al l owing unsanctioned 
short sel ling activit i es which, in times of financial 
turmoil, may accelerate the fall of the market. There 
is a need to maintain balance between rationalizing 
short selling and the concern for market stability. 
Regulating Market Activities - The results show that 
respondents generally favour the use of the law for 
ensuring an orderly market. In line with the pub l ic 
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I nterest Theory investors do think that l egislation is 
enacted for their benefits. 
Control over trading on margin (Chart 5.30; Table 5.30) 
Question 30 aims to find out whether trading on margin 
should be under some form of control for the sake of an 
order l y market. 
For PI, 60% of them agree t hat trading on margin should 
be under some form of contro l for the sake of an order l y 
market whi le 11.5% disagree. 
For SB, 60.6% of them agree while 14.3% disagree . 
For PRO, 85.7% of them agree while none disagree. 
Prohibit short selling (Chart 5 .3 1; Table 5.31) 
Question 31 aims to find out whether prohibiting short 
selling of stock and shares helps to protect investors. 
For PI, 30 . 6% of them agree that prohibiting short 
selling of stock and shares helps to protect investors while 
55.6% disagree. 
For SB, 19% of them agree while 61 .9% disagree. 
For PRO, none agree while 85.8% disagree. 
Low brokerage and incidental charges (Chart 5 . 32; Table 
5.32) 
Question 32 aims to find out whether the brokerage and 
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incidental charges on the buying of securities in HK a r e 
l ow . 
For PI, 47.3% of them agree that the brokerage and 
incidenta l charges on the buying of securities in HK a r e l ow 
while 36.2% disagree. 
For SB, 61.6% of them agree while 19.1% disagree. 
For PRO, 28.6% of them agree while 28.6% disagree. 
Costs paid by investors (Chart 5 . 33; Table 5.33) 
Question 33 aims to find out whether the cost of 
supervising the securities industry should be mostly paid 
for by investors. 
For PI, 30.6% of them agree that the cost of 
supervising the securities industry should be mostly paid 
for by investor s while 50% disagree. 
For SB, 38.1% of them agree while 33 . 4% disagr ee. 
For PRO, 14. 3% of them agree while 42.9% disagree. 
Ensure fair and orderly market (Chart 5.34; Table 5.34) 
Question 34 asks respondents to choose from a list the 
best method for ensuring an orderl y and fair market: law, 
informal guidelines by the author i ty, rules by the stock 
exchange, informal codes similar to the codes of takeovers 
and mergers, practice rules by trade associations or any 
other sugges tions . 
For PI, 50% of them c h oose law, 38.9% c hoose rules by 
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stock exchange. 
For SB, 45% of them choose rules by stock exchange, 25% 
choose law and 20% choose informal guidelines by the 
authority. 
For PRO, 66.7% of them choose law, 16.7% choose rules 
by the exchange and 16.7% choose informal codes similar to 
the codes of takeovers and mergers. 
End of Chapter 
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CHAPTER 6 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND CONCLUSIONS 
After the collection of data, the next most important 
task is to subject the data to analysis using statistical 
methods to estimate some property of the population that was 
sampled and to test the three formulated hypotheses. It is 
necessary to employ statistical methods because a survey 
based on a sample involves incomplete information about the 
population and it is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the 
degree of confidence for the data collected and subsequently 
on the inferences drawn and hypotheses tested. 
The present researcher proposes to use two separate and 
unrelated statistical techniques to analyze the data 
collected. The first and the more important technique, 
binary choice modeling, is employed to test the three 
hypotheses stipulated in chapter one. The second technique, 
the chi-square statistical method, is employed for the 
purpose of finding out the other characteristics of the 
collected data. 
The following three hypotheses are to be tested : 
Hypothesis 1: That the Securities and Futures 
Commission has caused the making and enforcement of 
appropriate law and regulations for protecting the interest 
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of the general public, i.e. private investors. 
Hypothesis 2 That the Securities and Futures 
Commission has adequately supervised the stock exchange, a 
self regulated body, for protecting the interest of the 
general public, i.e. private investors. 
Hypothesis 3 That the Securities and Futures 
Commission has adequately supervised listed companies and 
their management for protecting the interest of the general 
public, i.e. private investors. 
The researcher is following a three step routine in 
applying the model. These steps are 
a) Apply the data to the model to calculate the 
constant and the coefficients of the independent variables. 
b) Calculate the averages of the independent 
variables. 
c) Input the averages back to the models to calculate 
the Logit and Probit figures. 
The above three steps are repeated for each of the 
hypotheses and for each of the two groups - the private 
investor group and the stock broker group. The results of 
the analysis are presented in Chapter Five. The findings 
and conclusions derived from these results are presented in 
the following paragraphs. 
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FINDINGS FROM TESTING OF HYPOTHESES USING BINARY CHOICE 
MODELING 
The data from section 2 of the questionnaire is used to 
test the first hypothesis "That the Securities and Futures 
Commission has caused the making and enforcement of 
appropriate law and regulations for protecting the interest 
of the general public, i.e. private investors." The SFC has 
the function of considering and proposing reforms of the 
securities legislation and is required to ensure that 
securities legislation is complied with. 
Data from section two of the questionnaire is applied 
to the first binary choice model for estimating the formula. 
Averages of the two groups are input to the model to find 
out the likelihood of each supporting the SFC. The model 
predicts that for private investors, the probability of a 
private investor supporting the SFC is 0.68 while for stock 
brokers the probability is 0.76. There is a two thirds 
chance in one that a private investor supports the SFC. For 
a stock broker the chance is even higher. From the 
foregoing findings the first hypothesis "That the Securities 
and Futures Commission has caused the making and enforcement 
of appropriate law and regulations for protecting the 
interest of the general public, i.e. private investors." is 
accepted. Although private investors are satisfied, if the 
probability of the private investor group is compared with 
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the probability of the stock broker group, it is observed 
that a stock broker is more likely to support the SFC. 
Observation of charts 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 lends 
support to the above finding. Chart 5.7 shows the results 
of question 7. Question 7 asks respondents if they agree 
that the present law governing the securities industry is 
already adequate for the protection of investors. Chart 5.8 
shows the results of question 8. Question 8 asks 
respondents if they agree that the authorities have already 
exercised adequate vigilance in the enforcement of the law 
relating to securities for the protection of investors. 
From both charts one observes that private investors and 
stock brokers are satisfied with the present law although 
the phenomenon is more pronounced in stock brokers than 
private investors. Charts 5.9 and 5.10 relate to questions 
9 and 10 both of which are concerned with the role of self 
regulating bodies in protecting investors. Results show 
that all three groups agree that self regulating bodies 
should play a role in investor protection. Further, from 
chart 5.10 it is observed that respondents support the 
legalization of rules and regulations made by self 
regulating bodies for investor protection. 
Section three aims at testing the second hypothesis of 
Chapter one. The second hypothesis states "that the 
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securities and Futures Commission has adequately supervised 
the stock exchange, a self regulated body, for protecting 
the interest of the general public, i.e. private investors". 
The SFC has the function of supervising and monitoring the 
activities of the stock exchange. 
Data from this section is applied to the second binary 
choice model of chapter four to arrive at a formula. The 
averages are then input into the model to arrive at the 
probabilities of supporting the SFC. The model predicts 
that for a private investor, there is a probability of 0.62 
or approximately a two thirds chance in one that he supports 
the SFC while for stock brokers the probability is 0.63. 
There is only a slight difference of one percentage point 
between the two groups. For both private investors and 
stock brokers there is approximately a two thirds chance in 
one of supporting the SFC. From the foregoing findings the 
second hypothesis "that the Securities and Futures 
Commission has adequately supervised the stock exchange, a 
self regulated body, for protecting the interest of the 
general public, i.e. private investors" is accepted. From 
the results one finds that stock brokers are deriving from 
SFC the same level of satisfaction as private investors. 
Observation of charts 5.12, 5.15 and 5.16 also lends 
support to the above finding. These charts relate 
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respectively to questions 12, 15 and 16 of the 
questionnaire. Question 12 asks if closer supervision of 
the Exchange by the SFC will give better protection to 
investors. The chart shows that all three groups agree to 
closer supervision. Question 15 relates to the 
determination of share subscription prices of new listings. 
Most private investors and stock brokers agree that the 
stock exchange should be given a role. Question 16 relates 
to the Exchange's function of scrutinizing new listings. On 
this issue all three groups are satisfied with the work of 
the Exchange. 
Section five aims at testing the third hypothesis "that 
the Securities and Futures Commission has adequately 
supervised listed companies and their management for 
protecting the interest of the general public, i.e. private 
investors" . 
Data from this section is used in the third binary 
choice model for estimating the formula. The averages are 
then calculated and input into the model to arrive at the 
probabilities of being satisfied and supportive of the SFC. 
The model predicts that for a private investor, there is 
only a probability of 0.27 or approximately a one quarter 
chance in one that he is satisfied and supportive of the 
SFC. For a stock broker exactly the same probability of 
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0.27 is arrived at. Neither private investors nor stock 
brokers are satisfied with or supportive of the SFC. It 
follows that both stock brokers and private investors are 
not deriving benefits from the SFC on this issue. From the 
foregoing findings the third hypothesis "That the Securities 
and Futures Commission has adequately supervised listed 
companies and their management for protecting the interest 
of the general public, i.e. private investors" is rejected. 
Benefits relating to this matter should have been 
appropriated to parties other than the general public, stock 
brokers or fund managers. 
Observation of charts 5.24, 5.27 and 5.29 lends support 
to the above finding. Chart 5.24 relates to the promptness 
of listed companies in disclosing sensitive information to 
the public. Most respondents are dissatisfied with the 
current practice. Chart 5.27 relates to the proper 
discharge of duties by listed company directors towards 
investors. Respondents are disappointed with listed company 
directors on this matter. Question 5.29 relates to investor 
protection in take-over and merger situations. Most 
respondents believe that their interests are not being 
protected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions are drawn from the findings. 
a) The benefits of the Securities and Futures 
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Commission Ordinance, an economic legislation, do not 
always accrue to interest groups, as predicted by the 
"Capture Theory". The general public does occasionally 
derive benefits from this legislation, although it is 
not correct to state that most of the benefits go to 
the general public, as stated under the "Public 
Interest" theory. Interest groups also derive benefits 
from the legislation. Both the Public Interest Theory 
and the Capture Theory are, at least in this analysis, 
unable to explain fully the findings observed. 
b) Private investors, i.e. the general public, do 
behave like an interest group and it should be so 
treated. In the present analysis, private investors, 
as an interest group, win legislative support for 
regulating the stock exchange but lose legislative 
benefits to listed companies (eg: on the issue of 
disclosing price sensitive information by listed 
companies) which could also be regarded as an interest 
group. This phenomenon lends support to this 
researcher's postulation that for every economic 
legislation there are at least two bidders. The first 
bid is offered by the general public offering a 
negative price consideration while the other bid comes 
from an interest group or groups. The negative price 
consideration includes the "not creating a public 
uproar" or "not orchestrating a public outcry". 
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c) There is no support for the hypothesis that the 
smaller an interest group the more cohesive it is and 
the easier for it to bid for economic benefits from 
legislators and regulators. The general public, as an 
interest group, is neither small in size nor cohesive 
in nature. However, it does successfully bid for 
legislative benefits. 
d) The present analysis lends support to the view 
expressed by Haddock and Macey that interest groups may 
join together when they possess compelling mutual 
interests. In the present analysis, private investors, 
as an interest group, and the stock brokers interest 
group are both interested in the enactment of law and 
regulation for the proper supervision of the stock 
exchange. This they got. There, apparently, are 
grounds for supporting the view that interest groups 
sometimes join hands in bidding for legislative 
benefits. 
e) The present researcher observes that the Securities 
and Futures Commission does behave like a profit 
maximizing entity. On the one hand the SFC is 
maximizing support from the general public which will 
guarantee its future funding from the public purse. On 
the other hand the SFC is soliciting rewards from 
interest groups, most notably from listed companies. 
Again, if the general public is regarded as an interest 
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group, the SFC is driving a course which would bring to 
it maximum benefits or minimum detriments, taking the 
interest of all parties into consideration. The SFC 
will pursue this "corporate policy" irrespective of the 
legal provisions in the Securities and Futures 
Commission Ordinance as long as the SFC is bestowed the 
power of discretion in key issues by legislators. In 
general the SFC, as a regulator, is following a profit 
maximizing function. This function is represented by : 
f(x) = p + gl + g2 + ... gn 
where x are the "profits" to the SFC 
p is consideration given by the general public 
gl is consideration given by interest group 1 
g2 is consideration given by interest group 2 
etc ... 
Consideration in this case includes negative 
consideration of "detriments and public outcries". 
Acting like a profit maximizing interest group, the SFC 
seeks to maximize its profits (x), within the legal 
framework, in every course of action it takes or will 
take. 
FINDINGS FROM CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
The CQ statistical analysis is performed on the data of 
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all three groups. However, because of the small number of 
replies from professional investors, it is not statistically 
sound to rely on the data collected 1 As such, data from 
the professional investor group is not used for comparative 
purposes nor for the purpose of drawing conclusions about 
interest groups except for section one which deals with the 
background of the three groups. 
The results of the CQ statistical analysis are 
presented in chapter five. Findings from the statistical 
analysis are given below. 
For section one there are altogether six questions. 
The findings of this section suggest that investors in Hong 
Kong are sophisticated. A significant number of private 
investors (30%) are investing in both local and overseas 
markets. However, many of them are only moderately 
experienced in the local market. More than half of the 
professional investors have less than five years of local 
experience while half of the private investors have less 
than ten years of local market experience. Except for 
professional investors, most private investors are not 
active participants. Private investors tend to put a 
substantial portion of their share investments locally while 
professional investors tend to diversify into other markets. 
1.p.274 Basic Statistics for Business and Economics, Paul G. Hoel 
and Raymond J Jessen, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971. 
184 
Local investors are not risk avers'e. They regard capital 
gain as the prime motive for participating in the local 
market. Private investors give a low priority to dividend 
gained from investment. 
For section two there are altogether four questions 
(Q.7 - Q.10). Questions 7 and 8 are key questions. 
Question 7 attempts to find out the adequacy of the present 
law while question 8 the adequacy of the law enforcement. 
Other questions in this section refer to rules and 
regulations of self regulated bodies. 
Question 7 investigates the adequacy of the present 
law. The opinions from private investors and stock brokers 
are evenly distributed. The null hypothesis "that there is 
no appreciable statistical difference in the sample 
population regarding the adequacy of the present securities 
law" is accepted by both groups. No definite conclusion 
could be drawn from the data. 
Question 8 deals with the adequacy of the enforcement 
of the present securities law. The null hypothesis "that 
there is no appreciable statistical difference in the sample 
population regarding the enforcement of the present 
securities law" is accepted by the stock broker group and 
rejected by the private investor group. It could be 
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concluded that private investors are happy with the present 
law enforcement whereas stock brokers do not give a clear 
indication. 
Opinion on the other 2 questions of this section 
indicates that both private investors and stock brokers are 
favouring a more prominent role for self regulated bodies in 
making rules and regulations for the protection of 
investors. 
For section three there are seven questions (Q.11 -
Q.17). Questions 11 and 12 are key questions. For question 
11, the null hypothesis "that there is no appreciable 
statistical difference in the sample population regarding 
the adequacy of the Exchange in protecting investors" is 
rejected by both the private investor group and stock broker 
group, indicating a definite opinion on this issue. More 
than 60% of private investors agree that the exchange has 
made an adequate effort in protecting investors while only 
47% of stock brokers agree. Both private investors and 
stock brokers are satisfied with the present arrangement 
while the former show a higher satisfaction. 
For question 12, the null hypothesis "that there is no 
appreciable difference in the sample population regarding 
closer supervision of the Exchange by the SFC" is rejected 
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by the private investors group. 72% of private investors 
agree that closer supervision of the exchange by the SFC 
would give better protection to investors, indicating a 
definite trusting attitude towards the agency. In the case 
of stock brokers the null hypothesis is accepted for this 
question which indicates a rather divided attitude towards 
the SFC. 
From the response to the above two key questions, the 
researcher is of the opinion that private investors are more 
satisfied with the stock exchange in protecting investors 
and are more willing to subject the exchange to the 
supervision of the SFC than stock brokers. For private 
investors, supervision of the stock exchange is effective. 
Although stock brokers are less positive than private 
investors towards the running and supervision of the 
exchange, on a number count the majority of them are still 
satisfied. 
Other questions in this sections refer to the other 
activities of the stock exchange. Responses to these 
questions reinforced and corroborated the earlier findings 
that private investors are more satisfied with the working 
and supervision of the stock exchange than other groups. 
Section four aims at providing information relating to 
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the adequacy of the 8FC in supervising stock brokers. 
There are five questions in this section (Q.18 - Q.22). 
Question 18 requests the respondents to express opinion 
about the adequacy of information supplied by market 
intermediaries. The majority of private investors and 
professional investors are of the opinion that market 
intermediaries are not supplying to them adequate financial 
information. Question 19 requests the respondents to 
express opinions about the adequacy of training of market 
intermediaries. Again, the majority of private investors 
and professional investors express dissatisfaction. 
Question 20 asks the respondents to express their opinions 
about the adequacy of capital requirements for stock 
brokers. The 8FC, by virtue of the power vested upon it by 
legislation, sets the capital requirements for stock 
brokers. The majority of private investors express 
satisfaction while the majority of professional investors 
are dissatisfied. Question 21 asks the respondents if they 
know of any dishonest or sharp practices by stock brokers 
and market intermediaries against the interest of clients. 
For private investors, 42% say that they know of such 
practices while 57% reply that they do not know of such 
practices. For professional investors, a majority of them 
say that they know of such practices while only 16% reply 
that they do not know of such practices. Most of them wish 
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that these practices be stopped by the operation of law. 
The overall conclusion from the replies is that both 
private investors and professional investors are 
dissatisfied with the supervision of and services provided 
by market intermediaries. However, professional investors 
are more critical of market intermediaries' professional 
conduct. 
For section five there are seven questions (Q.23 -
Q.29). Q.23, 24 and 29 are key questions for testing the 
third hypothesis. Q.23 asks the respondents if they agree 
that the amount of information disclosed by listed companies 
to their shareholders is adequate. The null hypothesis 
"that there is no appreciable difference in the sample 
population regarding the adequacy of the disclosure by 
listed companies" is rejected by the private investor group. 
For the stock broker group the null hypothesis is accepted. 
While both the private investors group and the stock brokers 
group agree that listed companies do not provide adequate 
information, the opinion of private investors is more 
pronounced (the null hypothesis rejected) . 
Q.24 asks the respondents if listed companies are 
prompt in disclosing sensitive information to the investing 
public. The null hypothesis "that there is no appreciable 
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difference for the sample population regarding the 
promptness in disclosing sensitive information by listed 
companies" is rejected by both the private investor and 
stock broker group. Both groups disagree that listed 
companies are prompt in disclosing sensitive information to 
the investing public. 
Q.29 asks the respondents if the interests of 
shareholders are always protected in take-over situations. 
The null hypothesis "that there is no appreciable difference 
in the sample population regarding the protection of 
investors in take-over situations" is rejected by the 
private investor group and accepted by the stock brokers 
group. Both private investors and stock brokers disagree 
that investors' interests are protected in take-over 
situations but stock brokers exhibit a more balanced 
opinion. 
Findings from other questions of this section further 
support the view that both groups are dissatisfied with the 
SFC on the supervising of listed companies. However, 
private investors, as compared with stock brokers, are more 
dissatisfied. 
Section six deals with general issues. 
On margin trading the majority of the three groups 
190 
agree that it should be under some form of control to ensure 
an orderly market. 
On prohibiting short selling the majority of the three 
groups agree that prohibiting short selling will not help 
protect investors. 
On brokerage and incidental charges on securities 
transactions the majority of private investors and stock 
brokers agree that brokerage and charges in Hong Kong are 
low while professional investors are indecisive. 
On the cost of supervising the securities industry the 
majority of private investors and professional investors do 
not agree that investors should bear the cost while most of 
the stock brokers agree that it should be borne by 
investors. This divergence of opinion basically arises from 
their divergence of interest. 
For the methods of supervision both private investors 
and stock brokers choose law as the most favoured means 
while stock brokers, understandingly, choose the less formal 
method of supervision by the stock exchange. Only a few 
respondents of each group prefer informal mechanisms for 
supervision. 
SUMMARY 
The data is subject to two analyses i.e. Binary Choice 
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Modelling and Chi Square Analysis. The three hypotheses are 
tested using binary choice models. Results indicate that 
neither the Capture Theory nor the Public Interest Theory 
can explain in full the behaviour of interest groups and the 
general public. Rather, it would be more realistic to 
regard both the regulator and the general public as two 
distinct interest groups. These two interest groups, 
together with the other more traditionally defined interest 
groups, such as the stock broker group, would engage in open 
competition for legislative benefits. Benefits, as defined 
by the present researcher, could be tangible benefits, such 
as votes or money, or intangible benefits such as "not 
raising a public outcry against the regulator". 
Flowing from the above insight one is tempted to take a 
fresh look at the two "newly defined", "always present" 
interest groups - the regulator and the general public. The 
regulator should no longer be regarded as only a distributor 
of legislative benefits nor the general public only a 
passive player in the legislative game. There is every 
reason to believe that the game is feverishly played and 
ardently participated in by all parties concerned. 
It is logical to conclude that the Capture Theory, 
which was derived from analysing a particular group of 
industries in the United States of America, is only 
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applicable to industries adopting the "legislative versus 
legislative-free (self regulation) 11 model. 1 These polar 
situations, as observed by some theorists, do not have 
universal applications. The UK financial services industry 
is a case in point. A substantial number of industries are 
now being regulated by a mix of legislation and elements of 
practitioner-based regulation with appropriate safeguards 
against industry capture. This modified Public Interest 
model - i.e. a Public Interest model with interest groups, 
including the general public interest group, internalized -
seems to work well in quite a number of economies and it 
could be a "winning" model for regulating businesses and 
industries in the twenty-first century. 
Understanding more the underlying reasons for the modus 
operandi of all interest groups, including the general 
public, will allow legislators to enact legislation and to 
devise regulatory frameworks which would comply more with 
the original design and purposes of their enactment. 
Further, understanding more the behaviour of the major 
players in the economy will provide economists and state 
planners with better insights into the distribution of 
resources in society. Hopefully, in future, state planners 
may be able to devise a more effective regulatory system for 
1.see Chapter 2. 
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the economy aiming at modifying market imperfections. 
End of Chapter 
194 
"- - --_ .. 
... - "-- - - - . ·_._-------.----",- ---------.---- .,,-- ---
. Hong Kong Polytechnic 
Questionnaire 
Department of Business Studies 
December 1989 
A'ITACHMENI' A 
~ ' . 
. - -' ,,_ ... 
195 
· QUESTIONNAIRE ABOUT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SECURITIES· 
INDUSTRYAND'THEPROTECTION OF SECURITIES INVEStOR~f6F 
" 
HONG KONG 
IN THE FOLLOWING, THE TERM SECURITIES MEANS STOCKS, SHARES, BONDS, 
AND :UNIT TRUSTS INVESTING IN STOCKS, SHARES OR BONDS. 
/ '( t { 
GENERAL INFORMATION " 
1. Do you invest in securities markets? 
1. __ I do not invest in securities " 
(if you tick the above please ignore the rest of this questionnaires and send back this, 
form to us) 
2, __ I invest in HK securities only 
3. __ I invest in overseas securities only 
4. __ I invest in both HK and overseas securities 
2. How long have you been investing in the Hong Kong securities market? 
1. __ never 
2. __ less than 5 years 
3, __ between 5 - 10 years 
4. __ more than 10 years 
3. For whom are you investing in the HK securities? 
1. __ for yourself only (including friends and relations) 
2. __ for your company only 
3. __ for both yourself and your company 
4. Frequency of your activities in the HK securities market 
1. __ deal in the market every day 
2. __ deal in the market every week 
3. __ deal in the market every month 
4. __ only infrequently 
-1-
' .. 
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5.' The amount of HK securitiesyo"U have or under your control is: 
L_'_:' _' less th::ilri io%~i ~il YOiiii~c~~iti~n~ve~tments ' 
2. _' _ between .. 100/0 '..:...: 300l{of all'your securities investments 
, 3. __ between 300/0 - 500/0 of all your securities investments 
. . . '. .' .'. " 
4 .. __ more than 500/0 of a1.l"your securities investments 
6. You invest in HK securities for ... 
I. __ the high yield in dividend and interest 
2 .. __ the high appreciation of capital value 
3. __ the necessary portfolio diversification 
, , 
4. __ other such as __________________________ _ 
LAW AND REGULATIONS FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
7.. Do you agree that the present law governing the securities industry are already adequate for the 
protection of investors such as yourself? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
8. Do you agree that the authorities already exercise adequate vigilance in the enforcement of law 
relating to securities for the protection of investors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
9. Do you agree that professional bodies such as Stock Brokers Association, Unit Trusts AssoCiation, 
HK Society of Accountants etc. should play a: role in marking rules and regulations governing 
their members for the protection of investors? . 
- strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
'. . - - . 
5 ) 
10. Do you agree that such rules and regulations made by professional bodies relating to securities 
industry should have the force of law behind them? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
l 
-2-
disagree 
4 
. strongly disagree 
5 
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11. Do you agree that the Stock Exchange has already made adequate effort for the protection of 
investors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
12yDo you agr~e tliat bloser supervision of the Stock Exchange by the Securities and Futures COmnUssion 
and the government could give better protection to investors? . ,I - -
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
• 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
13.00 you agree that the Stock Exchange should request theirmembers (stock brokers) to take out 
insurance against their possible financial default towards investors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
14. Do you agree that the Stock Exchange should have the power to limit the number of new listings 
and placements to the market in any given period? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
15. Do you agree -that the Stock Exchange should be given a role in the determination of share 
subscription prices of new listings in conjunction with the company applying to be listed and 
their advisors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
16. Do you agree that companies which apply to be listed are always properly scrutinized by the Stock 
Exchange before their requests for listing are approved? 
- strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
-4 
strongly disagree 
5 
17. Do you agree that in time of exceptional financial turmoil the Stock Exchange should be temporarily 
closed for the protection of investors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
-3-
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
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I , 
18. Doyou agree that investors already receive an adequate supply of financial information from stock 
brokers, invest.!11ent advisors and various professionals of the securities industry? . 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
19. Do you agree that stock brokers, investmenfadvisors and other professionals in securities dealings 
are adequately trained?' . 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
20. Do you agree that the capital requirements of stock brokers are adequate, from the point of view 
of investors and the brokers' dealing counterpart? (HK$I million for personal brokers and HK$5 
million for corporate brokers irrespective of turnover) 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
21. Do you know of any dishonest or sharp practices by stock brokers and market intermediaries which 
are against the interest of their clients? 
1. __ yes 
2. __ no 
22. What do you think is the best way of curbing dishonest or sharp practices of brokers and market 
intermediaries? (Tick one only) 
I. __ by enacting law 
2. __ sanction by the Stock Exchange 
3. __ sanction by their respective trade associations 
4. __ sanction by quasi-government bodies, such as the Consumers' Council 
5. __ other, such as __________________________ _ 
LISTED COMPANIES 
Do you agree that the amount of information disclosed by listed companies to their shareholders 
is adequate? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
-4-
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
5 
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24. Do you agree that listed companies are prompt in disclosing sensitive information to the investing 
public? 
strongly agree, agree 
,2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
25. Do you agree that if listed companies are compelled by law to disclose more information to the 
public, some' private companies may be discouraged from seeking a listing? 
strongly agree agree' 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
" s 
26. Do you agree that the law should require disclosure of listed company shareholding above 5OJo? .. 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
27. Do you agree that directors of listed companies in HK adequately discharge their duties towards 
the investors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
28. Do you agree that shareholders of listed companies should be given more power to approve maj or 
transactions of their companies? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
29. Do you agree that in the take-over of one listed company by another company, the interest of 
shareholders are always protected? 
strongly agree 
SECURITIES DEALINGS 
agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
30. Do you agree that trading on margin should be under some form of control for.the sake of an 
orderly market? 
strongly agree 
1 
agree 
2 
neutral 
3 
-5-
disagree 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
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31. Do y()u agree.that prohibiting short sellingof stock and shareshelps to protect investorsL 
" , strongly agree· " 
I 
agree 
2 
neutral 
3 " 
disagree "" 
4 
strongly disagree 
s 
32. Do you agree that the brokerage and incidental charges on the buying of securities in HK are low? 
I. ~' . , 
strongly agree agree neu tral 
. ~ '. .. .. 
2 3 
disagree 
4 
str~ngly disagree 
s 
33. Do you agree that the cost of supervising the securities industry should be mostly paid for by 
" investors? 
strongly agree agree 
2 
" neutral 
3 
disagree 
'4 
strongly disagree 
5 
34. Indicate below which methods you considered the best for ensuring an orderly and fair market? 
(Tick one only) 
1. __ law 
2. __ informal guidelines "by the authority 
3. __ rules by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 
4. __ informal codes similar to the codes of takeovers and mergers 
5; __ practice rules by trade associations 
6. __ others such as ___________________ --'-______ _ 
35. Please state below any comments which you wish to make on the subject of the protection of investors 
trading in securities 
THANK YOU 
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ATTACHMENT B 
Table 5.1a 
INVEST IN SECURITIES MARKET BY PRIVATE INVESTORS (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
,r 
NOT INVEST 1 1 • 2.7 2.8 2.8 
HK SECUR 2 21 56.8 58.3 61.1 
OVERSEA SECUR 3 3 8.1 8.3 69.4 
BOTH 4 11 29.7 30.6 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.1b : INVEST IN SECURITIES MARKET BY STOCK BROKERS (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
NOT INVEST 1 2 8.7 8.7 8.7 
HK SECUR 2 7 30.4 30.4 39.1 
OVERSEA SECUR 3 1 4.3 4.3 43.5 
BOTH 4 13 56.5 56.5 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.1c : INVEST IN SECURITIES MARKET BY PROF. INVESTORS (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
BOTH 4 7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.2a : HOW LONG IN HK SECURITIES MKT (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
LESS THAN 5 YRS 2 7 18.9 19.4 19.4 
5-10 YRS 3 11 29.7 30.6 50.0 
MORE THAN 10 YRS 4 18 48.6 50.0 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100."0 
Table 5.2b HOW LONG IN HK SECURITIES MKT (SB) 
1 
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Valid Cum 
Value Label Value .. Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
LESS THAN 5 "YRS 2 2 8.7 9.5 9.5 
5-10 YRS 3 4 17.4 19.0 28.6 
MORE THAN 10 YRS 4 15 65.2 71.4 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
1~ 
Table 5.2c : HOW LONG IN HK SECURITIES MKT (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
LESS THAN 5 YRS 2 4 57.1 57.1 57.1 
5-10 YRS 3 2 28.6 28.6 85.7 
MORE THAN 10 YRS 4 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.3a : FOR WHOM INVESTING IN HK SECUR MKT (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
YOURSELF 1 27 73.0 75.0 75.0 
BOTH 3 9 24.3 25.0 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.3b : FOR WHOM INVESTING IN HK SECUR MKT (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
YOURSELF 1 9 39.1 42.9 42.9 
COMPANY 2 2 8.7 9.5 52.4 
BOTH 3 10 43.5 47.6 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.3c : FOR WHOM INVESTING IN HK SECUR MKT (PRO) 
valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
COMPANY 2 4 57.1 57.1 57.1 
BOTH 3 3 42.9 42.9 100.0 
------- ------- -------
2 
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TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.4a FREQUENCY IN HK SECUR MKT (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
,/ 
EVERYDAY 1 7 ;18.9 19.4 19.4 
EVERYWEEK 2 5 13.5 13.9 33.3 
EVERYMONTH 3 8 21. 6 22.2 55.6 
INFREQ 4 16 43.2 44.4 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.4b : FREQUENCY IN HK SECUR MKT (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
EVERYDAY 1 10 43.5 47.6 47.6 
EVERYWEEK 2 4 17.4 19.0 66.7 
EVERYMONTH 3 3 13.0 14.3 81.0 
INFREQ 4 4 17.4 19.0 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.4c : FREQUENCY IN HK SECUR MKT (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
EVERYDAY 1 2 28.6 40.0 40.0 
EVERYWEEK 2 3 42.9 60.0 100.0 
2 28.6 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.5a : AMT HK SECU UNDER CONTROL (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
0-10% 
10-30% 
30-50% 
MORE THAN 50% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 
6 
5 
3 
22 
16.2 
13.5 
8.1 
59.5 
16.7 
13.9 
8.3 
61.1 
16.7 
30.6 
38.9 
100.0 
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1 .. 2.7 MISSING. 
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table S.5b : AMT HK SECU UNDER CONTROL (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent . Percent Percent 
0-10% 1 4 17 ;4 19.0 19.0 
10-30% 2 6 26.1 28.6 47.6 
30-50% 3 3 13.0 14.3 61.9 
MORE THAN 50% 4 8 34.8 38.1 100.·0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.5c : AMT HK SECU UNDER CONTROL (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
0-10% 1 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
10-30% 2 5 71.4 71.4 85.7 
MORE THAN 50% 4 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.6a : REASON FOR INVESTING HK SECU (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
YIELD IN DIVIDEND 1 6 16.2 17.1 17.1 
APPRECIATION 2 26 70.3 74.3 91.4 
PORTFOLIO DIVERS 3 1 2.7 2.9 94.3 
OTHER 4 2 5.4 5.7 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.6b : REASON FOR INVESTING HK SECU (SB) 
Value Label 
YIELD IN DIVIDEND 
APPRECIATION 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1 2 8.7 10.5 10.5 
2 11 47.8 57.9 68.4 
4 
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PORTFOLio 
.- .-
.. .. 
.. 
84:2 DIVERS .. 3 3 13.0 15.8 
OTHER 4 3 13.0 15.8· 100.0 
4 17.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.6c : REASON FOR INVESTING HK SECU (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
PORTFOLIO DIVERS 3 1 14.3 50.0 50.0 
OTHER 4 1 14.3 50.0 100.0 
5 71.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.7a : OPINION ON LAW PROTECTION (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 4 10.8 11.1 11.1 
AGREE 2 10 27.0 27.8 38.9 
NEUTRAL 3 10 27.0 27.8 66.7 
DISAGREE 4 9 24.3 25.0 91.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 8.1 8.3 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.7b : OPINION ON LAW PROTECTION (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 5 21.7 23.8 23.8 
AGREE 2 7 30.4 33.3 57.1 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17.4 19.0 76.2 
. DISAGREE 4 5 21.7 23.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5;7c : OPINION ON LAW PROTECTION (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
5 
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AGREE 
. "." .~-
2., ____ 
--
1 14.3_ 14:3 28.6 
DISAGREE 4 4 57.1 57.1 85.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE . 5 1 14.3 14.3 - 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.8a : AUTHORITIES ENFORCE LAW (PI) I 
It 
Valid Cum I Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 2.7 2.8 2.8 I 
AGREE 2 17 45.9 47.2 50.0 
NEUTRAL 3 6 16.2 16.7 66.7 
I DISAGREE 4 11 29.7 30.6 97.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 2.7 2.8 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
I 
----------------------------------------------------------------------1 
Table 5.8b : AUTHORITIES ENFORCE LAW (SB) I 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 3 13.0 14.3 14.3 
AGREE 2 7 30.4 33.3 47.6 
NEUTRAL 3 6 26.1 28.6 76.2 
DISAGREE 4 3 13.0 14.3 90.5 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 8.7 9.5 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.8c : AUTHORITIES ENFORCE LAW (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
NEUTRAL 3 2 28.6 28.6 42.9 
DISAGREE 4 2 28.6 28.6 71.4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 28.6 28.6 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
6 
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~Tai)ie 5 .. ~,a : PROFESSIONAL BODIES .. TO i?ROTEi:::T:(PI)~~ 
Valid Cum 
Value Label' Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 10 27.0 27.8 27.8 
AGREE 2 20 54.1 55.6 83.3 
NEUTRAL 3 3 8.1 8.3 91.7 
DISAGREE 4 3 8.1 8.3 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.9b : PROFESSIONAL BODIES TO PROTECT (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 4 17.4 19.0 19.0 
AGREE 2 12 52.2 57.1 76.2 
NEUTRAL 3 2 8.7 9.5 85.7 
DISAGREE 4 1 4.3 4.8 90.5 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 8.7 9.5 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.9c : PROFESSIONAL BODIES TO PROTECT (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 5 71.4 71.4 71.4 
NEUTRAL 3 2 28.6 28.6 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.10a : RULES BACKED UP BY LAW (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 
5 
23 
4 
3 
2 
13.5 
62.2 
10.8 
8.1 
5.4 
-------
------- --------_. 
14.3 14.3 
65.7 80.0 
11.4 91.4 
8.6 100.0 
MISSING 
-------
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Table 5.10b : RULES BACKED UP BY LAW (SB) 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL 
Frequency 
1 
12 
2 
3 
2 
3 
23 
Percent 
4.3 
52.2 
8.7 
13.0 
8.7 
13.0 
100.0 
Table 5.10c : RULES BACKED UP BY LAW (PRO) 
Valid 
Percent 
5.0 
60.0 
10.0 
15.0 
10.0 
MISSING 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
5.0 
65.0 
75.0 
90.0 
100.0 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
TOTAL 
1 
2 
2 
2 
7 
14.3 
28.6 
28.6 
28.6 
100.0 
14.3 
28.6 
28.6 
28.6 
100.0 
14.3 
42.9 
71.4 
100.0 
Table 5.11a : OPINION ON STOCK EXCHANGE PROTECTION (PI) 
Value Label 
AGREE 
. NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL 
12 
10 
12 
2 
1 
37 
32.4 
27.0 
32.4 
5.4 
2.7 
100.0 
33.3 
27.8 
33.3 
5.6 
MISSING 
100.0 
33.3 
61.1 
94.4 
100.0 
Table 5.11b : OPINION ON STOCK EXCHANGE PROTECTION (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
8 
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.- -----------
1 1 · .... STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
-- - ---•... _. 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Table·5.11c OPINION 
Value Label 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
Table 5.12a : CLOSER 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Table 5.12b : CLOSER 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Table 5.12c CLOSER 
2 9 
3 4 
4 6 
5 1 
2 
-------
TOTAL 23 
ON STOCK EXCHANGE 
Value Frequency 
2 2 
3 2 
4 3 
-------
TOTAL 7 
SUPERVISION (PI) 
Value Frequency 
1 3 
2 23 
3 7 
4 2 
5 1 
1 
-------
TOTAL 37 
SUPERVISION (SB) 
Value Frequency 
1 2 
2 8 
3 5 
4 4 
5 2 
2 
-------
TOTAL 23 
SUPERVISION (PRO) 
9 
~ ~ 
c. 
-
4.3 4.B ,4 .. 8 
39.1 42.9 47.6 
17.4 19.0 66.7 
26.1 28.6 95.2 
4.3 4.8 100.0 
8.7 MISSING 
------- -------
100.0 100.0 
I! 
PROTECTION (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 
.. 
28.6 28.6 28.6 
28.6 28.6 57.1 
42.9 42.9 100.0 
------- -------
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 
8.1 8.3 8.3 
62.2 63.9 72.2 
18.9 19.4 91.7 
5.4 5.6 97.2 
2.7 2.8 100.0 
2.7 MISSING 
------- -------
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 
8.7 9.5 9.5 
34.8 38.1 47.6 
21.7 23.8 71.4 
17.4 19.0 90.5 
8.7 9.5 100.0 
8.7 MISSING 
------- -------
100.0 100.0 
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--vaiue- Frequency·Percent --Perc:ent-·Perc:en£ ... -- .. 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL 
Table 5.13a : INSURANCE AGAINST FIN 
4 
1 
1 
1 
7 
57.1 
14.3 
14.3 
14.3 
-------
100.0 
DEFAULT (PI) 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 6 16.2 
AGREE 2 20 54.1 
NEUTRAL 3 9 24.3 
DISAGREE 4 1 2.7 
1 2.7 
------- ------
TOTAL 37 100.0 
Table 5.13b : INSURANCE AGAINST FIN DEFAULT (SB) 
57.1 57.1 
14.3 71.4 
14.3 85.7 
14.3 100.0 
-------
100.0 
,/ 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent 
16.7 16.7 
55.6 72.2 
25.0 97.2 
2.8 100.0 
MISSING 
--------
100.0 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 5 21.7 23.8 23.8 
AGREE 2 4 17.4 19.0 42.9 
NEUTRAL 3 5 21.7 23.8 66.7 
DISAGREE 4 6 26.1 28.6 95.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 4.3 4.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.13c : INSURANCE AGAINST FIN DEFAULT (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 5 71.4 71.4 71.4 
DISAGREE 4 2 28.6 28.6 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.14a LIMITING THE NO OF NEW LISTINGS (PI) 
Valid Cum 
10 
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STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
TOTAL 
5 
16 
6 
9 
1 
-------
37 
13.5 13.9 
43.2 44.4 
16.2 16.7 
24.3 25.0 
2.7 MISSING 
------- -------
100.0 100.0 
,f 
Table 5. 14b . : LIMITING THE NO OF NEW LISTINGS (SB) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 4 17.4 19.0 
AGREE 2 5 21.7 23.8 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17.4 19.0 
DISAGREE 4 5 21.7 23.8 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 13.0 14.3 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.14c : LIMITING THE NO OF NEW LISTINGS (PRO) 
Valid 
Value Label . Value Frequency Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 . 14.3 
AGREE 2 3 42.9 42.9 
DISAGREE 4 3 42.9 42.9 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
: -
13.9 
58.3 
75.0 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
19.0 
42.9 
61.9 
85.7 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
14.3 
57.1 
100.0 
Table 5.15a : DETERMINATION OF SHARE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 3 8.1 8.6 8.6 
AGREE 2 19 51.4 54.3 62.9 
NEUTRAL 3 7 18.9 20.0 82.9 
DISAGREE 4 4 10.8 11.4 94.3 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 5.4 5.7 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -----.--
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.15b DETERMINATION OF SHARE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE (SB) 
11 
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Value Label " Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL 
2 
8 
5 
4 
2 
2 
23 
8.7 
34.8 
21.7 
17.4 
8.7 
8.7 
_..1. _____ 
100.0 
9.5 9.5 
38.1 47.6 
23.8 71.4 
19.0 90.5 
9.5 100.0 
MISSING 
-------
100.0 
Table 5.15c : DETERMINATION OF SHARE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
NEUTRAL 3 1 14.3 14.3 28.6 
DISAGREE 4 3 42.9 42.9 71.4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 28.6 28.6 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.16a : SCRUTINIZING BY EXCHANGE BEFORE APPROVAL (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 3 8.1 8.3 8.3 
AGREE 2 16 43.2 44.4 52.8 
NEUTRAL 3 7 18.9 19.4 72.2 
DISAGREE 4 9 24.3 25.0 97.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 2.7 2.8 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.16b : SCRUTINIZING BY EXCHANGE BEFORE APPROVAL (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 3 13.0 14.3 14.3 
AGREE 2 6 26.1 28.6 42.9 
NEUTRAL 3 9 39.1 42.·9 85.7 
DISAGREE 4 3 13.0 14.3 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
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Table 5.16c : SCRUTINIZING BY EXCHANGE BEFORE APPROVAL (PRO) 
Value Label 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
Value Frequency 
2 4 
3 3 
Valid 
Percent Percent 
57.1 57.1 
42.9 42.9 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.17a TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF EXCHANGE IN FINANCIAL 
(PI) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 2.7 2.8 
AGREE 2 5 13.5 13.9 
NEUTRAL 3 9 24.3 25.0 
DISAGREE 4 17 45.9 47.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 4 10.8 11.1 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.17b TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF EXCHANGE IN FINANCIAL 
(SB) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 5 21.7 23.8 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17.4 19.0 
DISAGREE 4 7 30.4 33.3 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 5 21.7 23.8 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.17c TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF EXCHANGE IN FINANCIAL 
(PRO) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
DISAGREE 4 4 57.1 57~1 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 42.9 42.9 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
13 
Cum 
Percent 
57.1 
100.0 
TURMOIL 
Cum 
Percent 
2.8 
16.7 
41.7 
88.9 
100.0 
TURMOIL 
Cum 
Percent 
23.8 
42.9 
76.2 
100.0 
TURMOIL 
Cum 
Percent 
57.1 
100.0 
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_ TablEL.S .• 18a_.: __ FINANCIAL .. HlFORMATION_.FROM .. PROFESSIONALS .. (PI) 
Valid Cum I 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 2.7 2.9 2.9 
AGREE 2 9 24.3 26.5 29.4 
NEUTRAL 3 6 16.2 17.6 47.1 
DISAGREE 4 14 37.8 41.2 88.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 4 10.8 11.8 100.0 
3 , 8.1 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.18b : FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM PROFESSIONALS (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 4.3 4.8 4.8 
AGREE 2 9 39.1 42.9 47.6 
NEUTRAL 3 6 26.1 28.6 76.2 
DISAGREE 4 4 17.4 19.0 95.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 4.3 4.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.18c : FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM PROFESSIONALS (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 2 28.6 28.6 28.6 
NEUTRAL 3 2 28.6 28.6 57.1 
DISAGREE 4 3 42.9 42.9 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.19a . TRAINING OF THE PROFESSIONALS (PI) . 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 3 8.1 8.6 8.6 
AGREE 2 7 18.9 20 •. 0 28.6 
NEUTRAL 3 9 24.3 25.7 54.3 
DISAGREE 4 11 29.7 31.4 85.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 5 13.5 14.3 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
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Table 5.19b': TRAINING OF THE PROFESSIONALS (SB) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 9 39.1 42.9 
NEUTRAL 3 3 13.0 14.3 
DISAGREE 4 7 '30.4 33.3 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 8.7 9.5 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.19c : TRAINING OF THE PROFESSIONALS (PRO) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
NEUTRAL 3 4 57.1 57.1 
DISAGREE 4 2 28.6 28.6 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 14.3 14.3 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.20a : CAPITAL REQUIREMENT OF BROKERS (PI) 
Valid 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 5.4 5.7 
AGREE 2 11 29.7 31.4 
NEUTRAL 3 12 32.4 34.3 
DISAGREE 4 9 24.3 25.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 2.7 2.9 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.20b : CAPITAL REQUIREMENT OF BROKERS (SB) 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
Value Frequency 
1 1 
2 13 
3 3 
4 4 
2 
15 
Percent 
4.3 
56.5 
13.0 
17.4 
8.7 
Valid 
Percent 
4.8 
61.9 
14.3 
19.0 
MISSING 
""L. ' 
Cum 
Percent 
42.9 
57.1 
90.5 
100.0 
cum 
Percent 
57.1 
85.7 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
5.7 
37.1 
71.4 
97.1 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
4.8 
66.7 
81.0 
100.0 
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TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.20c : CAPITAL REQUIREMENT'OF BROKERS (PRO) 
Value Label 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
Table 5.21a 
Value Label 
YES 
NO 
Table 5.21b 
Value Label 
YES 
NO 
Table 5.21c 
Value Label 
YES 
NO 
. 
. 
: 
: 
Valid 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
3 3 42.9 42.9 
4 4 ·57.1 57.1 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
DISHONEST OR SHARP PRACTICES (PI) 
Valid 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 15 40.5 42.9 
2 20 54.1 57.1 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
DISHONEST OR SHARP PRACTICES (SB) 
Valid 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 9 39.1 42.9 
2 12 52.2 57.1 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
DISHONEST OR SHARP PRACTICES (PRO) 
Valid 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 5 71.4 83.3 
2 1 14.3 16.7 
1 14.3 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.22a : CURBING DISHONEST OR SHARP PRACTICES (PI) 
16 
Cum 
Percent 
42.9 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
42.9 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
42.9 
100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
83.3 
100.0 
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Valid Cum 
Value Label . Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
BY LAW 1 23 62.2 65.7 65.7 
STOCK EXCHANGE 2 10 27.0 28.6 94.3 
QUASI-GOVT BODIES 4 1 2.7 2.9 97.1 
OTHER 5 1 2.7 2.9 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ---.----
___ L ___ 
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.22b : CURBING DISHONEST OR SHARP PRACTICES (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
BY LAW 1 5 21.7 25.0 25.0 
STOCK EXCHANGE 2 13 56.5 65.0 90.0 
TRADE ASS 3 1 4.3 5.0 95.0 
OTHER 5 1 4.3 5.0 100.0 
3 13.0 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.22c : CURBING DISHONEST OR SHARP PRACTICES (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
BY LAW 1 6 85.7 85.7 85.7 
STOCK EXCHANGE 2 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.23a : DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY LISTED COMPANIES (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 2.7 2.9 2.9 
AGREE 2 7 18.9 20.0 22.9 
NEUTRAL 3 10 27.0 28.6 51.4 
DISAGREE 4 13 35.1 37.1 88.6 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 4 10.8 11. 4 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
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Table .. 5.23b._: .. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION .BY .LISTED COMPANIES (SB). 
Value Label 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL 
6 
4 
8 
3 
2 
23 
26.1 
17.4 
34.8 
13.0 
8.7 
__ ..a. ___ _ 
100.0 
28.6 
19.0 
38.1 
14.3 
MISSING 
100.0 
28.6 
47.6 
85.7 
100.0 
Table 5.23c : DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY LISTED COMPANIES (PRO) 
Value Label 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
3 2 28.6 28.6 28.6 
4 5 71.4 71.4 100.0 
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.24a : PROMPT IN DISCLOSING SENSITIVE INFORMATION (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 5.4 5.7 5.7 
AGREE 2 6 16.2 17.1 22.9 
NEUTRAL 3 7 18.9 20.0 42.9 
DISAGREE 4 17 45.9 48.6 91.4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 8.1 8.6 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.24b : PROMPT IN DISCLOSING SENSITIVE INFORMATION (SS) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 4.3 4.8 4.8 
AGREE 2 4 17.4 19.0 23.8 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17.4 19.0 42.9 
DISAGREE 4 9 39.1 42.9 85.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 13.0 14.3 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
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_ Tabl~ 5. 26a . DISCLOSURE _ OF __ SHAREHOLDING ABOVE FIVE PERCENT (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 5.4 5.7 5.7 
AGREE 2 17 45.9 48.6 54.3 
NEUTRAL 3 11 29.7 31.4 85.7 
DISAGREE 4 5 13.5 14.3 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ---~--- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.26b DISCLOSURE OF SHAREHOLDING ABOVE FIVE PERCENT (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 4 17.4 19.0 19.0 
AGREE 2 6 26.1 28.6 47.6 
NEUTRAL 3 6 26.1 28.6 76.2 
DISAGREE 4 5 21.7 23.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.26c . DISCLOSURE OF SHAREHOLDING ABOVE FIVE PERCENT (PRO) . 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 
AGREE 2 3 42.9 
NEUTRAL 3 1 14.3 
DISAGREE 4 2 28.6 
------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 
Table 5.27a : DIRECTORS DISCHARGE DUTIES (PI) 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Frequency Percent 
1 2.7 
5 13.5 
13 35.1 
13 35.1 
3 8.1 
2 5.4 
------- -------
20 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent 
14.3 14.3 
42.9 57.1 
14.3 71.4 
28.6 100.0 
-------
100.0 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent 
2.9 2.9 
14 ~ 3 --- 17.1 
37.1 54.3 
37.1 91. 4 
8.6 100.0 
MISSING 
-------
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. TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.27b : DIRECTORS DISCHARGE DUTIES (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 6 26.1 28'! 6 28.6 
NEUTRAL 3 7 30.4 33.3 61.9 
DISAGREE 4 4 17.4 19.0 81.0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 4 17.4 19.0 100.0 
Table 5.27c : 
Value Label 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
Table 5.28a 
(PI) 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL 
DISAGREE 
Table 5.28b 
(SB) 
Value Label 
STRONGLY AGREE 
AGREE 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
DIRECTORS DISCHARGE DUTIES (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
3 3 42.9 42.9 57.1 
4 3 42.9 42.9 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
SHAREHOLDERS MORE POWER TO APPROVE TRANSACTIONS 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1 5 13.5 14.3 14.3 
2 15 40.5 42.9 57.1 
3 14 37.8 40.0 97.1 
4 1 2.7 2.9 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
SHAREHOLDERS MORE POWER TO APPROVE TRANSACTIONS 
Valid Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1 2 8.7 9.5 9.5 
2 8 34.8 38.1 47.6 
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NEUTRAL 3 6 26.1 28.6 76.2 
DISAGREE 4 4 17.4 19.0 95.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 4.3 4.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.28c SHAREHOLDERS MORE POWER TO APPROVE TRANSACTIONS 
(PRO) ,I 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
AGREE 2 4 57.1 57.1 71.4 
NEUTRAL 3 2 28.6 28.6 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.29a : PROTECTION IN THE TAKEOVER (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 5.4 5.7 5.7 
AGREE 2 5 13.5 14.3 20.0 
NEUTRAL 3 9 24.3 25.7 45.7 
DISAGREE 4 13 35.1 37.1 82.9 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 6 16.2 17.1 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.29b : PROTECTION IN THE TAKEOVER (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 4.3 4.8 4.8 
AGREE 2 4 17.4 19.0 23.8 
NEUTRAL 3 6 26.1 28.6 52.4 
DISAGREE 4 3 13.0 14.3 66.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 7 30.4 33.3 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.29c PROTECTION IN THE TAKEOVER (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
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Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
NEUTRAL 3 2 28.6 28.6 28.6 
DISAGREE 4 4 57.1 57.1 85.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.30a . CONTROL OVER TRADING ON MARGIN (PI) ,f . 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 9 24.3 25.7 25.7 
AGREE 2 12 32.4 34.3 60.0 
NEUTRAL 3 10 27.0 28.6 88.6 
DISAGREE 4 3 8.1 8.6 97.1 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 2.7 2.9 100.0 
2 5.4 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.30b : CONTROL OVER TRADING ON MARGIN (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency. Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 8.7 9.5 9.5 
AGREE 2 12 52.2 57.1 66.7 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17 .4 19.0 85.7 
. DISAGREE 4 2 8.7 9.5 95.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 4.3 4.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.30c : CONTROL OVER TRADING ON MARGIN (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
AGREE 2 5 71.4 71.4 85.7 
NEUTRAL 3 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.31a PROHIBIT SHORT SELLING (PI) 
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Valid Cum 
Value Label Value" Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 5.4 5.6 5.6 
AGREE 2 9 24.3 25.0 30.6 
NEUTRAL 3 5 13.5 13.9 44.4 
DISAGREE 4 14 37.8 38.9 83.3 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 6 16.2 16.7 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- ------.1.. 
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 6. 31b : PROHIBIT SHORT SELLING (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 8.7 9.5 9.5 
AGREE 2 2 8.7 9.5 19.0 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17.4 19.0 38.1 
DISAGREE 4 10 43.5 47.6 85.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 13.0 14.3 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.31c . PROHIBIT SHORT SELLING (PRO) . 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
NEUTRAL 3 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
DISAGREE 4 3 42.9 42.9 57.1 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 3 42.9 42.9 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.32a : LOW BROKERAGE AND INCIDENTAL CHARGES (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 5.4 5.6 5.6 
AGREE 2 15 40.5 41.7 47.2 
NEUTRAL 3 6 16.2 "16.7 63.9 
DISAGREE 4 11 29.7 30.6 94.4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 5.4 5.6 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
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Table 6.32b": LOW BROKERAGE AND INCIDENTAL CHARGES (SB). 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 4 17.4 19.0 19.0 
AGREE 2 9 39.1 42.9 61.9 
NEUTRAL 3 4 17,4 19.0 81. 0 
DISAGREE 4 3 13.0 14.3 95.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 4.3 4.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.32c : LOW BROKERAGE AND INCIDENTAL CHARGES (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
AGREE 2 1 14.3 14.3 28.6 
NEUTRAL 3 3 42.9 42.9 71.4 
DISAGREE· 4 1 14.3 14.3 85.7 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.33a . COST PAID BY INVESTORS (PI) . 
Valid cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 1 2.7 2.8 2.8 
AGREE 2 10 27.0 27.8 30.6 
NEUTRAL 3 7 18.9 19.4 50.0 
DISAGREE 4 16 43.2 44.4 94.4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 5.4 5.6 100.0 
1 2.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 37 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.33b : COST·PAID BY INVESTORS (SB) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
STRONGLY AGREE 1 2 8.7. 9.5 9.5 
25 
226 
") 
j 
AGREE 2 6 26.1 . 28.6 38.1 
NEUTRAL 3 6 26.1 28.6 66.7 
DISAGREE 4 6 26.1 28.6 95.2 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 1 4.3 4.8 100.0 
2 8.7 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 23 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.33c . COST PAID BY INVESTORS (PRO) it . 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
AGREE 2 1 14.3 14.3 14.3 
NEUTRAL 3 3 42.9 42.9 57.1 
DISAGREE 4 1 14.3 14.3 71.4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 5 2 28.6 28.6 100.0 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.34a : ENSURE FAIR AND ORDERLY MKT (PI) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
LAW 
INFORMAL GUIDELINES 
RULES 
PRACTICE RULES 
1 
2 
3 
5 
TOTAL 
18 
3 
14 
1 
1 
37 
48.6 
8.1 
37.8 
2.7 
2.7 
100.0 
Table 5.34b : ENSURE FAIR AND ORDERLY MKT (SB) 
50.0 
8.3 
38.9 
2.8 
MISSING 
100.0 
50.0 
58.3 
97.2 
100.0 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
LAW 
INFORMAL GUIDELINES 
RULES 
INFORMAL CODES 
OTHERS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
TOTAL 
5 
4 
9 
1 
1 
3 
23 
21.7 
17.4 
39.1 
4.3 
4.3 
13.0 
100.0 
25.0 
20.0 
45.0 
. 5.0 
5.0 
MISSING 
100.0 
25.0 
45.0 
90.0 
95.0 
100.0 
Table 5.34c : ENSURE FAIR AND ORDERLY MKT (PRO) 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
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LAW 1 4 57.1 66.7 66.7 
RULES 3 1 14.3 16.7 83.3 
INFORMAL CODES 4 1 14.3 16.7 100.0 
'1 14.3 MISSING 
------- ------- -------
TOTAL 7 100.0 100.0 
.. 
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ATTACHMENT C 
" 
RATS version 3.11. 08/01/90 L' ') 
copyright (c) 1986-90 by VAR Econometrics 
Portions (c) 1988-90 by Doan Associates 
open data k03.dat 
allocate 0 22 
data(org=obs,length = 255) 1 22 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 
q11 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17 q18 q19 q20 q21 q22 q23 q24 
q26 q27 q28 q29 q30 q31 q32 q33 q34 q35 
set dvar 1 21 = q8(T»=4 
print .1 22 dvar q7 q9 q10 
ERROR ·-DATA 22 SERIES DVAR ( 36) 
**WARNING 7 Using Possibly Undefined Entry of Series. 
ENTRY DVAR 36 Q7 7 
1 1. 00000 4.00000 
2 .000000 1. 00000 
3 .000000 2.00000 
4 1. 00000 1. 00000 
5 .000000 2.00000 
6 .000000 1. 00000 
7 .000000 2.00000 
8 .000000 2.00000 
9 .000000 2.00000 
10 .000000 2.00000 
11 .000000 4.00000 
12 .000000 3.00000 
13 1. 00000 4.00000 
14 .000000 1. 00000 
15 .000000 3.00000 
16 1. 00000 4.00000 
17 .000000 3.00000 
18 1. 00000 4.00000 
19 .000000 3.00000 
20 .000000 1.00000 
21 .000000 2.00000 
22 NA 3.00000 
* 19t dvar 1 21 
# constant q7 q9 q10 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 7 
36 DVAR DEPENDENT VARIABLE' 
OBSERVATIONS 21 CASES CORRECT 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -6.7342522 AVG. 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT 
1 
Q9 
2.00000 
1.00000 
2.00000 
5.00000 
2.00000 
1. 00000 
2.00000 
3.00000 
1. 00000 
2.00000 
5.00000 
3.00000 
2.00000 
2.00000 
2.00000 
2.00000 
4.00000 
2.00000 
2.00000 
1.00000 
2.00000 
1. 95230 
18 
LIKELIHOOD 
STAND. ERROR 
q9 q10 $ 
q25 $ 
Ignore if set 
9 Q10 .. 
2.0000 
2~0000 
3.0000 
2.0000 
2.0000 
5.0000 
4.0000 
2.0000 
1. 0000 
2.0000 
5.0000 
4.0000 
2.0000 
4.0000 
2.0000 
3.0000 
2.0000 
2.0000 
2.0000 
3.0000 
2.0000 
2.1428 
.72565639 
T-STATISTI 
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*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -5.181759 3.227067 
2 , Q7 7 0 1. 984527 .9793879 
,3 ,Q9 9 0 1.121543 .8666253 
4 Q10 10 0 -1. 904027 1.192503 
smpl 22 22 
prj predict 22 22 
set predict = exp(predict(t»/(l+exp(predict(t») 
print / predict . 
. ", 
ENTRY 
22 
* prb dvar 1 21 
PREDICT 37 
.246282 
# constant q7 q9 q10 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 7 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 21 CASES CORRECT 
"'J-
LOG LIKELIHOOD -6.6700855 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
1 
., 
18 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* 
1 CONSTANT 
2 Q7 
3 Q9 
4 Q10 
smpl 22 22 
prj(cdf=predict) 
print / predict 
*** *** 
0 0 
7 0 
9 0 
10 0 
ENTRY 
22 
PREDICT 37 
.246282 
************ 
-3.085155 
1.178247 
.6717767 
-1.139177 
set dvar 1 21 = q11(T»=4 
print .1 22 dvar q12 q15 q16 
************ 
1.868588 
.5517158 
.44577 48 
.6667401 
ERROR DATA 22' SERIES DVAR ( 36) 
*********** 
-1. 605718 
2.026293 
1. 294150 
-1. 596665 
~ 
.72787706 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-1.651062 
2.135605 
1. 506987 
-1. 708578 
**WARNIN~7 Using Possibly Undefined Entry of Series. Ignore if set 
2 
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ENTRY DVAR 36 Q12 12 Q15 15 Q16 
1 .000000 2.00000 3.00000 3.0000 
'2 
.000000 2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
3 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 3.0000 I 
4 1. 00000 5.00000 5.00000 3.0000 
5 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
6 .000000 5.00000 2.00000 1. 0000 I 7 .000000 1. 00000 5.00000 3.0000 
8 .000000 3.00000 1.00000 4.0000 
9 1. 00000 2.00000 1.00000 1. 0000 
10 .000000 4.00000 4.00000 , 3.0000 
11 1. 00000 2.00000 3.00000 1- 7 3.0000 
12 .000000 4.00000 4.00000 3.0000 
13 1. 00000 1. 00000 3.00000 4.0000 
14 .000000 4.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
15 1. 00000 3.00000 3.00000 1. 0000 
16 1. 00000 2.00000 3.00000 4.0000 
17 .000000 4.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
18 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
19 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
20 1. 00000 2.00000 4.00000 2.0000 
21 .000000 3.00000 4.00000 3.0000 
22 NA 2.23800 2.71420 2.5714 
* 19t dvar 1 21 
# constant q12 q15 q16 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 5 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 21 CASES CORRECT 14 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-12.081135 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 .1371773 2.120261 
2 Q12 12 0 -.5579688 .4703685 
3 Q15 15 0 .5462734 .5071797 
4 Q16 16 0 -.3450373 .6180775 
smpl 22 22 
prj predict 22 22 
set predict = exp(predict(t»/(1+exp(predict(t») 
print / predict 
ENTRY i' 
22 
PREDICT 37 
.373767 
3 
.56254050 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
.6469831E-01 
-1.186238 
1. 077081 
-.5582427 
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* prb dvar 1 21 
# constant q12 q15 q16 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 5 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 21 CASES CORRECT 14 
LOG LlKELIHOOD -12.037268 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
NO. "-'LABEL VAR LAG 
*** ******* *** *** 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 
2 Q12 12 0 
3 Q15 15 0 
4 Q16 16 0 
smpl 22 22 
prj(cdf=predict) 
print / predict 
ENTRY 
22 
set dvar 1 
print 1 22 
ERROR DATA 
PREDICT 37 
.373767 
21 = q24(T»=4 
dvar q27 q29 
22 SERIES 
COEFFICIENT . STAND. ERROR 
************ ************ 
.5694921E-01 1. 238637 
-.3365026 .2662535 
.3322897 .2840749 
-.2111065 .3639192 
DVAR ( 36) 
**WARNING 7 Using Possibly Undefined Entry of Series. 
.56371682 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
.4597733E-01 
-1. 263843 
1.169725 
-.5800916 
Ignore if set 
ENTRY DVAR 36 Q27 27 Q29 29 
1 .000000 4.00000 5.00000 
2 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 
3 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 
4 1. 00000 5.00000 4.00000 
5 1. 00000 3.00000 1. 00000 
6 .000000 2.00000 3.00000 
7 1. 00000 3.00000 3.00000 
8 1. 00000 5.00000 5.00000 
9 1. 00000 4.00000 5.00000 
10 1. 00000 3.00000 3.00000 
11 .000000 2.00000 5.00000 
12 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
13 1. obooO 5.00000 5.00000 
14 1. 00000 4.00000 4.00000 
15 1. 00000 3.00000 3.00000 
16 .000000 4.00000 4.00000 
4 
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* 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
19t dvar 1 21 
1. 00000 
.000000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
1. 00000 
NA 
# constant q27 q29 
2.00000 
2.00000 
2.00000 
5.00000 
3.00000 
3.42850 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 6 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
2.00000 
5.00000 
2.00000 
5.00000 
3.00000 
3.57140 
OBSERVATIONS 21 CASES CORRECT 16 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -10.334857 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -2.898953 2.007880 
2 Q27 27 0 1. 959073 .9987888 
3 Q29 29 0 -.9153415 .7717743 
smpl 22 22 
prj predict 22 22 
set predict = exp(predict(t))/(l+exp(predict(t))) 
print / predict 
ENTRY 
22 
* prb dvar 1 21 
PREDICT 37 
.633829 
# constant q27 q29 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 6 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 . DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 21 CASES CORRECT 16 
.61131920 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-1. 443788 
1.961449 
-1.186022 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -10.243120 AVG. LIKELIHOOD .61399552 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERRORT-STATISTI 
*** ******* *'** " 1 CONSTANT 0 
2 Q27 27 
3 Q29 29 
*** ************ 
0 -1. 805020 
0 1.192732 
0 -.5476381 
5 
************ 
1.187480 
.5661915 
.4376282 
*********** 
-1.520042 
2.106587 
-1.251378 
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smpl 22,22 
prj(cdf=predict) 
print / predict 
ENTRY 
end 
22 
PREDICT 37 
.633829 
NORMAL COMPLETION OF JOB 
HALT AT 0 
o ERRORS 
6 
3 WARNINGS 
.234 
ATTACHMENT D 
/ 
RATS Version 3.11. 08/01/90 
copyright (c) 1986-90 by VAR Econometrics '"' -
Portions (c) 1988-90 by Doan Associates 
open data ko1.dat 
allocate 0 :J7 
data (org=obs, length=255) 1 37 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 ql0 $ 
ql1 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17 q18 q19 q20 q21 q22 q23 q24 q25 $ 
q26 q27 q28 q29 q30 q31 q32 q33 q34 q35 
set dvar 1 36 = q8(T»=4 
print 1 37 dvar q7 q9 q10 
ERROR DATA 37 SERIES DVAR ( 36) 
**WARNING 7 Using Possibly Undefined Entry of Series. Ignore if set 
ENTRY DVAR 36 Q7 7 Q9 9 Q10 
1 1. 00000 2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2 .000000 5.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
3 1. 00000 4;00000 2.00000 4.0000 
4 .000000 2.00000 1. 00000 2.0000 
5 .000000 4.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
6 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
7 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
8 1. 00000 4.00000 1. 00000 1. 0000 
9 .000000 4.00000 1. 00000 2.0000 
10 1.00000 4.00000 1. 00000 1. 0000 
11 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
12 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 1. 0000 
13 1. 00000 1. 00000 3.00000 4.0000 
14 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
15 1. 00000 2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
16 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 1. 0000 
17 .000000 1. 00000 1. 00000 4.0000 
18 .000000 4.00000 1.00000 2.0000 
19 1. 00000 2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
20 .000000 4.00000 4.00000 3.0000 
21 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
22 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 1. 0000 
23 .000000 5.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
24 .000000 2.00000 1. 00000 3.0000 
25 1.00000 4.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
26 1. 00000 3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
27 1. 00000 3.00000 1. 00000 2.0000 
28 .000000 5.00000 4.00000 2.0000 
29 .000000 3.00000 1. 00000 2.0000 
30 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
31 .000000 2.00000 1. 00000 2.0000 
32 1. 00000 3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
33 .000000 2.00000 4.00000 2.0000 
34 .000000 1.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
35 .oobooo 1. 00000 2.00000 2.0000 
36 1.00000 4.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
37 NA 2.91660 1.97220 2.1666 
1 
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* 19t dval:" 1 36 
# constant q7 q9 ql0 
CONVERGENCE. REACHED ON ITERATION 4 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 36 CASES CORRECT 24 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -22.394671 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
NO. 0'_, LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT . STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -1. 034022 1. 638391 
2 Q7 7 0 .1437543 .3187033 
3 Q9 9 0 -.3722597 .4592762 
4 Ql0 10 0 .2921455 .4716324 
smpl 37 37 
prj predict 37 37 
set predict = exp(predict(t»/(l+exp(predict(t») 
print / predict 
ENTRY 
37 
* prb dvar 1 36 
PREDICT 37 
.328284 
# constant q7 q9 ql0 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 4 
36 DVAR DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
OBSERVATIONS 36 CASES CORRECT 24 
LIKELIHOOD 
STAND. ERROR 
************ 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -22.365458 AVG. 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT 
*** 
1 
2 
3 
4 
******* *** 
CONSTANT 0 
Q7 7 
Q9 9 
Ql0 10 
smpl 37 37 
prj(cdf=predict) 
*** ************ 
o -.6307433 
o .8671535E-Ol 
o -.2428917 
o .1896657 
2 
1. 016149 
.1962759 
.2869000 
.2889298 
.53682979 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-.6311206 
.4510601 
-._8105356 
.6194348 
.53726559 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-.6207191 
.4418033 
-.8466076 
.6564422 
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print / predict 
ENTRY 
37 
set dvar 1 
print 1 37 
ERROR DATA 
**WARNING 
.. -
ENTRY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
I' 
PREDICT 37 
.328284 
36 == q11(T»=4 
dvar q12 q15 q16 
37 SERIES 
7 Using Possibly 
DVAR 36 
.000000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
.000000 
.000000 
.000000 
1.00000 
1. 00000 
1. 00000 
1.00000 
.000000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
.000000 
1.00000 
.000000 
.000000 
.000000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
.000000 
.000000 
1.00000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
1. 00000 
• 000000 
.000000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
.000000 
.000000 
.000000 
1. 00000 
NA' 
DVAR ( 36) 
Undefined Entry of Series. Ignore if set 
Q12 12 Q15 15 Q16 
2.00000 4.00000 4.0000 
2.00000 5.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 3.00000 1. 0000 
2.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
2.00000 1. 00000 1.0000 
3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 3.00000 4.0000 
2.00000 4.00000 2.0000 
3.00000 4.00000 4.0000 
1.00000 2.00000 4.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 5.00000 5.0000 
3.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 3.00000 3.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
4.00000 2.00000 4.0000 
3.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 1. 00000 3.0000 
1. 00000 2.00000 4.0000 
4.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 4.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 4.0000 
2.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
5.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
3.00000 . 1. 00000 2.0000 
1.00000 2.00000 2.0000 
3.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
2.00000 3.00000 2.0000 
3.00000 4.00000 1. 0000 
2.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 3.0000 
2.00000 2.00000 4.0000 
2.30550 2.52770 2.6944 
3 
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* 19t dvar 1 36 
# constant gl2 gl5 gl6 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 4 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 36 CASES CORRECT 23 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -23.241770 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -2.353019 1. 730248 
2 Q12 12 0 .2076240 .4361860 
3 Q15 15 0 .1371903 .3613131 
4 Q16 16 0 .3924534 .3559603 
smpl 37 37 
prj predict 37 37 
set predict = exp(predict(t))/(1+exp(predict(t))) 
print / predict 
ENTRY 
37 
* prb dvar 1 36 
PREDICT 37 
.384583 
# constant g12 g15 g16 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 4 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 36 CASES CORRECT 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -23.238342 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
23 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* 
1 CONSTANT 
2 Q12 
3 Q15 
4 Q16 
smpl 37 37 
prj(cdf=predict) 
print / predict 
*** 
0 
12 
15 
16 
*** ************ ************ 
0 -1. 462399 1.061940 
0 .1264333 .2719961 
0 .8860896E-01 .2264973 
0 .2436751 .2205096 
4 
.52434536 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-1. 359932 
.4759989 
.3796992 
1.102520 
.52439529 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-1. 377101 
.4648349 
.3912143 
1.105054 . 
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ENTRY PREDICT 37 
37 .384583 n 
",;j 
set dvar 1 36 = q24(T»=4 
print 1 37 dvar q27 q29 
ERROR DATA 37 SERIES DVAR ( 36) 
**WARNING 7 Using Possibly Undefined Entry of Series. Ignore if set 
.. 
ENTRy DVAR 36 Q27 27 Q29 29 
.. 
'1 1. 00000 4.00000 4.00000 
2 1.00000 5.00000 5.00000 
3 1. 00000 3.00000 4.00000 
4 .000000 2.00000 4.00000 
5 1. 00000 4.00000 4.00000 
6 .000000 1.00000 2.00000 
7 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 
8 1. 00000 4.00000 3.00000 
9 1. 00000 3.00000 4.00000 
10 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
11 .000000 3.00000 4.00000 
12 1. 00000 4.00000 5.00000 
13 1. 00000 5.00000 5.00000 
14 1.00000 4.00000 3.00000 
15 1. 00000 4.00000 4.00000 
16 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
17 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
18 1.00000 4.00000 4.00000 
19 1. 00000 4.00000 2.00000 
20 .000000 4.00000 4.00000 
21 1. 00000 3.00000 3.00000 
22 1. 00000 4.00000 1. 00000 
23 1. 00000 4.00000 5.00000 
24 1. 00000 4.00000 4.00000 
25 1. 00000 4.00000 4.00000 
26 1. 00000 2.00000 5.00000 
27 .000000 2.00000 3.00000 
28 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
29 .000000 3.00000 4.00000 
30 .000000 3.00000 1.00000 
31 1. 00000 3.00000 4.00000 
32 .000000 2.00000 2.00000 
33 .000000 3.00000 2.00000 
34 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
35 .000000 3.00000 3.00000 
36 1. 00000 5.00000 5.00000 
37 NA 3.33330 3.44440 
~\ 
* 
19t dvar 1 36 
5 
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# constant q27 q29 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 7 
36 DVAR DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
OBSERVATIONS 36 CASES CORRECT 30 
LIKELIHOOD 
STAND. ERROR 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -13.497900 AVG. 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT 
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -11. 43250 4.060289 
2 Q27 27 0 2.541667 .9399845 
3 Q29 29 0 1. 015328 .5510966 
, 
smpl 37 37 
prj predict 37 37 
set predict = exp(predict(t))/(1+exp(predict(t))) 
print / predict 
ENTRY 
37 
* prb dvar 1 36 
PREDICT 37 
.631074 
# constant q27 q29 
CONVERGENCE REACHED ON ITERATION 6 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 36 DVAR 
OBSERVATIONS 36 CASES CORRECT 30 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -13.539090 AVG. LIKELIHOOD 
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************ 
.68732938 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
-2.815688 
2.703946 
1.842377 
.68654341 
T-STATISTI 
*********** 
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -6.440337 2.050409 . -3.141001 
2 Q27 
3 Q29 
smpl 37 37 
prj(cdf=predict) 
print / predict 
27 0 
29 0 
ENTRY i' 
37 
PREDICT 37 
.631074 
1. 418655 .4684072 3·.028679 
.5748208 .2977749 1.930387 
6 
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end 
NORMAL COMPLETION OF JOB 
HALT AT 0 
o ERRORS 3 WARNINGS 
7 
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ATTACHMENT E 
RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS FOR PRIVATE INVESTORS 
QUESTION CHI-SQ DEGREE OF SIGNIF NULL 
SECTION 1 
Q1. 
Q2. 
Q3. 
Q4. 
Q5. 
Q6. 
invest in sec mkt 
how long in HK mkt 
for whom invest in mkt 
frequency in HK mkt 
amt HK sec control 
reason invest in HK 
SECTION 2 
Q7. 
Q8. 
Q9. 
Q10. 
law protection 
authority enforce law 
SRB to protect 
rules back by law 
SECTION 3 
Q11. exchange protection 
Q12. closer EX. monitor 
Q13. broker insurance 
Q14. new listing 
Q15. new share offer price 
Q16. check new listings 
Q17. close of exchange 
SECTION 4 
Q18. 
Q19. 
Q20. 
Q21. 
Q22. 
broker supply info 
training of broker etc 
broker finance 
dishonest practices 
curb dishonest pract. 
LISTED COMPANIES 
Q23. company disclosures 
Q24. prompt disclosures 
Q25. more disclosures 
Q26. 5% disclosure 
Q27. director's duty 
Q28. approve tran. 
Q29. takeovers 
SECURITIES DEALINGS 
Q30. marg~n trading 
Q31. short selling 
, 
Q32. brokerage fees etc 
Q33. cost paid by invts. 
Q34. ensure fair mkt 
27.556 
5.167 
9.000 
7.778 
25.556 
46.943 
6.5 
26.222 
21. 556 
31.117 
7.556 
46.222 
21. 556 
8.222 
27.714 
19.000 
21. 222 
14.529 
5.714 
15.143 
.714 
37.114 
12.857 
20.286 
5.886 
15.171 
18.286 
16.086 
10.000 
12.857 
11.500 
18.167 
20.944 
22.889 
1 
FREEDOM HYPO 
3 
2 
1 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
3 
4 
4 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
.000 
.. 076 
.003 
.051 
.000 
.000 
.165 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.056 
.000 
.000 
.042 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.006 
.222 
.004 
.398 
.000 
.012 
.000 
.053 
.002 
.001 
.001 
.040 
.012 
.021 
.001 
.000 
.000 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
accept 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
accept 
reject 
accept 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
reject 
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ATTACHMENT F 
RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS FOR STOCK BROKERS 
QUESTION CHI-SQ DEGREE OF SIGNIF NULL 
FREEDOM HYPOTH 
SECTION 1 
Q1. invest in sec mkt 15.783 3 .001 reject 
Q2. how long in HK mkt 14.000 2 .001 reject 
Q3. for whom invest in mkt 5.429 2 .066 reject 
Q4. f:t:equency in HK mkt 5.857 3 .119 accept 
Q5. amt HK sec control 2.810 3 .422 accept 
Q6. reason invest in HK 11.105 3 .011 reject 
SECTION 2 
Q7. law protection .905 3 .824 acc-ept 
Q8. authority enforce law 4.476 4 .345 accept 
Q9. SRB to protect 19.238 4 .001 reject 
Q10. rules back by law 20.500 4 .000 reject 
SECTION 3 
Q11. exchange protection 11.143 4 .025 reject 
Q12. closer Ex. monitor 5.905 4 .206 accept 
Q13. broker insurance 3.524 4 .474 accept 
Q14. new listing .667 4 .955 accept 
Q15. new share offer price 5.905 4 .206 accept 
Q16. check new listings 4.714 3 .194 accept 
Q17. close of exchange .905 3 .824 accept 
SECTION 4 
Q18. broker supply info 11.143 4 .025 reject 
Q19. training of broker etc 6.238 3 .101 accept 
Q20. broker finance 16.143 3 .001 reject 
Q21. dishonest practices .429 1 .513 accept 
Q22. curb dishonest pract. 19.200 3 .000 reject 
LISTED COMPANIES 
Q23. company disclosures 2.810 3 .422 acc.ept 
Q24. prompt disclosures 8.286 4 .082 reject 
Q25. more disclosures 4.571 2 .102 accept 
Q26. 5% disclosure .524 3 .914 accept 
Q27. director's duty 1.286 3 .733 accept 
Q28. approve tran. 7.810 4 .099 reject 
Q29. takeovers 5.429 4 .246 accept 
SECURITIES DEALINGS 
Q30. margin trading' 19.238 4 .001 reject 
Q31. short selling 10.667 4 .031 reject 
Q32. brokerage fees etc 8.286 4 .082 reject 
Q33. cost paid by invts. 5.905 4 .206 accept 
Q34. ensure fair mkt 11. 000 4 .027 reject 
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ATTACHMENT G 
RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS FOR FUND MANAGERS 
QUESTION CHI-SQ DEGREE OF SIGNIF NULL 
FREEDOM HYPOTH 
SECTION 1 
Q1. invest in sec mkt nja nja nja 
Q2. how long in HK mkt 2.000 2 .368 accept 
Q3. for whom invest in mkt .667 1 .414 accept 
Q4. frequency in HK mkt .200 1 .655 accept 
Q5. amt HK sec control 4.571 2 .102 accept 
Q6. reason invest in HK .000 1 1. 000 accept 
SECTION 2 
Q7. law protection 3.857 3 .277 accept 
Q8. authority enforce law .429 3 .934 accept 
Q9. SRB to protect 1.286 1 .257 accept 
Q10. rules back by law .429 3 .934 accept 
SECTION 3 
Q11. exchange protection .286 2 .867 accept 
Q12. closer Ex. monitor 3.857 3 .277 accept 
Q13. broker insurance 1.286 1 .857 accept 
Q14. new listing 1.143 2 .565 accept 
Q15. new share offer price 1.571 3 .666 accept 
Q16. check new listings .143 1 .705 accept 
Q17. close of exchange .143 1 .705 accept 
SECTION 4 
Q18. broker supply info .286 2 .867 accept 
Q19. training of broker etc 2.000 2 .368 accept 
Q20. broker finance .143 1 .705 accept 
Q21. dishonest practices 2.667 1 .102 accept 
Q22. curb dishonest pract. 3.571 1 .059 reject 
LISTED COMPANIES 
Q23. company disclosures 1.286 1 .257 accept 
Q24. prompt disclosures 1.286 1 .257 accept 
Q25. more disclosures 2.000 2 .368 accept 
Q26. 5% disclosure 1.571 3 .666 accept 
Q27. director's duty 1.143 2 .565 accept 
Q28. approve tran. 2.000 2 .368 accept 
Q29. takeovers 2.000 2 .368 accept 
SECURITIES DEALINGS 
, 
Q30. margtn trading 4.571 2 .102 accept 
Q31. shor selling 1.143 2 .565 accept 
Q32. brokerage fees etc 2.286 4 .683 accept 
Q33. cost paid by invts. 1.571 3 .666 accept 
Q34. ensure fair mkt 3.000 2 .223 accept 
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'fue Manager 
Securities Cepartment 
date 9 T)=cemher 1989 
Dear SirjMadam, 
our ref. your ref. 
~ Hong Kong 
tttJ Polytechnic 
( 
/1 \ 
er' ~ 
Hong Kong Polytechnic 
i!'", ill I!illil' iJ'iill'L mr Sl 
Hung Horn, Kow!oon 
Hong Kong 
Telephone 766 5111 
Cable Poly1eched 
Telex 38964 Polyx Hx , 
Fax (852) 764 3374 
Director 
Professor John L. Clark, JP 
'Ibe Cepartment of Business Studies of Hon; KDn; Polytechnic is new 
corrluctin; a survey' on the OOrovemerrt: of the securities infustty and the 
protection of securities investors of How KDw. Q,lestionnaires about these 
topics are l::eing sent to leacli.rY:r IIEllbers of society to fin:1 out their views on 
these issues. F~ from this survey will be sent to interested parties, 
includin:J the various professional associations and goverrnrent or quaSi 
goverrnrental agencies, for their consideration. It is a ~ exercise 
and it will not be fruitful unless IIEllbers of the public assist us. 
A questionnaire is enolosed. We hope you will spare a few minutes of 
y= t:ilre to answer the questions. It is an anonynous survey so ,there is no 
need to disclose y= identity. HO'n'ever, if you wish to receive a stIImlIi3IY of 
the f~ of this survey, please return this questionnaire with y= callin; 
card. Should you have any quay please do not hesitate to cali Ire. My 
telet:hone I1UII'ber is K-638344 extension 626. 
315412 
--
'Ihank you for your help in advance • 
. With seasonal Greetin;s, 
. . 
-
Yours sincerely; 
S~ H. KO ' 
Senior Lecturer 
Department of Business' studies 
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